commit 268d01ada5f4a11c5d8e63215288eb593dbfb9ed
Author: David Goulet <dgou...@torproject.org>
Date: Fri Jul 10 10:03:06 2020 -0400
Rename blacklist and whitelist wording
Closes #40033
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgou...@torproject.org>
---
src/app/config/fallback_dirs.inc | 6 +++---
src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
src/core/or/connection_or.c | 2 +-
src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 4 ++--
src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c | 4 ++--
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 2 +-
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c | 2 +-
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h | 2 +-
src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c | 4 ++--
src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c | 2 +-
10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/app/config/fallback_dirs.inc b/src/app/config/fallback_dirs.inc
index 793f65ce88..ba7e848715 100644
--- a/src/app/config/fallback_dirs.inc
+++ b/src/app/config/fallback_dirs.inc
@@ -3,10 +3,10 @@
/* timestamp=20190625114911 */
/* timestamp0=20190625114911 */
/* timestamp1=20190628085927 */
-/* source=whitelist */
+/* source=allowlist */
/* ===== */
-/* 0: Whitelist excluded 1550 of 1711 candidates. */
-/* 1: Whitelist excluded 1601 of 1765 candidates. */
+/* 0: Allowlist excluded 1550 of 1711 candidates. */
+/* 1: Allowlist excluded 1601 of 1765 candidates. */
/* Checked IPv4 DirPorts served a consensus within 15.0s. */
/*
0:
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
index cef70e3e76..db8c5b3113 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
{
const node_t *middle_node = NULL;
- smartlist_t *whitelisted_live_middles = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_t *allowlisted_live_middles = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *all_live_nodes = smartlist_new();
tor_assert(pick_from);
@@ -1779,21 +1779,21 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
/* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */
router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes, flags);
- /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* whitelisted middles
- * to the list whitelisted_live_middles. */
+ /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* allowlisted middles
+ * to the list allowlisted_live_middles. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_live_nodes, node_t *, live_node) {
if (routerset_contains_node(pick_from, live_node)) {
- smartlist_add(whitelisted_live_middles, live_node);
+ smartlist_add(allowlisted_live_middles, live_node);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(live_node);
/* Honor ExcludeNodes */
if (exclude_set) {
- routerset_subtract_nodes(whitelisted_live_middles, exclude_set);
+ routerset_subtract_nodes(allowlisted_live_middles, exclude_set);
}
if (exclude_list) {
- smartlist_subtract(whitelisted_live_middles, exclude_list);
+ smartlist_subtract(allowlisted_live_middles, exclude_list);
}
/**
@@ -1809,9 +1809,9 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
* If there are a lot of nodes in here, assume they did not load balance
* and do it for them, but also warn them that they may be Doing It Wrong.
*/
- if (smartlist_len(whitelisted_live_middles) <=
+ if (smartlist_len(allowlisted_live_middles) <=
MAX_SANE_RESTRICTED_NODES) {
- middle_node = smartlist_choose(whitelisted_live_middles);
+ middle_node = smartlist_choose(allowlisted_live_middles);
} else {
static ratelim_t pinned_notice_limit = RATELIM_INIT(24*3600);
log_fn_ratelim(&pinned_notice_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC,
@@ -1819,17 +1819,17 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
"in %d total nodes. This is a lot of nodes. "
"You may want to consider using a Tor controller "
"to select and update a smaller set of nodes instead.",
- position_hint, smartlist_len(whitelisted_live_middles));
+ position_hint, smartlist_len(allowlisted_live_middles));
/* NO_WEIGHTING here just means don't take node flags into account
* (ie: use consensus measurement only). This is done so that
* we don't further surprise the user by not using Exits that they
* specified at all */
- middle_node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(whitelisted_live_middles,
+ middle_node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(allowlisted_live_middles,
NO_WEIGHTING);
}
- smartlist_free(whitelisted_live_middles);
+ smartlist_free(allowlisted_live_middles);
smartlist_free(all_live_nodes);
return middle_node;
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
index b88d1b6afb..8865f7246c 100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ static time_t or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts = 0;
* port.
*
* We need to identify a connection failure with these three values because we
- * want to avoid to wrongfully blacklist a relay if someone is trying to
+ * want to avoid to wrongfully block a relay if someone is trying to
* extend to a known identity digest but with the wrong IP/port. For instance,
* it can happen if a relay changed its port but the client still has an old
* descriptor with the old port. We want to stop connecting to that
diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
index 6e8259142d..9b20684bf7 100644
--- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
@@ -1576,12 +1576,12 @@ guard_create_exit_restriction(const uint8_t *exit_id)
}
/** If we have fewer than this many possible usable guards, don't set
- * MD-availability-based restrictions: we might blacklist all of them. */
+ * MD-availability-based restrictions: we might denylist all of them. */
#define MIN_GUARDS_FOR_MD_RESTRICTION 10
/** Return true if we should set md dirserver restrictions. We might not want
* to set those if our guard options are too restricted, since we don't want
- * to blacklist all of them. */
+ * to denylist all of them. */
static int
should_set_md_dirserver_restriction(void)
{
diff --git a/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c b/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c
index ac9325a608..f89c1b91cf 100644
--- a/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c
+++ b/src/feature/dirparse/ns_parse.c
@@ -1354,8 +1354,8 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s,
goto err;
}
if (ns->type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) {
- if (authority_cert_is_blacklisted(ns->cert)) {
- log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting vote signature made with blacklisted "
+ if (authority_cert_is_denylisted(ns->cert)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting vote signature made with denylisted "
"signing key %s",
hex_str(ns->cert->signing_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
goto err;
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index 995c1ca78b..b56b7f4368 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@ -3904,7 +3904,7 @@ hs_service_exports_circuit_id(const ed25519_public_key_t
*pk)
/** Add to file_list every filename used by a configured hidden service, and to
* dir_list every directory path used by a configured hidden service. This is
- * used by the sandbox subsystem to whitelist those. */
+ * used by the sandbox subsystem to allowlist those. */
void
hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,
smartlist_t *dir_list)
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
index 97e44d53e3..8ca22f818e 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ static const char *BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[] = {
* which, because of the old openssl heartbleed vulnerability, should
* never be trusted. */
int
-authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert)
+authority_cert_is_denylisted(const authority_cert_t *cert)
{
char hex_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
int i;
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h
index 33065589ba..4c3d79ceed 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void authority_cert_dl_failed(const char *id_digest,
void authority_certs_fetch_missing(networkstatus_t *status, time_t now,
const char *dir_hint);
int authority_cert_dl_looks_uncertain(const char *id_digest);
-int authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert);
+int authority_cert_is_denylisted(const authority_cert_t *cert);
void authority_cert_free_(authority_cert_t *cert);
#define authority_cert_free(cert) \
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
index f63d598ef7..dfff1f704b 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c
@@ -471,8 +471,8 @@ networkstatus_check_document_signature(const
networkstatus_t *consensus,
DIGEST_LEN))
return -1;
- if (authority_cert_is_blacklisted(cert)) {
- /* We implement blacklisting for authority signing keys by treating
+ if (authority_cert_is_denylisted(cert)) {
+ /* We implement denylisting for authority signing keys by treating
* all their signatures as always bad. That way we don't get into
* crazy loops of dropping and re-fetching signatures. */
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ignoring a consensus signature made with deprecated"
diff --git a/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c b/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
index 2b4181e7f8..820e4fd1a5 100644
--- a/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ sb_epoll_ctl(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
*
* NOTE: if multiple filters need to be added, the PR_SECCOMP parameter needs
- * to be whitelisted in this function.
+ * to be allowlisted in this function.
*/
static int
sb_prctl(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
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