commit 7e807c15aee409b68930a616d0e37b10a6f6f147 Author: David Goulet <dgou...@torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 31 09:39:34 2017 -0500
prop224: Fix tabs issue Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgou...@torproject.org> --- proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt index 4a685e5..6f71b32 100644 --- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt +++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt @@ -2137,80 +2137,80 @@ Appendix E. Managing authorized client data [CLIENT-AUTH-MGMT] E.1.1. Hidden Service side - A hidden service that wants to perform client authorization, adds a new - option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient to its torrc file: + A hidden service that wants to perform client authorization, adds a new + option HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient to its torrc file: - HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,... + HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,... - The only recognized auth-type value is "basic" which describes the scheme in - section [CLIENT-AUTH]. The rest of the line is a comma-separated list of - human-readable authorized client names. + The only recognized auth-type value is "basic" which describes the scheme in + section [CLIENT-AUTH]. The rest of the line is a comma-separated list of + human-readable authorized client names. - Let's consider that one of the listed client names is "alice". In this - case, Tor checks the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file for any entries - with client_name being "alice". If an "alice" entry is found, we use the - relevant pubkeys to authenticate Alice. + Let's consider that one of the listed client names is "alice". In this + case, Tor checks the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file for any entries + with client_name being "alice". If an "alice" entry is found, we use the + relevant pubkeys to authenticate Alice. - If no "alice" entry is found in the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file, Tor - is tasked with generating public/private keys for Alice. To do so, Tor - generates x25519 and ed25519 keypairs for Alice, then makes a - "client_authorized_privkeys/alice.privkey" file and writes the private - keys inside; it also adds an entry for alice to the - "client_authorized_pubkeys" file. + If no "alice" entry is found in the "client_authorized_pubkeys" file, Tor + is tasked with generating public/private keys for Alice. To do so, Tor + generates x25519 and ed25519 keypairs for Alice, then makes a + "client_authorized_privkeys/alice.privkey" file and writes the private + keys inside; it also adds an entry for alice to the + "client_authorized_pubkeys" file. - In this last case, the hidden service operator has the responsibility to - pass the .key file to Alice in a secure out-of-band way. After the file - is passed to Alice, it can be shredded from the filesystem, as only the - public keys are required for the hidden service to function. + In this last case, the hidden service operator has the responsibility to + pass the .key file to Alice in a secure out-of-band way. After the file + is passed to Alice, it can be shredded from the filesystem, as only the + public keys are required for the hidden service to function. E.1.2. Client side - A client who wants to register client authorization data for a hidden service - needs to add the following line to their torrc: + A client who wants to register client authorization data for a hidden service + needs to add the following line to their torrc: - HidServAuth onion-address x25519-private-key ed25519-private-key + HidServAuth onion-address x25519-private-key ed25519-private-key - The keys above are either generated by Alice using a key generation utility, - or they are extracted from a .key file provided by the hidden service. + The keys above are either generated by Alice using a key generation utility, + or they are extracted from a .key file provided by the hidden service. - In the former case, the client is also tasked with transfering the public - keys to the hidden service in a secure out-of-band way. + In the former case, the client is also tasked with transfering the public + keys to the hidden service in a secure out-of-band way. E.2. Configuring client authorization using the control port E.2.1. Service side - A hidden service also has the option to configure authorized clients - using the control port. The idea is that hidden service operators can use - controller utilities that manage their access control instead of using - the filesystem to register client keys. + A hidden service also has the option to configure authorized clients + using the control port. The idea is that hidden service operators can use + controller utilities that manage their access control instead of using + the filesystem to register client keys. - Specifically, we require a new control port command ADD_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH - which is able to register x25519/ed25519 public keys tied to a specific - authorized client. + Specifically, we require a new control port command ADD_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH + which is able to register x25519/ed25519 public keys tied to a specific + authorized client. [XXX figure out control port command format] - Hidden services who use the control port interface for client auth need - to perform their own key management. + Hidden services who use the control port interface for client auth need + to perform their own key management. E.2.2. Client side - There should also be a control port interface for clients to register - authorization data for hidden services without having to use the - torrc. It should allow both generation of client authorization private - keys, and also to import client authorization data provided by a hidden - service + There should also be a control port interface for clients to register + authorization data for hidden services without having to use the + torrc. It should allow both generation of client authorization private + keys, and also to import client authorization data provided by a hidden + service - This way, Tor Browser can present "Generate client auth keys" and "Import - client auth keys" dialogs to users when they try to visit a hidden service - that is protected by client authorization. + This way, Tor Browser can present "Generate client auth keys" and "Import + client auth keys" dialogs to users when they try to visit a hidden service + that is protected by client authorization. - Specifically, we require two new control port commands: - IMPORT_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA - GENERATE_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA - which import and generate client authorization data respectively. + Specifically, we require two new control port commands: + IMPORT_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA + GENERATE_ONION_CLIENT_AUTH_DATA + which import and generate client authorization data respectively. - [XXX how does key management work here?] - [XXX what happens when people use both the control port interface and the - filesystem interface?] + [XXX how does key management work here?] + [XXX what happens when people use both the control port interface and the + filesystem interface?] _______________________________________________ tor-commits mailing list tor-commits@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-commits