Nick Mathewson <[email protected]> writes: > Filename: 195-TLS-normalization-for-024.txt > Title: TLS certificate normalization for Tor 0.2.4.x > Author: Jacob Appelbaum, Gladys Shufflebottom, Nick Mathewson, Tim Wilde > Created: 6-Mar-2012 > Status: Draft > Target: 0.2.4.x > > <snip> > > 2. TLS handshake issues > > 2.1. Session ID. > > Currently we do not send an SSL session ID, as we do not support session > resumption. However, Apache (and likely other major SSL servers) do have > this support, and do send a 32 byte SSLv3/TLSv1 session ID in their Server > Hello cleartext. We should do the same to avoid an easy fingerprinting > opportunity. It may be necessary to lie to OpenSSL to claim that we are > tracking session IDs to cause it to generate them for us. > > (We should not actually support session resumption.) >
This is a nice idea, but it opens us to the obvious active attack of Them checking if a host *actually* supports session resumption or if it's faking it. What is the reason we don't like session resumption? Does it still makes sense to keep it disabled even after #4436 is implemented? _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
