Hi Leeroy, On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 08:09:13AM -0400, l.m wrote: > Hi, > > I'm curious what analysis has been done against a gateway adversary. > In particular dealing with the effectiveness of entry guards against > such an adversary. There's a part of me that thinks it doesn't work at > all for this case. Only because I've been studying such an adversary > at the AS-level and what I see over time is disturbing. Any pointer to > related material? >
You may find the following useful. http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/biblio/users-get-routed-traffic-correlation-tor-realistic-adversaries Analysis there is a now few years old, but this is the first attempt to try to fully consider the sort of question I think you are asking. This was one of the prompts for the move from three guards to one, as described in https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Dingledine.pdf There is subsequent related published work on measurement and analysis of AS and similar adversaries, e.g., http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.2015.issue-2/popets-2015-0021/popets-2015-0021.xml?format=INT Also subsequent work on managing assignment of guards in a practical and secure manner (although this paper pretty much assumes only relay adversaries). http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.2015.issue-2/popets-2015-0017/popets-2015-0017.xml?format=INT This also remains an active area, both for analysis and for AS-aware route selection. (I haven't put in any pointers to papers on the latter.) HTH, Paul _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev