> On 29 Sep 2015, at 09:39, Jeff Burdges <burd...@gnunet.org> wrote: > >> The issue I do see is that SPV validation doesn't work well unless >> you >> ask multiple peers to make sure that you're getting the chain with >> the >> most PoW. So I gather that this would require connecting to Namecoin >> peers running on multiple exit nodes. I don't think that's >> problematic, but it would have to be taken into account. > > This is no different from validation for existing DNS results. Tor > attempts to prevent this by building a list of bad exits, but it's > challenging to catch an exit that attacks only one website. > > You could check multiple peers but that costs you some anonymity. If > you use many .bit names, this might expose the fact that you use > Namecoin to your guard.
How do you anticipate this exposure happening? Via traffic correlation? As far as I understand, your guard only sees your encrypted traffic, and not your exit(s) or your DNS queries. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F
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