I understand that the original Tor model is to set low-latency and low-jitter as a constraint as to permit things like interactive web-browsing etc. And yes, I presume Tor will always have this as a constraint.
I am asking if: (1) There currently exists some way I can specify in my torrc to sacrifice some of these in exchange for a little greater anonymity protection (say I want to slowly leak a file, etc.) (2) If not, how difficult would be it to shoe-horn this into the current tor model? In short, if it's not too difficult, I can look into finding funding it. -V On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 1:37 PM, grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 3:03 AM, Virgil Griffith <i...@virgil.gr> wrote: >> I.e., if I want the extra resistance to traffic analysis that higher latency >> connections provide, is there a way to specify that in my Tor config? > > Higher latency, in and of itself, does not provide any resistance to > traffic analysis. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latency_(engineering) > > Higher global jitter might help, but circuit orientation at > guards and exits through to the clients seems to nullify that. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jitter > > For which an idea may to become packet switching, which > is really no longer Tor. > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_switching > > Link padding seems the next real step but I've not put enough > reading to it, only have idea to read about. Nor do I yet review about > Tor padding proposal as sufficient or not, sorry. > > As it is not the Tor original model design maybe some other > network will take this analysis / padding issue up before then. > I've no idea. > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > tor-dev@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev