Hi, there is a strict limit on the number of relays that one can run on a single IP address to make Sybil attacks harder, but there are no limits on sign-up rates.
Such sign-up rate limits would prevent many of the known and simple Sibyls of the past months and probably reduce the manual actions required by dir auth ops to mitigate them (but I've little inside on that part). In the past 8 months the proposed AS sign-up rate limit thresholds (see below) triggered on ~27 events [some-examples]. I consider all of them to be true-positives, but 15 (vs total: >750) likely unrelated relays signed up on the same ASes during these events. AS-level sign-up rate limit thresholds --------------------------------------- max new relays per 24 hours per AS per OS family: 9 (default); value for OVH/ONLINE/Digital Ocean ASes: 14 I deduced to these threshold values by watching the past 8 months of OrNetRadar emails while keeping false-positives at a minimum (at the price of more false-negatives). How does a well behaving operator (aka Brian) add more than 9 relays per AS per day? All relays in an effective family should be treated as "1 new relay". (In my opinion a reason to keep the family [0] functionality and implement prop242). denial of service risk To prevent trivial dos attacks where an attacker with a single IP generates several new relay fingerprints until the entire AS is blocked from adding new relays for a few hours these relays should come from distinct IP addresses. Pros: + automatically enforced + less manual action required by dir auth ops (maybe some dir auths can commend on that.) + address more (and smaller) Sibyls (I assume that many small Sibyls are currently ignored due to risk/effort trade-offs) Cons: - maxmind AS-IP mapping db becomes crucial and needs to be in sync across dir auths - false-positives - non-dir auths will not notice if an AS run into this limit unless they publish some kind of transparency reports - dir auths must keep more state (not sure if they know all existing FPs of the past already) Feasibility Initially the idea was to provide immediate feedback to the relay that tries to publish its descriptor to the dir auth via the HTTP response (an important point), but since descriptors are not uploaded to a single central dir auth that does not work I guess. So before thinking on how one would actually achieve that or something similar I wanted to gather the general opinion about something like this. single relay caps ------------------ 250000 consensus weight (to prevent [1]) family-level caps ------------------ max cw fraction: 2.5% [2] max. exit probability: 10% [3] guard probability: 5% [4] AS-level caps: --------------- max cw fraction/guard/exit probability: 15% [5] AS12876 (ONLINE SAS) and AS16276 (OVH) are already past that value, so if you do not want to change the game for them you would have to set it to ~20%. [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6676 [1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-December/039696.html https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17810#comment:8 [2] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ornetstats/stats/master/o/main_operators_by_cw.txt [3] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ornetstats/stats/master/o/main_exit_operators.txt [4] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ornetstats/stats/master/o/main_guard_operators.txt [5] https://compass.torproject.org [some-examples] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/1135 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/1132 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/1100 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/1030 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/939 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/943 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/898 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/856 http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.onion-routing.ornetradar/813
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