On Tue, Feb 04, 2020 at 04:15:23PM -0500, David Goulet wrote: > On 04 Feb (19:03:38), juanjo wrote: > [snip] > > And the reason for private nodes is probably because this way you eliminate > noise from other tor traffic so _anything_ connecting back to your ORPort is > related to the onion service connections you've done. You don't need to filter > out the circuits with some custom code (which is very easy to do anyway). > > That is unfortunately a problem that onion service have. These types of guard > discovery attacks exists and they are the primary reasons why we came up with > Vanguards couple years ago: > > https://blog.torproject.org/announcing-vanguards-add-onion-services >
Indeed. Just to underscore the point: we demonstrated those attacks in the wild and proposed versions of vanguards in the same work where we introduced guards in the first place, published way back in 2006. > But one thing for sure, simply forcing rendezvous points to be part of the > consensus will _not_ fix this problem as it is fairly easy to pull this type > of attack by simply using a normal relay within the consensus. > +1 aloha, Paul _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev