Good day,
We am making this request to our bellowed Tor Project developers and relay
operators to reconsider issue
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/2667. Tor over tor scenario
is not recommended by Tor project but We are forced to use such setup to hide
our operations from the powerful adversary which would in case we use bridge
between our two tor path most likely possible de-anonymize us and put our life
in dangerous.
Tor is making our work possible and helping collaborate without restrictions,
please let's reconsider this issue one more time. We are running number of
relay and we considered not applying latest update to help us at least work
with our own relay but adversary observes big part of network and will most
likely identify us when 70% of network start dropping tor over tor connections.
Tor over tor scenario does not amplify attack power within tor network, the
strength of any request is losing it's power right after first hop, but for
many people it provides necessary and much required privacy.
We do highly sensitive work in research journalism across the globe and only
way we found so far not be de-anonymized was tor over tor scenario, probably
for reason that two circuits are dynamic and it's very hard for adversary to
track that down properly due to nature of tor network. Understandable that you
most of time support regular Tor Browser usage and 3 hop circuits but believe
us there are situations where our scenario is really necessary.
We have collected donations of around 21000 USD in XMR so far(we know it's not
much), which we can either donate to Tor project to help fix this issue or
otherwise fund relay operators to run not-up-to-date relays just to help us
operate under this powerful adversary. The second is worse solution as it would
make network more vulnerable, or at least allow relay operators to enable or
disable that option and don't make it mandatory.
Privacy for the win!
Much love for Tor project and you relay operators
Best regards
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