On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 12:01:47PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote: > Both parties know that they used the same verification string; if > they did not, they do not learn what the verification string was. > (This feature is required for HS handshakes.)
I'm not sure the protocol you specify has this feature as written. For example, if the verification string has low entropy, the server could brute-force the client's verification string (using the MAC to check its guess). This is unlike, say, OTR's SMP or a PAKE, in which each online execution of the protocol allows the server just one guess. But perhaps you don't actually need the property in as strong a form as you wrote it, since the HS handshake application has high-entropy secrets? _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
