to list, not me. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mirimir <miri...@riseup.net> Date: Wed, May 14, 2014 at 11:58 PM Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: [tor-relays] Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators
On 05/14/2014 09:07 PM, grarpamp wrote: >> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Jeroen Massar <jer...@massar.ch> wrote: <SNIP> >> <user - ovpn - torcli> -- <exit torrelay or_ip - localhost - ovpn_ip> -- >> world > >> That "ovpn" part on the left is easily detected by any party in the >> middle doing > > No. Understand the diagram. It is not detectable by anyone > between torcli and torrelay, because that is just normal > tor. > >> Note that you are running IP over TCP over Tor (which is over TCP). > > Of course. Unless of course, as suggested before, some operators > choose the method of binding/routing their exit over an ip different > from their OR_IP, then it would just be native tor and native TCP. > >> The performance of that will be very bad. Tor network is already >> overloaded enough as it is. > > No it won't, I've tested it, it works just fine. The only issue is the > exit ip may change. So the exit operator is expected to block > access to ovpn_ip from anything other than their associated or_ip, > and the user is expected to config their client to use only the > associated exit per whatever 'world' usage session they have in > mind. It's not supposed to be point-click easy, only possible. That's a very cool idea :) Using $5/mo VPS, there could be a large pool of exit IPs for each Tor exit. <SNIP> ---------- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
