> On 8 Dec. 2016, at 01:18, myflyrybr <myflyrybr.re...@runbox.com> wrote: > > Trying to hide exit nodes would have little effect on censorship. I believe a > more effective approach would be just do the same the vpngate guys did to > beat the chinese firewall. Just mix in the published list some essential or > high popularity IPs (ex. DNS servers...) as if they were relays. That would > send the censors in a goose-chase when a lot of people start complaining > about the block. The cost to censor is raised considerably.
This is somewhat like the approach taken by the meek pluggable transport, which uses popular sites to front for a reflector to a Tor bridge. > They would have to check every relay address before adding it to a blacklist, > or risk breaking popular services. It's just not worth the trouble. This would create a market for providing an accurate list. T -- Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP C855 6CED 5D90 A0C5 29F6 4D43 450C BA7F 968F 094B ricochet:ekmygaiu4rzgsk6n xmpp: teor at torproject dot org ------------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
