>>> https://medium.com/@nusenu/how-malicious-tor-relays-are-exploiting-users-in-2020-part-i-1097575c0cac >>> >>> There are multiple indicators that suggest that the attacker still >>> runs >10% of the Tor network exit capacity (as of 2020–08–08) >>> >>> And on this one: I trust nusenu who told me we still have massiv >>> malicious relays. >> >> as some of you have probably seen already >> now a fraction of them got confirmed to run the same attack tools: >> https://twitter.com/notdan/status/1295813432843829251 >> >> Unfortunately this is not the end of it. > > Yeah, it never ends. It's an ongoing issue.
Until rules are in place that reduce the risk from this reoccurring on this scale and at this rate. >> What I'm still wondering about is: What made Tor directory authorities >> change their policies and stop removing undeclared relay groups? > > I don't think this is the right list to ask directory authorities about > that. I was meant to shared my thoughts on this (more than actually expecting an answer even though there are actual dir auths on this list). -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu
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