Hello, here is the October 2015 report for SponsorR:
- The first bunch of hidden service statistics is now enabled by default. The feature was enabled in tor-0.2.7.3 and the coverage graphs have already climbed slightly: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-frac-reporting.html The stats enabled are: * The total number of unique hidden services: Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html * The total volume of hidden service traffic on the network: Graph: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html - As part of our larger statistical efforts, we did another security and privacy evaluation of the above stats to ensure that the obfuscatory noise we are adding is indeed completely covering the tracks of individual users. We performed the evaluation by extracting all the hidden service statistics values that were reported by relays over the month of September. Then we manually inspected them to see that the noise we are adding is significantly affecting the reports of relays. A more detailed analysis can be found here: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:33 We invite people to use or even expand our dataset to evaluate the privacy of our statistics. - We also improved on the HSDir health tool that tracks the health of the HSDir subsystem and the correctness of descriptor uploading by hidden services: https://gitlab.com/hs-health/hs-health/blob/master/design.md You can now see its results updated in real time: http://ygzf7uqcusp4ayjs.onion/tor-health/tor-health/index.html - As part of our efforts to engage the research community, we met with UCL researchers and students who have interest in anonymity-related topics like hidden services, private statistics, and mixnets. We discussed ideas regarding guard node security, detecting active end-to-end correlation attacks and hidden service scaling techniques. - To further lubricate the research community, we published a document describing the current status of open hidden service proposals. We also provided a brief summary for each proposal so that researchers and developers can get up to date faster: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/torz-dev/2015-October/009762.html - We fixed a TBB issue that allowed website operators to enumerate hidden service addresses: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009646.html - We did considerable progress on the implementation of proposal 250. The code can now perform the whole protocol successfuly. The next task is to improve the code, seek and destroy bugs, improve test coverage, etc: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16943 We also further refined the shared randomness proposal (prop250): https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009812.html - We improved our detection techniques on finding malicious hsdirs who enumerate onions. We busted some more adversarial relays over the course of October. - Discussion was conducted on additional properties of hidden services, like NAT punching: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-September/009596.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009604.html - A new proposal for hidden service scalability was posted by Tom van der Woerdt: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009618.html More discussion on hidden service scalability was done: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009750.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-October/009763.html _______________________________________________ tor-reports mailing list tor-reports@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-reports
