On Mon, 20 Feb 2012 16:15:37 +0800 Koh Choon Lin <2choon...@gmail.com> wrote: > "The authorities in Singapore are understood to have the ability to > track down a person online even if he or she uses anonymizing > facilities such as Virtual Private Networking, TOR onion routing, or > other forms of proxy servers, and even if encryption is involved. This > is because all internet traffic in Singapore is directed through a > common proxy choke with date, time and IP stamping operation in > place."
It's plausible they record all transit through their single internet connection to non-Singapore world. Here are my thoughts, sort of based on https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Torisdifferent faq answer. This collected information could give them tor clients talking to the public list of tor relays or known tor bridges. They have deployed a DPI device that can recognize the tor handshake and are recording the tor client to relay handshake. In both of these cases, they can only identify that you may be using tor, not what you're doing. Using obfsproxy could defeat both of the above issues. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x74ED336B _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk