Yo, i really appreciate such discussion about empowering TorHS, a lot of work still have to be done to make proper leverage of the capabilities that TorHS provide.
On 7/11/12 5:36 PM, proper wrote: > I think the concept of hidden services has a lot potential. Not only > because they are hidden. Let's face it: > - You get a free domain for live. > - You get transparent, free end to end encryption. No flawed root CA system. > - That's something remarkable, isn't it? > > With some modifications/improvements they could be potentially used for > any website, such as as e-commerce, google, twitter, facebook etc. Don't exaggerate, it still need a software client to access them, so the usability is heavily impacted. This imply that TorHS are not for general uses in the context of mutual anonymity . > > hidden services "1.0" as of July 2012 features: > - "optional" [1] client anonymity Standard Tor Client are always anonymous. > - "optional" [2] server anonymity Server is always anonymous. > - somewhat slow both, when client anonymity and server anonymity are active > - free live time domain > - no domain registrar can mess up > - somewhat [3] secure > - very few useful legitimate hidden services exist [4] > > ideas for hidden services "2.0": > - Marketing: Free domain for live! > - Marketing: Safer than SSL! It's not a replacement to SSL, it provide some good end-to-end crypto but does not provide you the same feature of SSL (like identification/authentication of a trust chain, client side authentication, certificate protection, etc). > - "optional" [1] client anonymity Standard Tor Client are always anonymous. > - "optional" server anonymity Server is always anonymous. > - add an option to let the server and/or client connect non-anonymously [6] > - somewhat slow both, client anonymity and server anonymity are active Please consider that most of the issues with TorHS are not related to bandwidth but are related to responsiveness (round-trip). > - fast if only one uses anonymity > - very fast if none use anonymity > - establish new human friendly name system [7] > - improved stability, reachability, performance and dos protection features > > advantages: > - More legitimate hidden services. Better reputation for Tor. > - Real solution for the flawed root CA system. > - Say goodbye to the DNS hierarchy system, DNS spoofing etc. Free > domains, domain security depends on local security, not on registrar / > DNS system. > - Tor gets more known and gets more relay / bridge contributors. > - Safes exit bandwidth. > > [1] Optional because if Tor2webMode is set to 1: Tor connects to hidden > services non-anonymously. As far I know it connects to the rondevouz > point directly, server of course stays anonymous. That's something only for tor2web uses, where it's explained that there is NO anonymity for the client. As a safeguard tor2web mode need to be enabled at build-time and it's not generally available in publicly available Tor binaries. > [2] There are exit enclaves. The server acts as exit and allows to exit > to it's own IP. The Tor exit enclaves are not based on Tor HS. As far as i remember Tor Exit Enclaves are "dead". > [3] Please don't make that the topic here. What I mean is the domain > name may not be long enough, weak sha1 hash and the encryption keys are > not the most up to date, strongest ones. There's still no way to secure the TorHS key provided by Tor. I'd love if someone would take on https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5976 . > [4] Depends on opinion, anyway, much more legitimate and useful servers > can not hurt. Let's not make this the topic here. > [5] One hop circuit or can you even make a 0 hop circuit, i.e. direct > connection? > [6] Non-anonymous domains could use something else, not .onion. > [7] There is already at least one proposal, pet name system. I would love if someone would implement something like that, we got some ideas to work. Imho we may have to discuss / and/or formalize better a concept to make a Tor2web network grow exponentially and with somehow automatic network joining/leaving/adaptation with NO manual intervention. That way it may be possible to create a big Tor2web network, acting as a public access backbone to TorHS (always inviting the client to download and use Tor, explaining with a big warning they are not anonymous) If many very cool service on TorHS starts, it would operate as an stimulus to use TorHS, exposing that Websites over the internet (client-free = maximum usability). -naif _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk