Maxim Kammerer: >> It's comforting that this approach yields quickly diminishing returns. >> Going from 25 to 60 networks only gets you a 10% increase in networks >> surveillance (if I'm reading the output correctly), and returns plateau >> entirely at that point (I'm considering about two percent to be in the >> noise, which may not be appropriate to this domain). > > That's why I insist that everyone should be a relay by default, even > if there are some theoretical issues that weren't worked out yet [1]. > Making everyone a relay also results in a healthier users community (I > think I2P is one), and more intrinsic network growth. >
This has serious intersection attack issues, as you note. However, from a purely practical perspective, even with our UPnP/NAT-PMP work, it's basically not realistic with ipv4 to make *everyone* a globally reachable relay. I do however generally agree with the sentiment that we need to make it significantly harder for an attacker. It's not clear to me that if everyone was a relay, they would change the exit selection very much. It would probably change the location of the guards as expected. Sadly, it probably wouldn't work well for everyone being an exit - not the least of which is that running Tor would attract attention beyond just sending/receiving encrypted traffic. Thanks for taking the time to start this discussion Maxim - it's a good one. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk