adrelanos: > Hi, > > Is it Amnesic or can it be made Amnesic? > > Or in other words.... Can you be sure, that after deleting (or wiping) > the torified AppVM no activity can not be reconstructed with local disk > forensics? Could the torified AppVM be securely wiped without any > leftovers? (Leftovers such as swap, or what else?)
Regarding deletion of the VM: I was under the impression secure deletion was not possible on modern SSDs. On the other hand, it should be possible to create an AppVM whose writeable diskspace lies in enitrely in RAM. I'll investigate this. > > Is Tor's data directory persistent, i.e. does it use Entry Guards? > I've not configured this explicitly, do you have any suggestions? Here's the tor config: https://github.com/abeluck/qubes-addons/blob/master/qubes-tor/start_tor_proxy.sh > Are hardware serials, such as BIOS DMI information, hdd serials etc. > hidden? (For a more comprehensive list of hardware serials and how to > test if them are visible, you could check Whonix less important > protected identifies as reference. [1]) > I'm fairly certain this is the case, seeing as how these are all VMs (xen is the hypervisor), but I've not verifier the hunch so I can't make this claim Hm, if you use the Qubes feature that lets you assign PCI (or USB) devices to a VM, then obviously, no. Thanks for the link, I'll investigate some more. > Cheers, > adrelanos > > [1] > https://sourceforge.net/p/whonix/wiki/Security/#less-important-identifies > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
