Thanks for your comment Lasse, that makes sense.
On 10/19/12 3:23 AM, "Lasse Ă˜verlier" <t...@zone.no> wrote: > >In principle this is (as they write) very similar to earlier papers. The >major catch to their plan may be that if a hidden service already has >chosen its entry guards, and the "modified Tor nodes" are put out there >later - they ("malicious nodes") will therefore not be a part of the >path. But if they already have trusted entry nodes out there and the >client/hidden service selects by default Tor method - their attack (and >earlier ones) should be quite realistic. > >Meaning that a hidden service should be very careful of which nodes it >selects as the entry node(s). Maybe Tor should *not* allow new entry >nodes (by default) to be added for hidden services upon unavailability >of old entry nodes because of this? Another option may be separation of >not trusting/adding new entry nodes for hidden services, but still do so >for the Tor client? (There is (was?) an option for StrictEntryNodes in >torrc which should be considered, but I seriously hope critical sites >are not hosted without deep knowledge of how the hidden services are >vulnerable.) > >Be safe! > > - Lasse > > > >On 19. okt. 2012 05:12, Lee Whitney wrote: >> I was reading a paper on discovering hidden service locations, and >>couldn't find any reason it shouldn't work in principle. >> >> However being that I'm a Tor novice, I wanted ask here. >> >> In a nutshell they propose throwing some modified Tor nodes out there >>that modify the protocol enough to track down the location. It does >>take some time, but it doesn't seem like years. >> >> Any comment appreciated, here's a link to the paper: >> >> http://www.cs.uml.edu/~xinwenfu/paper/HiddenServer.pdf >> >> _______________________________________________ >> tor-talk mailing list >> tor-talk@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > >_______________________________________________ >tor-talk mailing list >tor-talk@lists.torproject.org >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk