On Sat, Jan 26, 2013 at 8:49 AM, adrelanos <adrela...@riseup.net> wrote:
> Not exactly. I can imagine, that telling "let your Tor connection open > as often and long as possible and transfer some dummy/cover traffic as > often as possible before you do actions you really want to hide" could > improve anonymity. > Running a Bitcoin node set to use Tor as a proxy, and also publishing its listening port as a hidden service, will generate a constant stream of intermittent, fairly low-bandwidth connections, which slowly change over time. You don't even have to use Bitcoin for anything, just passively participate in the P2P network traffic that gets relayed. One machine I have, there are 8 outgoing connections and 14 incoming hidden service connections, resulting in about 15-20 Kbps up and down, with 35 open Tor circuits. Now whether this kind of chaff makes any difference to a correlation attack I have no idea =) Johnathan _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk