I'm working on an updated version of SnakesOnATor (SOAT) that was used to monitor the Tor network for bad exit nodes. This is a similar function to InspectTor hosted on a .onion site but that page owner has not been reachable and has not reached out to other Tor folk.
The main problem with InspecTor is that he/she is recommending that because a bad exit node has been detected, users should change their Tor configs to never use those nodes. This would eventually negatively affect a user's anonymity as they would create a network fingerprint unlike any others. But this is, AFAIK, going to be the same problem that SOAT or any future solution would have. Namely, that there is no official mechanism to kick off a bad exit. If I understand correctly, this was a manual process in the past that entailed emailing the op and eventually kicking them off? I'm looking for feedback on the above statements. Maybe I'm missing something or do not know about the underlyings of the process. If I do understand it correctly, I wonder if a solution is necessary that integrates monitoring and removing bad exit nodes and malicious activity, If we agree that users should not change their routes, then routes should be changed on a global level to remove bad exits by an authoritative party. Such a solution would be a challenge to say the least because what stops a bad Op from spinning up a new node. Maybe this is the reason we haven't done this in the past. ROCAdmin _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk