On 04.12.2013 18:57, James Marshall wrote: > Is there any risk with another local application using Tor's SOCKS 5 > interface? I heard a vague comment that it wasn't recommended, but I > haven't heard exactly what the risks are, if any.
Using a regular browser opens you to a lot of deanonymization attacks that Tor Browser does not. Read https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/ for more details. > This is for CGIProxy, which can use SOCKS 5 to provide a clientless > front-end to the Tor network (clientless in the sense that it doesn't > require an installation on the browsing machine). This could significantly > increase the potential user base of Tor, since many users can't or don't > want to install anything on their browsing machine. You don't have to "install" Tor Browser, just extract to any directory you have write permission for. This can be a USB stick, or the home directory, or, if you can boot from a separate disk, Tails. So, everyone "can" install Tor Browser. With CGIProxy, you have to trust the operator of the cgi proxy, because it sees all traffic. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk