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>> http://cryptome.org/2014/10/another-tor.pdf > > The idea here is to make a "anonymity" network where it is possible to > reveal any users IP if the majority of the relays in the network agree > that this particular person should have their anonymity "revoked". > > You get to be "anonymous" until/unless "the majority" decides you should > no longer be anonymous. "The majority" could simply mean "any adversary > with the resources to run enough relays to be the majority. I notice that the scheme also requires the directory servers to be the folks that choose the random path that a message takes through the Tor network. This seems like a poorly thought out choice to me. If a directory turns out to be untrustworthy it could easily route a client through a path that allows it to determine who the client is, what they are sending, and to whom they are sending it. This scheme in general gives a lot of power to the directory servers. At least that is my reading of it. I'm definitely no expert in this topic. Thank you, Derric Atzrott -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (MingW32) iD8DBQFUNDrbRHoDdZBwKDgRAoV3AJ9KQAqQmGxAkH6aCZULfzye+FQDuACgn7GB 80gQA4O/AQAny7f4uxXfgAc= =dUD/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - [email protected] To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
