So it's not who is already published in the list but whoever has published most recently? Very confused now. Seems like that works completely backwards from how it should.
> On Mar 4, 2016, at 4:05 PM, Mirimir <miri...@riseup.net> wrote: > >> On 03/04/2016 01:39 PM, Scfith Rise up wrote: >> It _would_ be the same private key. Good luck with generating 1.2 >> septillion permutations (16^32). > > That's not what I get from > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/HiddenServiceNames. > SHA1 collisions are possible. > >> But could be doable in a few years so to answer your question, I >> believe there can only be one published in the HSDIR, so first come >> first served. Facebook's would have to be DDOS / shutdown and then >> the forged one can be spun up and published. > > As I understand it, what matters is which one announced most recently. > >> Please correct me if I'm wrong as I've only been researching Tor since 2015. >> >>>> On Mar 4, 2016, at 3:23 PM, Mirimir <miri...@riseup.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 03/04/2016 01:03 PM, Andreas Krey wrote: >>>>> On Fri, 04 Mar 2016 19:55:01 +0000, Flipchan wrote: >>>>> IF i generate a .onion domain , isnt there a risk that someone can >>>>> generate the same domain? I mean anyone can generate .onion domains and >>>>> IF i got an easy .onion address then some could easily generate that rsa >>>>> key right? >>>> >>>> There is no 'easy' onion address, only ones that look like they >>>> are. Faking facebookcorewwwi takes the same effort as any other. >>>> Getting an onion that starts with facebook but does not end in >>>> corewwwi is much easier (by the factor 1099511627775), but that >>>> is true for any other eight character prefix as well. >>>> >>>> Andreas >>> >>> OK, but let's say that someone got facebookcorewwwi.onion, running >>> scallion on some mega-GPU monster. It's hugely improbable, I know. And >>> they'd have a different private key, of course. But how would Tor handle >>> that? Would it work like running multiple onion copies does now? That >>> is, would they compete for HSDir priority? >>> -- >>> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org >>> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
