Something like this is what I feared when days ago I sent a message to this list... If you allow Tor Browser to have all hops from the same country, or the Tor network relies only on a few countries to host their nodes (Germany, US, France) then Tor will be useless soon...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-May/040991.html El 02/06/16 a las 06:13, grarpamp escribió: > https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-uk-is-using-bulk-interception-to-catch-criminalsand-not-telling-them > https://conspicuouschatter.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/a-technical-reading-of-the-himr-data-mining-research-problem-book/ > https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702948-Problem-Book-Redacted.html > > Researchers have speculated that GCHQ may have the capability to > deanonymise Tor users by examining the timing of connections going in > and out of the Tor network. > ... > there is clear evidence that timing information is both recognized as > being key to correlating events and streams; and it is being recorded > and stored at an increasing granularity. There is no smoking gun as of > 2011 to say they casually de-anonymize Tor circuits, but the writing > is on the wall for the onion routing system. GCHQ at 2011 had all > ingredients needed to trace Tor circuits. It would take extra-ordinary > incompetence to not have refined their traffic analysis techniques in > the past 5 years. The Tor project should do well to not underestimate > GCHQ’s capabilities to this point. > ... > one should wonder why we have been waiting for 3 years until such > clear documents are finally being published from the Snowden > revelations. If those had been the first published, instead of the > obscure, misleading and very non-informative slides, it would have > saved a lot of time — and may even have engaged the public a bit more > than bad powerpoint. > > http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-uk-will-police-the-dark-web-with-a-new-task-force > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows > > > Prediction market (place your bids): > "First networks utilizing fill traffic as TA countermeasure to > emerge and reach early deployment by year end 2017..." -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk