On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 03:40:22AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 11:49:22PM -0700, Yuri wrote: > > Here is the white paper with MTor design: > > https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/popets.2015.2016.issue-2/popets-2016-0003/popets-2016-0003.pdf > > > > > > So, what is MTor's status? > > It's the standard story -- it's a research paper written by a research > group to show a concept, and then they moved on. >
Right. The primary author had graduated and moved on to other things c. a year and a half ago. > I don't remember the design in detail, but I remember based on the talk > at PETS thinking that they had really changed the threat model for Tor > to something much weaker, in exchange for better scalability in some > situations. Main differences were (1) a multicast root is selected amongst (adequate-weight) available middle relays that will mate all connections to it for that multicast session, (2) that any relay that is part of a multicast session has a session group identifier (GID), (3) that if a circuit building request hits a guard or middle relay already participating in the session, it connects that circuit to its existing group circuit, and (4) optionally, the set of relays to select a middle hop from is restricted for deduplication benefit. Our analysis showed that for small to moderate sized groups on the existing Tor network, absent a pretty restricted middle-hop set, there was virtually no deduplication (hence a star, which still saved over all pairs). If curious, you can see our security analysis of MTor against targeting adversaries (also analysis of a group chatting via a private IRC channel and of people connecting to the same onion service) here: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.10292 aloha, Paul -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk