TorProject has added some traffic padding in Tor 0.3.1.7 <https://blog.torproject.org/tor-0317-now-released> And they are working on Adaptive traffic padding 254-padding-negotiation <https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/254-padding-negotiation.txt>.
> On Oct 6, 2017, at 12:12 PM, Seth David Schoen <sch...@eff.org> wrote: > > Matej Kovacic writes: > >> Hi, >> >> there is some interesting project called Noiszy: https://noiszy.com/ >> >> It generates fake traffic. It is more "artists" project that real >> countermeasure, but I am thinking to implement something like this on my >> network with several machines inside. >> >> However, the main problem is that Noiszy works too random, and is not >> "walking" in websites enough time and enough consistent to give an >> impression someone is really browsing something. > > There have been a few projects in this space before, like Helen > Nissenbaum's TrackMeNot, and at least two others that I'm not thinking > of right away. > > I agree with your concern that it's currently too easy for an adversary > to use statistics to learn if traffic is human activity or synthesized. > Another problem is that the sites that the traffic generator interacts > with might themselves get suspicious and start responding with CAPTCHAs > or something -- which would then also reduce the plausibility of the > traffic. > > I also wonder if someone has studied higher-order statistics of online > activity, in the sense that engaging in one activity affects your > likelihood of engaging in another activity afterward (or concurrently). > For example, you might receive an e-mail or instant message asking you > to look at something on another site, and you might actually do that. > On the other hand, some sites are more distracting and less conducive > to multitasking than others. For example, you probably wouldn't be > playing a real-time online game while composing an e-mail... but you > might play a turn-based game. > > There are also kind of complicated probability distributions about events > that retain attention. For instance, if you're doing something that > involves low-latency interactions with other people, it's only plausible > that you're actually doing that if the other people were also available > and interacting with you. The probability that a given person continues > communicating with you declines over time, and is also related to time > zone and time of day. But there's also a probability that someone else > starts interacting with you. > > Some of these things will probably have to be studied in some depth in > order to have a hope of fooling really sophisticated adversaries with > synthesized online activity. > > -- > Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> > Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ > Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join > 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk