I recall I encountered an node-box technology on Wikipedia, designed for running tamper-proof Tor nodes such that monitoring was impossible: the system was designed to allow for boot and key authentication only, and could not be snooped. I seem to be unable now to locate the page, but this would solve many of the problems of bad nodes in the Tor network, at least if a filtered network composed solely of such systems were used. Of course, you would wonder why this hadn't been done if it were possible...but then again, while I shrug at what I view as major problems with Tor implementation, Linux security OS provision, and so on, I remind myself constantly that most things in modernity don't work, from products to theories, free or not, so there needn't be a conspiracy involved :)
Sent from ProtonMail, Swiss-based encrypted email. -------- Original Message -------- On February 11, 2018 2:30 PM, Anon Hyde <m...@andr.ru> wrote: >On 2/11/18, Iain Learmonth i...@torproject.org wrote: >>Bad relays are removed by the directory authorities from the consensus. >> > It is good decision, but not working well. I'd lot of problem in the > past until I filled my personal blacklist. It would be nice to load > the torrc over the URL, so as not to look for where to put it, where > to put it. I use three OS on two other's owners computers: Slax, Remux > and Muzdie 7 and 10 > >>the same way as everyone else's client. >> > > 10x4in4, got it. But of two evils choose the least > > cheers > >tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to >https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
