On 15 October 2014 06:06, Giovanni Pellerano <[email protected]> wrote: > i don't remember. think that hellas made the request so far :) > > by the way it's not so good at all as we are now not able easily to > change the SSL certificate after the heart bleed attack. :(
Key Pinning should not be implemented unless you have a robust backup strategy - the draft mandates at least two pins: a Deployed and a Backup. The backup is meant to be kept off a production server somewhere and if necessary, signed by a CA, and rolled in. I would recommend more than one backup. If it was my server, I would make 2 backups: one I keep myself somewhere, and one I PGP to myself, send to a friend, and instruct them not to send it to me unless I talk to them on the phone or in person. That way they can't decrypt it, and if someone compromises my email/PGP key, they can't get the ciphertext from my friend. -tom _______________________________________________ Tor2web-talk mailing list [email protected] http://lists.globaleaks.org/mailman/listinfo/tor2web-talk
