** Description changed:

+ [ Impact ]
+ 
+  * An explanation of the effects of the bug on users and
+ 
+  * justification for backporting the fix to the stable release.
+ 
+  * In addition, it is helpful, but not required, to include an
+    explanation of how the upload fixes this bug.
+ 
+ [ Test Plan ]
+ 
+  * detailed instructions how to reproduce the bug
+ 
+  * these should allow someone who is not familiar with the affected
+    package to reproduce the bug and verify that the updated package fixes
+    the problem.
+ 
+  * if other testing is appropriate to perform before landing this update,
+    this should also be described here.
+ 
+ [ Where problems could occur ]
+ 
+  * Think about what the upload changes in the software. Imagine the change is
+    wrong or breaks something else: how would this show up?
+ 
+  * It is assumed that any SRU candidate patch is well-tested before
+    upload and has a low overall risk of regression, but it's important
+    to make the effort to think about what ''could'' happen in the
+    event of a regression.
+ 
+  * This must '''never''' be "None" or "Low", or entirely an argument as to why
+    your upload is low risk.
+ 
+  * This both shows the SRU team that the risks have been considered,
+    and provides guidance to testers in regression-testing the SRU.
+ 
+ [ Other Info ]
+  
+  * Anything else you think is useful to include
+  * Anticipate questions from users, SRU, +1 maintenance, security teams and 
the Technical Board
+  * and address these questions in advance
+ 
+ 
+ [Original Description]
+ 
  Current Cyrus libsasl2 packaging (Ubuntu Jammy) distributes SASL bind 
mechanims into different packages. Plained and shared secret mechanisms are 
provided by package libsasl2-modules:
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libanonymous.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libanonymous.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libanonymous.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libcrammd5.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libcrammd5.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libcrammd5.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libdigestmd5.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libdigestmd5.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libdigestmd5.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/liblogin.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/liblogin.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/liblogin.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libntlm.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libntlm.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libntlm.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libplain.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libplain.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libplain.so.2.0.25
  
  The "safest" mechanism in this list is DIGEST-MD5, which is marked as
  obsolete by IANA and regarded as unsafe by IETF. Current safest standard
  mechanisms are SCRAM based (RFC7677).
  
  All SCRAM family SASL mechanisms of Cyrus SASL are provided by Ubuntu package 
libsasl2-modules-gssapi-mit:
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libscram.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libscram.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libscram.so.2.0.25
  
  But the focus of this package is GSSAPI and GS2 SASL mechanism, which
  have nothing to do with SCRAM. In addition, this package conflicts with
  package libsasl2-modules-gssapi-heimdal. System administrators have to
  choose one package for support of GSSAPI or GSS-SPEGNO. If they prefer
  Heimdal there is no safe SASL shared secret mechanism available anymore
  on the server/workstation.

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to cyrus-sasl2 in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1988730

Title:
  package libsasl2-modules provides only unsafe SASL bind mechanims

Status in cyrus-sasl2 package in Ubuntu:
  Fix Released
Status in cyrus-sasl2 source package in Jammy:
  In Progress

Bug description:
  [ Impact ]

   * An explanation of the effects of the bug on users and

   * justification for backporting the fix to the stable release.

   * In addition, it is helpful, but not required, to include an
     explanation of how the upload fixes this bug.

  [ Test Plan ]

   * detailed instructions how to reproduce the bug

   * these should allow someone who is not familiar with the affected
     package to reproduce the bug and verify that the updated package fixes
     the problem.

   * if other testing is appropriate to perform before landing this update,
     this should also be described here.

  [ Where problems could occur ]

   * Think about what the upload changes in the software. Imagine the change is
     wrong or breaks something else: how would this show up?

   * It is assumed that any SRU candidate patch is well-tested before
     upload and has a low overall risk of regression, but it's important
     to make the effort to think about what ''could'' happen in the
     event of a regression.

   * This must '''never''' be "None" or "Low", or entirely an argument as to why
     your upload is low risk.

   * This both shows the SRU team that the risks have been considered,
     and provides guidance to testers in regression-testing the SRU.

  [ Other Info ]
   
   * Anything else you think is useful to include
   * Anticipate questions from users, SRU, +1 maintenance, security teams and 
the Technical Board
   * and address these questions in advance

  
  [Original Description]

  Current Cyrus libsasl2 packaging (Ubuntu Jammy) distributes SASL bind 
mechanims into different packages. Plained and shared secret mechanisms are 
provided by package libsasl2-modules:
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libanonymous.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libanonymous.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libanonymous.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libcrammd5.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libcrammd5.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libcrammd5.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libdigestmd5.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libdigestmd5.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libdigestmd5.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/liblogin.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/liblogin.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/liblogin.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libntlm.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libntlm.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libntlm.so.2.0.25
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libplain.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libplain.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libplain.so.2.0.25

  The "safest" mechanism in this list is DIGEST-MD5, which is marked as
  obsolete by IANA and regarded as unsafe by IETF. Current safest
  standard mechanisms are SCRAM based (RFC7677).

  All SCRAM family SASL mechanisms of Cyrus SASL are provided by Ubuntu package 
libsasl2-modules-gssapi-mit:
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libscram.so
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libscram.so.2
  /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/sasl2/libscram.so.2.0.25

  But the focus of this package is GSSAPI and GS2 SASL mechanism, which
  have nothing to do with SCRAM. In addition, this package conflicts
  with package libsasl2-modules-gssapi-heimdal. System administrators
  have to choose one package for support of GSSAPI or GSS-SPEGNO. If
  they prefer Heimdal there is no safe SASL shared secret mechanism
  available anymore on the server/workstation.

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/cyrus-sasl2/+bug/1988730/+subscriptions


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