WELCOME TO IWPR'S TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 462, July 21, 2006

SPECIAL REPORT:

THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL AND BALKAN RECONCILIATION  More than a decade after the 
conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, IWPR asks whether criminal justice dispensed 
in The Hague can help divided communities in the Balkans to move on.  By IWPR 
staff in The Hague, Sarajevo, Ahmici and London

****************** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net ***************

PLEASE NOTE OUR NEW ADDRESS & PHONE NUMBERS:
48 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7831 1030  Fax: +44 (0)20 7831 1050

RSS: http://www.iwpr.net/en/tri/rss.xml 

FREE SUBSCRIPTION. Readers are urged to subscribe to IWPR's full range of 
electronic publications at: 
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=henh&s=s&m=p 

****************** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net ***************

SPECIAL REPORT:

THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL AND BALKAN RECONCILIATION

More than a decade after the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, IWPR asks whether 
criminal justice dispensed in The Hague can help divided communities in the 
Balkans to move on.

By IWPR staff in The Hague, Sarajevo, Ahmici and London

Hazrudin Bilic witnessed the notorious Croat massacre of Muslims in the Bosnian 
village of Ahmici on April 16, 1993. Taking refuge in a cellar with his 
pregnant wife and four-year-old son, he could only watch as men, women and 
children were slaughtered before his eyes.

The Ahmici attack, carried out by fighters loyal to the Croatian Defence 
Council, has gained prominence as the worst single atrocity of the conflict 
that broke out between the formerly allied Muslim and Croat forces.

It has also been the focus of a great deal of work at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY, in The Hague, the ad hoc 
court which has long been the core of the international community's efforts to 
see justice done for atrocities committed during the Balkans wars of the 
Nineties.

One former Croat fighter, Miroslav Bralo, has even taken the rare step of 
standing before Hague judges to publicly declare his deep remorse for his own 
role in this and other atrocities, stating that his apology "should be bigger 
than the globe".

But standing in Ahmici today, Hazrudin Bilic is cautious about what these 
developments in distant courtrooms mean for Muslim-Croat relations in a village 
whose Muslim residents have taken to the alien practice of locking their doors 
at night. 

The local mosque and most of the houses have been rebuilt, and it is hard to 
imagine now that this pretty little village nestled between the lush hills of 
the Lasva Valley was the scene of such violence. But on some level, the 
animosities remain.

"I think the only thing that could help Muslims and Croats in Ahmici to 
reconcile with each other would be an honest talk," said Bilic. "It would mean 
a lot to me if they said, 'We didn't participate in the massacre but we didn't 
do anything to stop it either, and we regret that.' This would be important for 
the future of our children."

Fehima Pezer, an elderly woman with thick glasses and a traditional headscarf, 
is more dismissive of the idea that the ICTY can repair the damage done in 
Ahmici. Nothing, she says, can turn back the clock on the massacre - in which 
her husband and 82-year-old mother died - or the death of her teenage son, who 
was shot by a sniper several months prior to it. 

She does not follow the war crimes trials that take place in The Hague, as she 
is not interested in the tribunal's work and she couldn't care less for the 
confessions of those who committed atrocities, even in her home village.

"Nothing will bring back those who were killed," she said bitterly.

FOCUS ON BOSNIA

This report represents the results of IWPR's efforts to dig deeper into the 
widely-held assumption that the ICTY has a central role to play in helping the 
divided communities of the Balkans to reconcile themselves with their violent 
recent histories and with one another.

Our research included speaking with survivors of some of the worst atrocities 
of the wars of the Nineties, representatives of Balkans civil society and 
senior figures within the ICTY, as well as international academics whose work 
focuses on transitional justice and post-conflict reconciliation.

While the issues at stake are region-wide, this report focuses on Bosnia, where 
the question of reconciliation is perhaps more crucial and more complex than in 
any other part of the Balkans. The war there involved all three of the main 
ethnic groups confronting one another in a conflict which saw some of the worst 
crimes of this whole period.

What we uncovered through our research proved, not unexpectedly, to be an 
incredibly complex state of affairs in which convenient assumptions about 
justice, truth and reconciliation quickly dissolve.

Our findings suggest that if the ICTY is able to play any role in fostering 
reconciliation in the Balkans, it can only do so within the context of an 
intricate web of interlinked factors which could take decades to unravel. At 
the heart of the problem lie an intense resistance by many in the region to the 
reality that their own ethnic kin committed atrocities, and unanswered 
political questions which make it difficult to look far into the future.

At the same time, it is clear that whatever chance the ICTY had to contribute 
to the complex process of reconciliation was for a long time compromised by its 
failure to engage with people in the region.

RECONCILIATION AS AN AIM OF THE TRIBUNAL

The Hague tribunal was established in 1993 with the aim of bringing to justice 
those most responsible for the wave of horrors that was sweeping through the 
Balkans in the wake of the collapse of the old Yugoslav order at the start of 
the decade.

Bosnia and Croatia were both still submerged in violence at the time, and there 
was a sense that something needed to be done in answer to the television images 
of indiscriminate shelling, burning homes and emaciated detainees, and the 
evidence of widespread, systematic ethnic cleansing.

Today, the violence is over but the Balkans remains very much divided.

Bosnia's state system, which emerged from the peace accords that brought an end 
to the war there, splits the country into two ethnically-defined entities, the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, which are at 
odds over key political issues.

At the same time, the federal government in Sarajevo is busy suing neighbouring 
Serbia for its role in the Bosnian war, in a case in which billions of dollars 
in reparations payments could be at stake.

Serbia, for its part, has been blocked from closer relations with the European 
Union over its apparent reluctance to square up to the Hague court's 
highest-profile war crimes fugitive, the former Bosnian Serb military leader 
Ratko Mladic, who along with indicted ex-Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan 
Karadzic, are still regarded by a significant proportion of Serbia's population 
as heroes.

And Croatia - also in the process of trying to sue Serbia for its wartime 
activities - only overcame a major obstacle of its own to EU membership late 
last year, with the long-awaited arrest of war crimes suspect Ante Gotovina, 
who is still equally lauded by many Croats.

Amid all this, it has been widely hoped that the ICTY had a role to play beyond 
simply dispensing criminal justice.

Officials and expert observers are often at pains to point out that criminal 
justice must be the priority. "The tribunal as a tribunal has to prosecute 
according to the law... those who are allegedly responsible for the violations, 
and it starts and finishes there," the current president of the ICTY, Judge 
Fausto Pocar, told IWPR. 

But the fact is that over the years, an expectation has persisted that the 
ICTY's work would or should help to reconcile the peoples of the Balkans with 
their violent recent history, even if only as a by-product of its central, 
specifically judicial aims.

The voices expressing this kind of faith are to be heard within the tribunal as 
well as outside it. While sticking by his assertion that the judicial process 
must remain the uncontested priority of the ICTY, Judge Pocar himself 
acknowledges that this "does not exclude of course the fact that the decisions 
the tribunal takes should have an impact on the reconciliation process". 

In 2001, during a speech in Sarajevo, the then president of the tribunal, Judge 
Claude Jorda, gave an even stronger assessment of the relationship between the 
court's work and the process of post-war reconciliation in the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia.

Referring to the United Nations Security Council resolution that established 
the ICTY in the early Nineties and which expressed the conviction that it would 
"contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace", Judge Jorda spoke of 
the court's "mission of reconciliation".

A similar sentiment is even to be found in the words of Dragan Obrenovic, a 
former soldier in the Bosnian Serb army who pleaded guilty in The Hague in 2003 
to involvement in mass executions of prisoners and agreed to provide 
prosecutors with insider information.

"In Bosnia, a neighbour means more than a relative. In Bosnia, having coffee 
with your neighbour is a ritual, and this is what we trampled on and forgot," 
Obrenovic told the court. "We lost ourselves in hatred and brutality.

"It is my wish that my testimony should help prevent this ever happening again, 
not just in Bosnia, but anywhere in the world."

WHAT IS RECONCILIATION?

The idea of reconciliation in post-conflict situations is a hot topic in 
academic, humanitarian and political circles. But the concept at the heart of 
the debate is itself controversial.

Some speak of reconciliation in a moral, quasi-religious sense, as involving 
individual acts of confession and forgiveness. But while this is a neat 
understanding of the term, many feel that this kind of reconciliation is rare 
in post-war situations and that there is also something inherently patronising 
in the idea that international actors should seek to promote it.

Instead, in the context of discussions about the ICTY and reconciliation in the 
Balkans, many find it more useful to speak about concepts such as "social 
reconstruction".

David Bloomfield, the director of the Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management, explained, "Where we at Berghof... use the term 
reconciliation, it's a much more pragmatic thing about building working 
relations in politics and society. It doesn't mean loving anybody. It doesn't 
necessarily mean stopping hating anybody. It just means we have to work 
together minimally to make politics work without killing each other."

In the long run, Bloomfield added, it is arguably possible that these "minimal 
grudging relations" could give rise to some kind of reconciliation. "If you set 
those habits in process, then gradually they develop; degrees of cooperation 
and trust and - who knows - even respect," he said. "And maybe down the line, 
after a few years, or a few decades, it does become peace and love."

A WORK IN PROGRESS

As far as the countries of the former Yugoslavia are concerned, international 
and local observers are agreed that reconciliation, if it has occurred to any 
significant degree, is still very much a work in progress 

Steven Burg, a professor of international politics at Brandeis University, told 
IWPR that refugee returns and economic cooperation are increasing across the 
region. But he is sceptical about the degree to which this represents a 
large-scale phenomenon of reconciliation, in the sense of confession and 
forgiveness.

"As a social phenomenon I certainly do not think it's working," he said. 
"There's no evidence in the political behaviours - in the voting patterns, in 
the way local governments function or don't function - that reconciliation has 
happened anywhere."

"What we have in Bosnia, unfortunately, is a continuing process of division and 
differentiation, instead of reconciliation," agreed Branko Todorovic, the 
president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Republika Srpska.

Nusreta Sivac, a Muslim former judge who fled the Bosnian town of Prijedor 
during the war and has since returned, told IWPR that relations with Serbs in 
the area have improved greatly. "It's getting better every day, we don't feel 
that threatened anymore," she said.

She also noted that Prijedor has an exceptionally high number of refugees who 
have returned since the war, compared with other parts of Bosnia. 

Yet she cautioned, "I don't think that's an indicator that the process of 
reconciliation has been successful here. It's more the result of people's 
determination to return to their homes.

"[Reconciliation] is such a complex process, in which all segments of society 
have to be involved. But there still isn't enough willingness to embark on it 
and start working on it properly."

JUSTICE, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

Whatever the current situation may be, and however we define reconciliation, 
few believe that it is best achieved in the longer term by ignoring the wrongs 
of the past. And it is widely held that criminal courts like the ICTY have an 
important role to play.

This might include helping to establish stability and a healthy political 
environment in an area in which conflict has broken these things down. "It's 
very hard to build a democracy that respects the rule of law when people who 
have committed mass crimes are not punished and are allowed to walk around the 
streets," explained Reed Brody, a counsel with Human Rights Watch.

In addition, in his 2001 speech, Judge Jorda himself noted that the ICTY could 
help by "neutralising" major war criminals and preventing them from doing more 
harm.

In more complex ways, he also suggested that it could individualise 
responsibility for war crimes, thereby preventing the stigmatisation of whole 
groups in whose name they were committed. And it could attempt to ease victims' 
suffering by giving them a "solemn but public forum".

Another task that Judge Jorda referred to, and which many experts argue is 
central to the process of reconciliation, is establishing an accurate 
historical record of the events that have disrupted a society.

Of course, the question of truth in this context is complex and it would be 
naive to expect all sides involved in the Balkans conflicts to quickly arrive 
at a consensus on what exactly occurred. "When we're in a civil war situation, 
particularly one with a long history... every community feels victimised and 
it's that much more impossible to establish a shared truth," Bloomfield told 
IWPR.

But Pierre Hazan, a senior fellow at the United States Institute for Peace and 
the author of Justice in a Time of War: The True Story Behind the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, suggests that it is still possible 
and desirable to at least "narrow the scope of permissible lies".

"If you can do that, maybe you can have different memories which can coexist 
peacefully," Hazan told IWPR. "And if you reach that point, even before 
reaching some kind of long-term common narrative, that's something significant."

Some argue that criminal tribunals suffer severe limitations when it comes to 
uncovering the truth about conflicts, which make institutions such as truth 
commissions more suited to the task. The investigations and balancing of 
evidence that occurs under the auspices of a court, for instance, must focus on 
the charges laid down in narrowly-framed indictments against particular 
individuals.

Helena Cobban, a columnist for the Christian Science Monitor who has written 
about transitional justice issues, argues that the trial process also naturally 
"pushes people into a defensive crouch" by placing them in a situation where 
revealing or confirming the truth could result in them being punished.

At the same time, however, courts also have clear advantages of their own when 
it comes to uncovering the truth about conflicts and war crimes.

Criminal judgements from a reputable institution, for instance, are based on 
carefully weighed evidence and deal with facts that have been proven to a high 
level of probity, beyond reasonable doubt.

And if courts are bound to focus their efforts on alleged perpetrators of 
crimes, Hazan points out that they also avoid the problems faced by many truth 
commissions which "have surveyed the victimisation of people without doing an 
adequate job of examining who the victimisers were".

Finally, whatever weaknesses the ICTY has when it comes to mapping the history 
of the Balkans wars, the fact is that for a long time it has been one of only a 
limited number of institutions carrying out such work on such a large scale.

In Bosnia, for instance, local commissions have been established to investigate 
what went on in such notorious war zones as Srebrenica, and there have been 
moves to set up similar projects elsewhere. But, so far, initiatives to 
establish a state-level truth commission have come to nothing.

INEVITABLE LIMITATIONS ON TRIBUNAL'S CAPACITY

The tribunal's ability to carry out the work of charging, trying and punishing 
individuals - and, possibly, contributing to reconciliation in the process - is 
of course constrained by its limited resources.

Since the court was established in 1993, its prosecutors have charged over 160 
individuals. But with its mandate now nearing its end, no further war crimes 
indictments will be issued. And in Bosnia alone, local prosecutors are said to 
have files on many thousands of suspected war criminals.

A case in point is the massacre in Srebrenica, the worst single atrocity of the 
Bosnian conflict, in which invading Serb forces slaughtered thousands of the 
town's Muslim men and boys in the only legally-defined episode of genocide on 
European soil since the Second World War. So far, the ICTY has tried and 
convicted just six men for their participation in the atrocity. This month, 
Hague trial proceedings formally began against a further seven men also alleged 
to have been involved, in what will be the biggest joint proceedings ever seen 
at the tribunal.

This scattering of trials clashes starkly with the situation on the ground in 
Bosnia. In October 2004, the authorities in the Republika Srpska - under 
pressure from the international community - released a report in which they 
acknowledged that Serbs had been responsible for killing prisoners from 
Srebrenica. It has been widely reported in the local media that a full version 
of the report exists that contains the names of over 20,000 people directly or 
indirectly implicated in the atrocity.

At the same time, the specialist war crimes chamber of the Bosnian State Court 
in Sarajevo, which has only been open for a short time, is already well 
underway with the trial of 11 men charged in connection with the massacre - 
nearly twice the number who have so far been convicted at the ICTY in all the 
years that it has existed. 

It has always been the Hague tribunal's stated aim to focus its limited 
resources on trying the most senior individuals responsible for crimes during 
the Balkans wars and those implicated in the most serious atrocities. But this, 
of course, is only the tip of the iceberg.

"Everybody talks about Karadzic and Mladic," said Hatidza Mehmedovic, a Muslim 
resident of Srebrenica. "But the whole Drina river valley is full of Karadzics 
and Mladics who still walk free, and haven't even been indicted for the crimes 
they committed."

For those who suffered during the conflicts, it is not even always the most 
senior perpetrators who matter the most. "To me, those who organised these 
crimes are much less responsible than those who carried them out," Bilic told 
IWPR. "One can plan anything he wants, but if there are no people willing to 
execute that plan, then it's worthless."

Part of the proposed solution on this front is for local courts to pick up the 
baton where the ICTY leaves off. To this end, the tribunal is amongst the 
international actors who have been engaged in capacity-building work with 
national justice systems in the region, including backing and closely 
cooperating with the Bosnian State Court's war crimes chamber.

CONFESSIONS

Despite the tribunal's limited resources, one aspect of events in The Hague 
that many hoped would be an especially powerful force in helping to foster 
reconciliation in the Balkans were the decisions by a number of former 
officials and fighters to admit their involvement in atrocities.

Inevitably, however, the reality of such confessions has been complex.

Many initially saw it as a breakthrough when Biljana Plavsic, a top Serb 
politician during the war in Bosnia, pleaded guilty in 2002 to persecuting 
non-Serbs. In return, prosecutors dropped other charges against her, including 
genocide.

A report by the International Centre for Transitional Justice, ICTJ, argued in 
October 2004 that "her expressions of remorse during and after the hearing, 
combined with her decision not to appeal her 11-year sentence, may have 
contributed to the process of justice and reconciliation".

But the report's authors also noted that Plavsic's reluctance to provide 
detailed information about or to testify about the roles of other senior Serb 
officials "limited the legal and moral value of her gesture". When Plavsic made 
her first reappearance as a witness in The Hague this month to give evidence in 
the trial of her former political colleague Momcilo Krajisnik, she made it 
abundantly clear that she was there under duress.

"After Biljana Plavsic's guilty plea, I said I hoped it was honest. But as it 
became apparent later, it was not," Tokaca told IWPR. Noting that his opinion 
had been partly swung by the contents of a book that Plavsic published after 
she was sentenced, he added, "It seems to me now that she did it only to get a 
milder sentence."

"I don't think she showed true remorse," agreed Edina Becirevic, a senior 
lecturer at the Faculty of Criminal Justice Sciences in Sarajevo, "and her 
whole statement in which she admitted her guilt was addressed to Bosnian Serbs.

"It seemed to me that her main goal was to ease the burden of collective guilt. 
And because of that, the victims thought it was just a farce and it didn't have 
a real effect on the process of reconciliation."

Last year, when the former Croat combatant Bralo admitted crimes including 
murder, burning homes and raping a woman during the war in Bosnia, it seemed to 
many again that a major milestone had been passed.

Prosecutors said they accepted that Bralo felt genuine remorse. And the accused 
himself said, "I encourage anyone who can do so to come forward and talk to 
their neighbours, to talk to the court and begin to make their peace."

Becirevic told IWPR that Bralo's guilty plea "seemed to be much more honest".

Yet it would be far too simple to expect even a genuine public apology to be 
met with immediate forgiveness from those who lived through the Ahmici attack.

"Whenever someone pleads guilty, it's a big deal to me," said Bilic, who 
asserts that he knew Bralo personally prior to the war. "But the fact that he 
confessed to the crimes doesn't mean he should be absolved of responsibility. 
Maybe he confessed to the murders he committed in order to ease his own 
conscience, but he should still face the consequences of his acts."

DOES THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME?

One of the main controversies surrounding guilty pleas at the ICTY is the 
question of the lengths of sentences handed down to those who confess their 
crimes.

Asked whether the 20-year sentence that Bralo received seemed adequate, Bilic 
was firm. "No," he said. "For crimes such as murders of innocent civilians, 
including women and children, any sentence that is not life imprisonment is too 
light. When a man kills another person in a car accident, he gets five to seven 
years in prison. How can 20 years be enough for deliberate murders of so many 
civilians?"

Tokaca agreed that plea agreements of the kind reached by Bralo and Plavsic - 
where the accused admits some crimes in return for other charges being dropped, 
or in the hope of a lighter sentence - are a "problem". "Guilty pleas are 
important, but not as important for the reconciliation process as one might 
think," he said. "What actually hurts victims the most is when war criminals 
get very light sentences after guilty pleas. The victims see it almost as an 
insult."

He cited as an example the case of Drazen Erdemovic, who received a five-year 
sentence for shooting prisoners during the Srebrenica massacre.

Erdemovic, who was a young man at the time of the atrocity, broke down in court 
and told the judges that he himself would have been killed if he hadn't gone 
through with the executions. But Bilic, for his part, described the sentence he 
received as "outrageous". "I know a man who worked at a local petrol station 
and got 11 years because he shot an intruder who tried to rob him while he was 
at work," he said. "How can that be fair?"

In fact, the ICTY's sentencing policies are a major bone of contention in 
general, not just in those specific situations where plea agreements are 
employed.

"There were too many cases when ICTY judges passed sentences that were very 
light," Becirevic told IWPR, echoing a widely-heard sentiment. She added that 
from her point of view, they seemed to have done this "to save time, money and 
resources".

"In my opinion," she said, "that's where the tribunal failed the most."

FACING UP TO THE PAST 

Besides reservations concerning the punishments handed down to convicted war 
criminals, many observers say a rather different obstacle to reconciliation is 
the resistance displayed by so many people in the Balkans to the reality of 
what occurred in the Nineties.

The website of the ICTY boasts that in the light of the court's work, "It is 
now not tenable for anyone to dispute the reality of the crimes that were 
committed in and around Bratunac, Brcko, Celebici, Dubrovnik, Foca, Prijedor, 
Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Zvornik to name but a few."

But the fact is that across the region, many people continue to do just that. 
"Every ethnic group accuses the ICTY of being biased as soon as people from 
their ranks are put on trial," explained Charles Ingaro, a professor of history 
at Purdue University.

"We still have a long way to go before we finally accept the truth, no matter 
how hard or painful that may be," agreed Todorovic.

Bloomfield, for his part, suggested that the region as a whole is probably 
"decades away from a shared truth of what happened in the Bosnian war".

The Serb community is often the primary focus of criticism concerning 
unwillingness to face the past. Many Serbs continue to hold up Karadzic and 
Mladic as heroes for their roles in the Bosnian war, for instance, despite the 
enormous quantities of evidence suggesting their responsibility for war crimes.

A human rights activist in Serbia, who preferred not to be named, suggested 
that the problem is at its most intractable there. "Many here, if they did not 
participate directly in the crimes, then they ignored them.... And many have 
continuously supported the perpetrators of those crimes," he said. "So it's 
obvious why they don't want to accept the truth about the war that the ICTY is 
presenting to them - if they did that, then they would admit that they 
personally supported war crimes."

Tokaca argued that among Serbs in Bosnia, in particular, this tendency to avoid 
painful truths is also fuelled by a fear that admitting Serb war crimes could 
jeopardise the autonomy they currently enjoy within the Republika Srpska, which 
itself emerged as a result of the conflict.

But it is by no means the case that resistance to the idea that one's ethnic 
kin committed atrocities is limited to Serbs. In Croatia, for instance, a 
private foundation channels funds for the defence of senior Croats charged with 
war crimes. And when it emerged that the current Croatian president, Stjepan 
Mesic, had secretly testified in The Hague in the trial of the Croat commander 
Tihomir Blaskic, the response from some quarters was virulent, with one 
newspaper running the headline "Mesic's knife in Croatia's back". 

At the same time, many Serbs are highly critical of Bosnian Muslims' 
interpretation of what happened during the war in Bosnia. They argue that the 
standard narrative of events in the Srebrenica area, for instance, largely 
ignores what they say were major Serb casualties, and crimes committed by 
Muslim fighters.

This latter controversy was stirred up following a recent decision by Hague 
judges to sentence Naser Oric, a high-profile commander of Muslim forces in 
Srebrenica, to two years in prison in connection with abuse of prisoners during 
the war. Oric, who had already served his time whilst standing trial, was 
released immediately. 

Senior Serb politicians reacted angrily to the verdict, claiming that it made a 
mockery of the suffering of local Serbs at the hands of Muslims during the war.

In Ahmici, a Bosnian army soldier who wished to remain anonymous, offered his 
own explanation of the continuing resistance to the truth in Bosnia. Suggesting 
that "history has always been written by the winners", he said, "The problem is 
that there are no winners in this war."

REACHING OUT

Many local and international observers told IWPR, however, that the ICTY itself 
is far from blameless when it comes to this persistent phenomenon in the 
Balkans of reluctance to face up to recent history.

Currently, the court has an outreach department which maintains offices in 
Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Pristina and The Hague, employing a total of ten 
people. Their activities include hosting conferences in conjunction with local 
non-governmental organisations, and producing CD-ROMs which explain the court's 
work in relation to some of the most notorious events of the early Nineties. 
The department is also involved in capacity-building work with local courts in 
the region.

However, the outreach service was only established in late 1999, many years 
after the ICTY was first set up. Up until around this time, the court employed 
no speakers of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian in its public information section.

David Gray, a visiting assistant professor of law at Duke
University Law School who has written on transitional justice, emphasises how 
important it is that the activities of institutions like the ICTY are visible 
to people in the regions they deal with.

"Transparency is one of those essential features of democracy and the rule of 
law that is notably absent in abusive regimes," he said. "To keep faith with 
their commitments to these principles, transitions and their supporters, 
including international tribunals, must function transparently."

Eric Stover, the director of the University of California, Berkeley Human 
Rights Centre, argued that international criminal tribunals should not become 
engaged in "social engineering", and that they should focus their work on the 
demanding task of rendering fair and impartial justice in difficult 
circumstances. "But as they work to that end, tribunals need to find ways of 
engaging communities so that those most affected by mass violence come to 
understand the criminal justice process," he added.

The ICTY's current efforts to reach out to people in the Balkans receive some 
praise.

Todorovic told IWPR that when the Helsinki Committee organised conferences 
along with ICTY outreach staff to publicise the court's findings in relation to 
some of the worst crimes committed during the Bosnian conflict, many of those 
who attended were initially sceptical. But their reactions to the meetings were 
"amazing".

"When faced with the true nature of the crimes committed, they were shocked," 
he remembered. "They all - without a single exception - condemned those crimes. 
Some of them were very emotional, some cried. They said that while they knew 
some crimes were committed, they were not aware of their full scale and the 
horror the victims went through."

Tokaca agreed that the tribunal's more recent efforts have been impressive, 
"When their policy changed and they started with more aggressive outreach 
several years ago, the effects were almost immediate," he told IWPR. "People in 
the areas where the crimes were committed were able to see first hand what 
really happened and were forced to face the truth."

But he underlined that such work should have begun much earlier.

Indeed, many are agreed that the delays in undertaking outreach work in the 
Balkans has been a major obstacle to the ICTY's chances of contributing to 
reconciliation there.

A report released earlier this year by the Scholars' Initiative - an 
association of international academics concerned with mapping the recent 
history of the Balkans, of which Ingaro is a member - notes, "In retrospect 
perhaps it [the ICTY] can even be said to have been seriously negligent in its 
failure to address this audience.

"Given the relative incomprehensibility of the tribunal and the lack of 
commensurability between its achievements and expectations within the region, 
the local peoples have often tended to the conclusion that the tribunal favours 
other interests than their own.

"In these circumstances, it has been possible for politicians to 'fish in 
troubled waters', and seek to use criticism of the tribunal (some of it, but by 
no means all, well-founded) to further their own ends."

Ingaro himself describes the ICTY's "lack of sensitivity towards public 
perception" in the early days as "a major mistake", the effects of which are 
still felt today. "They didn't know how they wanted to be perceived in 
Belgrade, Zagreb or Sarajevo; they acted in a very institutionalised way," he 
told IWPR.

"The work of the ICTY could have been publicised in the former Yugoslavia to a 
far greater extent," agreed Richard Goldstone, who was the chief prosecutor at 
the court in the early years of its existence.

"I would agree that it would have been ideal for outreach to have begun at the 
outset, when the ICTY was established," the court's deputy outreach 
coordinator, Olga Kavran, told IWPR.

"However, it is very difficult to say how much would have been accomplished 
given the situation on the ground," she added. "The war was still raging and, 
after the end of the war, the governments on the ground were generally hostile 
to the tribunal, especially those of Serbia, Croatia and Republika Srpska."

Kavran also noted that resources are "a serious constraint", and explained that 
the outreach department has never been part of the tribunal's main budget and 
is forced to survive on voluntary contributions.

"However, despite all of this, outreach has been able to accomplish a great 
deal," she said.

Judge Pocar, for his part, underlined that while outreach "may help the 
reconciliation process", for a criminal tribunal like the ICTY it is "in a way 
a sort of side activity" rather than a main priority. At the same time, he 
said, "In my view the outreach service is a good one. Whether it does all that 
could be done, that is another question - that depends on resources."

Hazan suggests that the lack of any real effort on this front for the first 
half of the ICTY's lifespan is linked to the way in which the institution came 
into being in the first place.

In his opinion, the court was created as a kind of "fig leaf" or "alibi", 
partly in order that the West would be seen to be doing something about the 
Balkans crisis. "The ICTY was established to be a PR exercise - or PR gadget - 
over western public opinion, and was not designed to address the people in the 
Balkans," he explained.

He added that a concern to keep the court alive forced staff to neglect those 
who were actually supposed to benefit from its work in the early days, in order 
to gear their efforts towards impressing those in the West who had the powers 
to provide funding and arrest suspects. It was only once the court was more 
firmly established, he says, that it was really free to focus on people in the 
Balkans.

The Scholars' Initiative report echoes this sentiment, noting, "The orientation 
which it [the ICTY] has adopted towards global actors, and global criteria of 
its success, have resulted in it turning, to some extent, a blank façade 
towards the very region which might have been presumed to be its most important 
constituency - the peoples of the former Yugoslavia."

POLITICAL BARRIERS

While the court may have been at fault in relation to issues such as outreach, 
some observers say political factors far beyond its control are also always 
likely to act as major obstacles to reconciliation.

"The large political questions that remain unresolved I believe stand in the 
way of reconciliation in the humanitarian sense of the word," Burg told IWPR. 
"Because reconciliation requires first and foremost problems to be settled. 
Whether people like the settlement or not, they have to be settled. And then 
people have to reconcile themselves to those circumstances and then to each 
other."

Among issues which have the potential to stand in the way of reconciliation 
efforts in the Balkans, he listed questions surrounding the nature of the 
Bosnian state and the future of Kosovo.

Addressing the specific situation in Bosnia, Tokaca pointed to factors such as 
its two ethnically-defined entities and "bad constitution", and agreed that 
"the problems are so deeply rooted in the society, so many issues remain 
unresolved... that it is really hard to be an optimist".

Todorovic also underlined that the ICTY has to contend with resistance from 
actors in the region itself. "Unfortunately, those who are in positions of 
power in Bosnia are still largely against reconciliation," he said. "They 
undermine every effort made in that direction."

GIVE IT TIME

In view of the complexity of the problem of post-conflict reconciliation and 
the lack of research that has been carried out in this field, some observers 
are keen to underscore the difficulty of predicting how all of these issues 
will unfold in the Balkans.

"A lot of the thinking that we have on this comes from the Second World War, 
when we're talking about countries reconciling across a national border," 
Bloomfield told IWPR. He expressed doubts about how neatly such lessons might 
apply to the recent conflicts that occurred in the Balkans, where survivors are 
often forced to go on living directly alongside those who were to blame for 
brutalities.

However, many are agreed that at this point in time it is still very early to 
be looking at whether reconciliation is occurring, and to be reviewing the 
ICTY's role in that process.

"Reconciliation, if it is to be achieved, is an immense task which will clearly 
require more than judicial intervention, and will extend well beyond the 
lifetime of the tribunal," the Scholars' Initiative report notes.

The anonymous human rights activist in Serbia suggested that it would be for 
future generations who had no direct involvement in the conflicts of the 
Nineties to finally come to terms with what happened.

In the meantime, Hatidza Mehmedovic continues to go about her daily life in 
Srebrenica. "Of course, nothing can bring my children back," she said.

"What gives me strength and hope, though, is when I see that Muslims are 
returning to their homes - about 4,500 of them have returned to the Srebrenica 
municipality. Some of them come only on weekends, some stay in the daytime and 
leave at night, but the numbers are increasing gradually.

"I'm sure we'll be able to live with our Serb neighbours again, but we'll all 
have to work on it. Serbs will have to accept the truth and the responsibility 
for their crimes sooner or later, and we will have to forgive them. That's the 
only path to reconciliation in this country. But we will never forget."

Another interviewee, a Serb resident of Sarajevo who hasn't seen her husband 
since he was arrested during the war, told IWPR, "There cannot be lasting peace 
and true reconciliation until all sides put their cards on the table and tell 
the truth about crimes that were committed by members of their ethnic groups. 

"We need to know where our loved ones are buried, where their bones are and we 
are all entitled to that - Serbs, Muslims and Croats alike. Only then can we 
talk about reconciliation." 

This report was researched and compiled by Merdijana Sadovic, an IWPR 
contributor in Sarajevo and Ahmici; Michael Farquhar, an IWPR reporter in 
London; Caroline Tosh, an IWPR contributor in London; and Janet Anderson, the 
director of IWPR's International Justice Programme in The Hague.

 

****************** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net ****************

These weekly reports, produced since 1996, detail events and issues at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY, at The Hague.

Tribunal Update, produced by IWPR's human rights and media training project, 
seeks to contribute to regional and international understanding of the war 
crimes prosecution process.

Tribunal Update is supported by the European Commission, the Dutch Ministry for 
Development and Cooperation, the Swedish International Development and 
Cooperation Agency, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and other funders. 
IWPR also acknowledges general support from the Ford Foundation.

The Institute for War & Peace Reporting is a London-based independent 
non-profit organisation supporting regional media and democratic change.

48 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7831 1030  Fax: +44 (0)20 7831 1050

For further information on this project and other reporting services and media 
programmes, visit IWPR's website: www.iwpr.net

Editor-in-Chief: Anthony Borden; Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan; Senior Editor: 
John MacLeod; Hague Project Manager: Janet Anderson; Translation: Predrag 
Brebanovic, and others.

The opinions expressed in Tribunal Update are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent those of the publication or of IWPR.

ISSN 1477-7940 Copyright © 2006 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting 

TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 462

Reply via email to