WELCOME TO IWPR’S ICTY - TRIBUNAL UPDATE No. 556, June 20, 2008

IS KOSOVO HEADING FOR PARTITION?  As new constitution comes into force, 
communal divisions and a row over the international presence threaten to split 
province.  By Nedim Sarac in Sarajevo

NGOS CALL FOR WAR CRIMES COMMISSION  They say regional body would help set 
historical record straight and aid reconciliation process.  By Aleksandar 
Roknic in Belgrade

BOSNIA: THE MUJAHEDIN UNMASKED  Recent book fills important gaps in what we 
know about the mysterious foreign fighters.  By Merdijana Sadovic in Sarajevo

COURTSIDE:

JOURNALIST SAYS GLAVAS ASSASSINATION STORY FABRICATED  Croatian reporter tells 
court that a newspaper report which backed assassination claim was not true.  
By Goran Jungvirth in Zagreb

BRIEFLY NOTED:

CROATIA FACES STATE ARCHIVE DEMAND  Tribunal prosecutors ask judges to order 
Zagreb to hand over military files in Gotovina trial.  By Goran Jungvirth in 
Zagreb

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IS KOSOVO HEADING FOR PARTITION?

As new constitution comes into force, communal divisions and a row over the 
international presence threaten to split province.

By Nedim Sarac in Sarajevo

Kosovo’s first constitution, which came into effect on June 15, could further 
inflame ethnic tensions in the province and even lead to partition, say 
analysts.

“The new constitution shows that Kosovo is a democratic country and has 
accepted and will respect the highest international values and standards,” said 
Kosovo president Fatmir Sejdiu at the ceremony marking the most important event 
for Kosovo since it unilaterally proclaimed independence from Serbia on 
February 17.

But representatives of Kosovo’s Serb minority say the constitution proclaimed 
in Pristina means nothing to them, and insist they will set up their own 
parliament. 

Belgrade’s fundamentally opposition to independence remains unchanged.

“Serbia regards Kosovo as its own southern province, and is defending its 
integrity by peaceful means, through diplomacy rather than force,” Serbian 
president Boris Tadic said this week. 

Observers fear that Kosovo faces a territorial split between the ethnic 
Albanian community – which comprises 90 per cent of the population – and the 
Serb minority. 

The constitution, introduced at a low-key ceremony held in the capital 
Pristina, has done little to end the confusion about where ultimate authority 
in Kosovo now resides.

UN STILL FORMALLY IN CHARGE

Despite the proclamation of the constitution, the United Nations mission UNMIK, 
which has administered the region since it was set up by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 after the Kosovo war ended in 1999, still holds formal power. 

More than 40 countries have recognised the independence of Kosovo, but Belgrade 
and Moscow are vehemently opposed to sovereignty, which they regard as a 
reckless breach of international law.   

Russia would certainly use its Security Council veto to obstruct any 
application from Pristina for a UN seat, a key sign of statehood. In order to 
neutralise Russian opposition, at least 100 member states would have to 
recognise the entity’s independence.

UNMIK has administered Kosovo – formerly a Serbian province – since June 1999, 
when NATO troops drove Serbian forces out of the province. 

Although the war broke out in 1999, the division between its two main 
communities had begun much earlier. For years, the two million ethnic Albanians 
and around 120,000 Serbs had led parallel, separate lives – deeply mistrustful 
of and occasionally hostile towards one another. 

International negotiations to resolve Kosovo’s status began in 2006, and the 
following year, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari submitted a proposal to 
Belgrade and Pristina suggesting “supervised independence” for Kosovo. This 
formed the basis for a draft Security Council resolution as well as for the new 
constitution of Kosovo. 

As part of the transition to independence, Ahtisaari proposed replacing UNMIK 
with a significantly reduced international presence, in the shape of the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission, EULEX, which would exist until power could 
be vested entirely in the authorities of the nascent state.

The EU mission is already present in Kosovo, although just 300 out of the 
planned 2,200 staff have been deployed so far.

However, Ahtisaari’s plan never won official acceptance due to Serbian and 
Russian opposition. While the Kosovo constitution calls for the EU to take over 
the supervisory role of the UN, Serbia and Russia insist that any EU mission is 
illegal because it lacks the approval of the UN Security Council. 

To end the impasse and prevent a power vacuum in Kosovo, UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon last week put forward a proposal to “reconfigure” the role of 
UNMIK. 

The proposal – revealed in two letters sent to Belgrade and Pristina – permits 
EULEX to deploy under the umbrella of the UN, and removes the need for a 
Security Council resolution to be passed transferring UNMIK’s authority to the 
EU.

But the Secretary General’s long-awaited plan was swiftly rejected by both 
Moscow and Belgrade, which accused Ban of overstepping his power.

“Since the goal of EULEX is to implement Kosovo's independence… it's obvious 
that this mission is in direct contravention of both [Security Council] 
Resolution 1244 and the Serbian constitution,” Serbian prime minister Vojislav 
Kostunica said this week.

TWO INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS INSTEAD OF ONE

It seems that despite the UN chief’s instruction last week, it remains unclear 
who is to run Kosovo in future, and how that should happen.

Commenting on the secretary general’s “reconfiguration” plan, Tim Judah, a 
British journalist and expert on Kosovo, said in a recent BBC interview, “There 
were two different letters. One was sent to the president of Serbia, Boris 
Tadic, and the other to Fatmir Sejdiu, who although addressed as “Excellency” 
appeared otherwise not to be president like his Serbian counterpart.  

“[A letter addressed to Albanian leaders] allows them to pretend that they are 
able to exercise power on the entire territory of Kosovo, but in reality 
everybody knows that they control just its predominantly Albanian parts. On the 
other hand, Ban Ki-moon’s [letter to Belgrade] allows Serbs to continue to 
pretend that Kosovo is not independent.”

He concluded, “This all adds to the confusion and does not help clarify the 
situation at all."

Many observers believe Kosovo will end up with two international missions 
instead of one, neither of them equipped with a clear mandate or legal 
framework. 

EULEX will provide assistance to the Kosovo Albanian administration, while 
UNMIK – unable to withdraw without Security Council approval for ceding control 
to the EU – will maintain a presence in municipalities with a Serb majority. 

“Having two international missions on the ground – the EU dealing with 
Albanians and the UN with Serbs in the north – will only widen the ethnic 
divide,” Agron Bajrami, editor-in-chief of the Pristina daily Koha Ditore told 
IWPR.  

“We are entering a process which is very risky and that could lead to the 
division of Kosovo,” he said, warning that lack of agreement over governance 
could result in “a prolonged frozen conflict”.
  
The EU’s special representative for Kosovo, Peter Feith, told The Financial 
Times that “functional partition” of Kosovo might take place.

“Mr Ban assured Serbia he would maintain the status quo in Serb-majority areas 
for a ‘limited duration’. This leaves space for Belgrade to run northern Kosovo 
and achieve functional partition,” he warned. 

Yet Feith also insisted that the western-backed plan for Kosovo’s statehood was 
moving forward despite “legal stumbles”.

MITROVICA WORKS TOWARDS DE FACTO PARTITION 

Earlier this month, Feith stressed that “that the state of Kosovo must rule in 
its entire territory”.   

But Kosovo’s Serbs are unlikely to accept that, and have already announced 
plans to form the Kosovo Serb Assembly in Kosovska Mitrovica in the north of 
the province on June 28.

Serb leader Nebojsa Jovic told Belgrade radio B92 that the constitution 
proclaimed in Pristina “means nothing to Kosovo Serbs”, who are determined to 
form their own parliament.  

According to news agency reports, Serbia’s minister for Kosovo, Slobodan 
Samardzic, said his country expects to get extensive rights to administer 
Kosovo Serb areas.

“These parallel institutions, this functional division only represent the facts 
on the ground,” he said. 

The 120,000 Kosovo Serbs are already, slowly but surely, creating parallel 
institutions for local government, education and healthcare, with financial and 
political backing from Belgrade. Most Serbs have withdrawn from institutions 
like the Kosovo police service and judiciary. 

Since the independence of Kosovo was proclaimed, Belgrade has consolidated its 
grip on Serb-held areas, especially in the region north of the divided city of 
Mitrovica. The region of Mitrovica north of the river Ibar River adjoins 
Serbia, and is under the de facto control of Belgrade.

But around two thirds of the Serbs in Kosovo live south of the Ibar, in 
isolated enclaves with no land link to Serbia. Yet even in these isolated Serb 
islands surrounded by an Albanian majority, everything is still tied to 
Belgrade – from schools to car licence plates, and from the health system to 
cell phone providers.   

Although Serbs living in those enclaves remain defiant when it comes to issues 
such as independence and a constitution for Kosovo, their tone is softer and 
more conciliatory than that people living in the north.

“Serbs in Kosovo will never accept the independence and the constitution of the 
province, but that does not mean that we are not going to respect the law,” 
Rada Trajkovic, president of the Serbian National Council for Central Kosovo, 
told IWPR. “We have to cooperate with the authorities on a daily basis.”

Trajkovic adds that a partition of Kosovo between Serbs and ethnic Albanians is 
not a solution.

“If partition took place, we would have another mass exodus from Kosovo Serb 
enclaves – around 90,000 people would leave their homes. Also, that would 
create chaos in the entire region.”

Sonja Biserko, head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, told 
IWPR that the political elite in Belgrade might be prepared to accept Kosovo’s 
independence, as long as they could carve off the northern territory of 
Mitrovica in compensation. 

“However, Belgrade authorities are aware that at the moment this is not 
possible due to the balance of power on the international scene,” she added.

“They are hoping that in the future they might have a stronger Russia on their 
side, that the US will turn its back to the Balkans, and that the EU will be 
even more divided.”

“HISTORIC DEAL” NEEDED

Biserko says that partition – which she called the “worst-case scenario”– could 
be avoided if the international community invested more energy and creativity 
into the Balkans, which is still fragile following the conflicts of the 
Nineties.

“It is crucial not just for Serbia but for the entire region to speed up the 
process of joining the EU,” she said. “That is the only way to prevent from 
repeating the nightmares of the Nineties that Kosovo and other countries in the 
region went through.”

Dejan Anastasijevic, a journalist and political analyst from Belgrade, told 
IWPR that the situation in Kosovo would remain unstable for a long time, maybe 
for years.

To resolve the problem, a “historic deal” between Pristina and Belgrade had to 
be reached, he said.

“For such a deal, we would need a stable political situation and mature 
political elites in Belgrade and Pristina. A more balanced and unified approach 
from the international community would also be helpful,” he said.

“The current politicians, both in Belgrade and in Pristina, use Kosovo’s status 
as a tool to gain political power. I don’t see that changing in the near 
future.”

Nedim Sarac is a Sarajevo-based journalist.


NGOS CALL FOR WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

They say regional body would help set historical record straight and aid 
reconciliation process.

By Aleksandar Roknic in Belgrade

Balkans NGOs want to found a special regional commission capable of 
establishing a coherent account of war crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

The is Research and Documentation Centre, RDC, in Sarajevo, Documenta in Zagreb 
and the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Fund, FHP, hope one million people will 
sign up to their initiative between now and the end of the year. 

Already, some 50 victims’ associations have backed the idea, they say. 

FHP executive director Natasa Kandic said that war crimes trials alone were not 
sufficient to create a historical record of what happened during the conflicts, 
or to promote reconciliation.

“By the end of 2020, courts in the region could have prosecuted at least 1,200 
war crimes perpetrators, but this doesn’t give us a correct picture of war 
crimes, nor restore human dignity to the victims or confidence between 
nations,” Kandic told a conference held on June 17 in Belgrade.

“The regional commission could secure clear evidence about how state 
institutions failed to defend human rights in the past.”  

During the wars in Bosnia and Croatia in the early Nineties, and the 1999 war 
in Kosovo, some 120,000 people were killed and 17,000 are still missing. 

Kandic said the commission would help the voices of victims to be heard. 

“The main idea is for this commission to establish the facts about war crimes, 
because all sides have different explanations,” a source who is involved with 
the commission proposal, but wished to remain anonymous, told IWPR.

The NGOs would like the commission to run for two or three years and to be free 
from government interference – and, when it finishes its work, report on what 
really happened and recommend what legislation would most help the victims, 
added the source.

The fate of the massive archive of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, ICTY, was also discussed at the conference.

Former ICTY state prosecutor Richard Goldstone will advise the United Nations 
Security Council, UNSC, by the end of the year on what the archives should be 
used for after the court closes in 2010, who should have access, and where it 
should be based. 

The archives will be a very valuable source of information to both prosecutors 
and historians, and there has been a great deal of debate about where it should 
be located.

Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia each say they should house the archive, with state 
officials from all countries worried that top secret documents – surrendered to 
the tribunal under protective measures – might be exploited by other countries. 

Representatives of the three NGOs think the archive must be returned to the 
region, because this would help national war crimes investigations and speed up 
the reconciliation process.

Florence Hartmann, a former spokeswoman for Hague prosecutors who participated 
in the conference, agreed.

“We can only find out the objective facts about war crimes by looking 
meticulously through the tribunal archive. And that could lead to 
reconciliation between nations and an acceptance of recent history,” she said. 

Zoran Pajic, the new president of FHP’s executive board, told the conference 
that the Council of Europe could encourage Balkan states to rewrite their 
historical textbooks that cover the wars.

However, Pajic, who is a law professor at King's College London, said that as 
things stood at present, people awaiting trial in the tribunal’s detention unit 
were better off than victims and their families. 

Victims of the wars are unsatisfied with both domestic and international 
courts, feel they lack state support and must rely on NGOs, he said. 

“Indicted people have the support of their own countries, also their families, 
but victims haven’t got all this. Victims need compensation, not only money, 
but also social and medical help,” said Pajic. 

“A lot of money and effort was spent on the national and international 
judiciary in recent years to try war crimes. But in the end, those for whom it 
was done, the victims, are not satisfied.”

Aleksandar Roknic is an IWPR-trained reporter in Belgrade.


BOSNIA: THE MUJAHEDIN UNMASKED

Recent book fills important gaps in what we know about the mysterious foreign 
fighters.

By Merdijana Sadovic in Sarajevo

Most of the mujahedin fighters who arrived to fight alongside government forces 
during the Bosnian war knew virtually nothing about the country.

“They joked about how at the beginning they didn’t know if Bosnia was in South 
America, North America, Europe or Australia,” said Evan F Kohlmann, an expert 
on terrorism and adviser to the American government and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  

The revelation is contained in a little-publicised book – “Al Qaeda in Bosnia: 
Myth or Reality?” by Vlado Azinovic – which tells more about the mujahedin and 
their role in the Bosnian war of 1992 to 1995 than any of the recent Hague 
tribunal trials in which they have featured, the latest being the prosecution 
of Bosnian army general Rasim Delic.

In the book, Radio Free Europe, RFE, editor Azinovic conducts interviews with 
journalists, politicians and FBI agents to provide an account of who the 
mujahedin were and how they came to Bosnia – some of the biggest mysteries of 
the bitter conflict.

The part played by the mujahedin has come under particular scrutiny in the 
Delic case, which closed last week as judges retired to consider a verdict.

Delic has been prosecuted for failing to prevent or punish crimes committed by 
the El-Mujahid detachment, which was meant to be subordinated to the 3rd Corps 
of the Bosnian army, ABiH, during the war. Members of the unit are alleged to 
have slaughtered and abused dozens of Croat and Serb prisoners between 1993 and 
1995. 

The Delic case, like others before it, examined the degree to which the Bosnian 
army exercised command responsibility over the mujahedin, but left a lot of 
questions about the group unanswered.

WHO WERE THE MUJAHEDIN?

According to Azinovic’s account, the mujahedin movement which first came to 
Bosnia in 1992 grew out of the contingent of foreign Muslims who fought 
alongside Afghan resistance forces in their ten-year war against Soviet 
occupation.

“They were Arabs… mainly from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Jordan,” said 
Kohlmann.

During the 1979-1989 war, Arab and other foreign Muslims fought as part of the 
Afghan mujahedin, supported by the United States and other powers, which 
supplied weapons and general equipment. 

The struggle against the Soviets attracted thousands of volunteers, mainly from 
Arab countries, and their governments also supplied financial support. Saudi 
Arabia played a prominent role, and one of the mediators in bringing Saudi 
money and volunteers to Afghanistan was the then little-known Osama bin Laden. 

When the Soviet army eventually withdrew, Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, an 
influential leader and recruiter of “Afghan Arabs”, declared the end of an era 
in which the political will of world superpowers dominated 

Azinovic explains in his book that the triumph in Afghanistan was seen as the 
first phase of a global fight for the establishment of Islamic states - the 
international jihad. 

HOW DID THE MUJAHEDIN ARRIVE IN BOSNIA?

The breakout of the Bosnian war in spring 1992 proved timely for many followers 
of Azzam’s ideas – they used the sufferings of Muslim people there as a pretext 
to come and fight, said Azinovic.

“Bosnia happened to come about at a propitious time,” said Kohlmann, noting 
that in 1989, Azzam was killed along with his two sons when his car exploded in 
Peshawar.

“The leaders of the movement were shattered. The Pakistani government decided 
that the jihad was over and they didn’t want foreign mujahedin fighters in 
their country any more, so they kicked them out in 1993,” he said.

Kohlmann explained the series of events in 1992 and 1993 which brought the 
mujahedin to Bosnia. 

“You had a period where the mujahedin are going from their naissance stage in 
Afghanistan under the watchful eye of Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden to the 
stage where they are going into the international jihad action, moving beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan – exactly what Bin Laden had always dreamed of,” he 
said. 

“And so the first place they came to was Bosnia.”

At first, the Sarajevo authorities were unsure why these foreign fighters had 
come, said Azinovic. Bosnian intelligence and authorities believed that 
mujahedin were brought into the country against the will of the Sarajevo-based 
government, and with the assistance of western security agencies. 

According to him, some mujahedin were suspected of doing intelligence work, 
while others were thought to be trying to strengthen Islamic sentiment and 
ideology in Bosniak-held territories. 

Bosniak member of the state presidency, Haris Silajdzic, who was Bosnia’s 
minister of foreign affairs at the time, said Muslim fighters arrived without 
an invitation.

“There were 600 to 700 of these people and most of them had arrived with 
honourable intentions to help Bosnia,” said Silajdzic.

“However, let me make this clear – nobody invited them, they arrived on their 
own.”

Kohlmann, who has researched the arrival of Afghan veterans in Bosnia, said 
there are documents from al-Qaeda as well as from Bosnian secret services which 
point to the same conclusion.

“Generally, at the beginning [the mujahedin] came on their own and have not 
been drafted – definitely not by somebody from Bosnia,” said Kohlmann.

They were instead spurred into action by international reporting on the Bosnian 
war, he said.

“They had seen media reports about the situation in Bosnia and they believed 
that genocide against Muslims was taking place there, so they took that as a 
reason for a new jihad,” he added.

Yet, in his book, Azinovic notes that international investigations conducted 
after the war determined that certain Sarajevo officials, as well as some 
foreign humanitarian organisations, backed the mujahedin’s arrival. 

Kohlmann recalled that as the war dragged on, international opinion turned 
against the Serbs and became largely supportive of the Muslim side. At this 
time, a recruitment drive began in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and mosque 
representatives and other recruiters started sending individuals to fight in 
Bosnia.

“It’s true that not all of these people were brought in with the knowledge of 
the Bosnian government,” he said.

HOW STRONG WERE THEY?

Azinovic said it is unclear how many foreign Muslim volunteers fought alongside 
the regular Bosnian army during the war. He cites local estimates which suggest 
there were around 3,000 of them. 

According to Esad Hecimovic, a reporter with Sarajevo-based weekly Dani, there 
are no reliable records to give an idea of mujahedin numbers.

Records show that some 400 foreign fighters contacted with local authorities at 
that time, for example to get passports and other personal documents endorsed. 
There are also documents containing lists of members of the El Mujahed 
detachment, a more formal unit whose status as part of the Bosnian military 
remains disputed. 

“However, this sort of evidence is unreliable because the majority of these 
people did not reveal their real identity to military or civil authorities. 
Therefore we don’t know how many of them were there or who they were,” said 
Hecimovic.

But while the number of the mujahedin in wartime Bosnia is still a mystery, 
said Kohlmann, there is very little doubt about their role there – to help 
counter what began as the superior military might of the Serbs. 

“The Serbs had the larger numbers of troops, they had better equipment, they 
had both the technological advantage and also, in some way, the propaganda 
advantage,” he said.

“The Bosnian military needed a boogieman, they needed somebody to scare the 
living daylights out of the Serbs and the Croats; they needed someone to make 
the Serbs and the Croats rethink their strategy of trying to take parts of 
Bosnia.”

According to Kohlmann, the mujahedin proved fearless on the battlefield.

“When you are confronting a superior force…you need hardcore, well-trained 
fighters; guys that aren’t afraid to die in combat; that would run straight 
into the line of enemy fire; that would dance across the minefield – do things 
that Bosnian soldiers would never, ever do,” he said.

Yet according to Silajdzic, the Bosnian army did not need the extra manpower 
supplied by the mujahedin.

“We didn’t need people, we needed weapons. But these people arrived anyway, and 
they evidently harmed the image of Bosnia,” he said.

The mujahedin, said Kohlmann, soon gained notoriety, “Within just a few days, 
or few weeks of being in combat in Bosnia they really made a name for 
themselves. Not as those great conventional fighters, but rather as those who 
are probably predisposed to commit war crimes on the battlefield.” 

As evidence of their brutality, Kohlmann said that when Serb soldiers killed 
two foreign Muslim fighters during the war, among their belongings, they found 
photos of mujahedin holding the severed heads of Serbs.

“They were actually taking these heads and they were collecting them in boxes 
to take back with them,” added Kohlmann. 

“This was not even so much a jihad at the beginning as it was a human safari.”

MUJAHEDIN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH BOSNIAN ARMY

A number of trials in The Hague, including that of Delic, have looked at the 
extent to which foreign Muslim combatants were subordinate to the Bosnian 
military command after the creation of the El Mujahed detachment. The Delic 
indictment lists a number of war crimes attributed to this unit. 

When they first arrived, the mujahedin irregulars do not appear to have been 
under the control of the Bosnian army.

“For the most part, these folks were independent units; they were fighting 
alongside Bosniaks, in some cases they were fighting alongside Bosnian military 
units,” said Kohlmann.

“But it would be a stretch to say that in the first year of the war they were 
closely commanded by anyone in the Bosnian military.”

At first, the foreign fighters established camps in central Bosnia, said 
Hecimovic, using remote mountain locations away from prying eyes, “It was only 
some time in April of 1993 that they took over a building in Zenica (Bosnia’s 
third largest city) and established their main headquarters there, after their 
armed forces had driven out units of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO).”

In the late summer of 1993, the Bosnian military tried to gain control over the 
mujahedin by integrating them more closely into the army. They established the 
El Mujahed detachment, consisting mainly of foreign Muslim fighters, which was 
intended to serve under the direct command of the Bosnian army's 3rd Corps.

The question of who had de facto control over the El Mujahed detachment is 
central to the Delic case. Prosecutors maintain the general had authority over 
them, while the defence argues they reported only to militant Islamist groups, 
like al-Qaeda, outside the country. 

A judgement date for the trial has not yet been set.

Merdijana Sadovic is IWPR’s international justice/ICTY programme manager.

Vlado Azinovic is an RFE editor and IWPR contributor.


COURTSIDE:

JOURNALIST SAYS GLAVAS ASSASSINATION STORY FABRICATED

Croatian reporter tells court that a newspaper report which backed 
assassination claim was not true. 

By Goran Jungvirth in Zagreb

A journalist told the trial of Branimir Glavas at Zagreb County Court this week 
that a newspaper article describing an assassination attempt on the Croatian 
politician by a Serb civilian was made up.

Croatian troops who gunned Serb civilian Cedomir Vuckovic down in September 
1991 claimed that they were thwarting an assassination attempt against Glavas.

However, other witnesses have testified that Vuckovic was first tortured and 
then killed on the pretext that he was a “terrorist who wanted to kill Glavas”. 
Forensic evidence presented during the case suggests that Vuckovic actually 
died from poisoning, and that he was trying to escape over a fence – not trying 
to attack Glavas – when he was shot. 

Vuckovic is one of the victims cited in the indictment issued against Glavas 
and six others for war crimes in the town of Osijek in late 1991. 

They are charged with torturing civilians in a garage, forcing Vuckovic to 
drink battery acid. Other civilians were shot and thrown into the Drava river, 
their mouths bound with gaffer tape, according to the indictment. 

Initially, some of Glavas’s co-defendants confirmed he was involved in the 
crimes, yet when the case came to trial they retracted their statements and 
accused police of forcing them to confess.

Robert Pauletic, a former reporter with Croatian weekly Slobodni Tjednik, is 
the named author of an article published at the time headlined “Assassination 
Attempt on Branimir Glavas Foiled”.

He told judges this week how the piece came to be written. He said that he made 
some rough notes after a colleague – Slovenian photo-journalist Alojz 
Krivobrada – told him about the alleged assassination attempt on Glavas by an 
apparently armed Vuckovic.

Krivobrada – who did not witness the incident, but heard what had happened from 
Croatian soldiers there – also produced some photographs of the crime scene. 

Pauletic gave his notes to his editor, the late Marinko Bozic, who instead of 
investigating the story to find out if it was true, wrote a piece from the 
notes and put Pauletic's name on it. According to the witness, Bozic changed 
and added information when he wrote the article – although he gave no further 
details on this.

Pauletic said that Glavas probably didn't call Bozic to tell him what to 
publish in the story,  which backed the version of events described by Croatian 
forces – which was published throuhgout the Croatian media. 

Drazen Rajkovic, another journalist and Pauletic’s former colleague, testified 
that the article could have been written by Bozic. 

While Rajkovic didn’t explain what he meant by this,  Bozic was seen by many as 
a journalist who put sensationalism ahead of the truth.

Both journalists told the court that media was often used for propaganda 
purposes in newly independent Croatia.

Two other reporters, Dario Topic and Davor Spisic, also testified this week. 

The journalists published an interview with Glavas in the Croatian regional 
daily Glas Slavonije in 1992. In the interview, which was read out at a hearing 
on June 17, the politician described how Osijek was defended against Serb 
troops and how weapons were obtained.

Both witnesses said the interview was conducted because Glavas was considered a 
very important and interesting person at the time.

The prosecution have tried to show that Glavas was the main military and 
political figure in the city from the start of its defence, and that’s why he 
was interesting to the Croatian media.

Yet Glavas has claimed since the beginning of the trial that he was not the 
most influential person in Osijek during the war and that other politicians – 
notably Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, official Vladimir Seks – had much more 
power than he did.

Glavas’s defence said the Glas Slavonije interview did not prove anything.

The trial continues next week.

Goran Jungvirth is an IWPR-trained journalist in Zagreb.


BRIEFLY NOTED:

CROATIA FACES STATE ARCHIVE DEMAND

Tribunal prosecutors ask judges to order Zagreb to hand over military files in 
Gotovina trial.

By Goran Jungvirth in Zagreb

The Hague tribunal’s chief prosecutor has asked the trial chamber prosecuting 
three Croatian generals to issue an order compelling Croatia to supply material 
from its state archives.

Serge Brammertz submitted the application on June 13, to the trial chamber 
prosecuting Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac.

The Croatian generals are currently standing trial for war crimes committed 
during and after the Operation Storm offensive of August 1995, when the army 
retook parts of Croatia that had been occupied by Serb rebels since 1991.

In the submission, Brammertz said “Croatia has failed to produce military 
documents relevant to the artillery operations carried out during Operation 
Storm”, as well as documents relating to Markac’s special police units, despite 
prosecution requests dating back to November 2006.

The Office of the Prosecutor, OTP, has asked the trial chamber to order Croatia 
to deliver the papers in question within two weeks.

Although the Croatian authorities have had 18 months to find the documents, 
they have not handed them over, nor made sincere efforts to find them, said the 
prosecution.
 
However, Deputy Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor told reporters on June 17 that 
while Croatia was “sincerely and fully” cooperating with the United Nations 
court, the government could not surrender the documents because it did not have 
them.

“Of the 788 requests, the government has partly failed to meet only one that 
concerns documents we cannot find,” said Kosor, adding that the government had 
told prosecutors several times that the documents could not be traced.

“Several internal investigations have been carried out, the commissions are 
working, but for now there have been no results.”  

The defence teams of the three generals are expected to respond next week.

Luka Misetic, Gotovina's lawyer, suggested that the prosecutors were already 
preparing for a defeat.

“[It is] a regular occurrence for the prosecution to create an alibi for 
acquittal,” said Misetic. 

“Now…three months into the trial, to say that that the Croatian government is 
obstructing their work is simply shocking.” 

The trial of the generals began on March 11, 2008.

Goran Jungvirth is an IWPR-trained journalist in Zagreb.

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