I installed Trisquel 8 on 01/12/2017.

Soon, I think it was the first day but am not sure, I had a problem with Abrowser and the Trisquel site which I posted here - https://trisquel.info/en/forum/flidas-and-abrowser

I ended up without Abrowser and was pretty happy using dooble except I didn't figure out how to download with it. I think it might be a 'save link' function but that didn't occur to me

Yesterday,
I downloaded, unpacked and did a dd to thumbdrive of GuixSD.

Later I installed bleachbit - http://archive.trisquel.info/trisquel/pool/main/b/bleachbit/bleachbit_1.0-1_all.deb

but also tried to install the latest version - https://www.bleachbit.org/download/file/t?file=bleachbit_1.12_all_ubuntu1604.deb

I was using the terminal due to the browser issue, wget and maybe ftp, the terminal's history function and copying and pasting. I screwed up and got my commands mixed up at some point during the bleachbit story and suddenly the terminal filled up with a bunch of binary looking stuff. It might have happened when I ran something like this command 'sudo dpkg -i bleachbit_1.0-1_all.deb' I mean I screwed up and maybe entered 'wget sudo dpkg -i bleachbit_1.0-1_all.deb' in the terminal.

Anyway, I don't know what happened but it was unsettling so a little while later I downloaded chkrootkit and ran it. Got the result below.

Searching for Linux/Ebury - Operation Windigo ssh... Possible Linux/Ebury - Operation Windigo installetd

Looking up further info saw the possibilty of a false positive but follow up tests didn't turn out well.

I think I flunked every test listed here:
https://www.cert-bund.de/ebury-faq

# ipcs -m
------ Shared Memory Segments --------
key        shmid      owner     perms      bytes      nattch
0x000006e0 65538      root      666        3283128    0
(that is an exact match to the example on the cert-bund website, the good news was this, "Please note that the SHMs are only created on the first event of data exfiltration – so immediately after a reboot of the system, the malicious SHMs will probably not show up in the output of 'ipcs -m'." So maybe I caught it before it got to do its dasterdly deeds.)

Cert-bund says, "On Linux-based systems, an additional shared library file 'libns2.so' is installed and the existing libkeyutils file is patched to link against this library instead of libc6. The malicious 'libns2.so' file can be located by running the following command, which should not return any results on clean systems. "

I had it:
# find /lib* -type f -name libns2.so
/lib64/libns2.so

I think this is like a backdoor waiting to be knocked on
netstat -nap | grep "@/proc/udevd"
george@Trisquel:~/myScripts$ unix 2 [ ACC ] STREAM LISTENING 5597 2529/atd @/proc/udevd

Based on the results of 'ipcs -m', 'find /lib* -type f -name libns2.so' and netstat -nap | grep "@/proc/udevd" I figured it was a high probabilty I was infected and trying to clean wasn't an option.

So I reformatted and reinstalled.
Currently Abrowser works like it should and haven't had any problem with Trisquel's certificate.

chkrootkit still comes back with:
Searching for Linux/Ebury - Operation Windigo ssh... Possible Linux/Ebury - Operation Windigo installetd

This file is mentioned (I'm not sure what I saw yesterday before reformating):
find /lib* -type f -name libkeyutils.so* -exec ls -la {} \;
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 14256 Dec 10 2015 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libkeyutils.so.1.5

but according to the cert-bund, "If any file is larger than 25 kilobytes in size, it is most probably a malicious version of the library," and mine is only around 14 kb.

ls -als | grep libkeyutils*
Binary file libkeyutils.so.1.5 matches
 and a simple 'ls -als' shows:
0 lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 18 Jan 17 21:56 libkeyutils.so.1 -> libkeyutils.so.1.5
  16 -rw-r--r--  1 root root   14256 Dec 10  2015 libkeyutils.so.1.5
in the list.

but this comes up clean:
find /lib* -type f -name libns2.so

and this comes back empty as well:
sudo netstat -nap | grep "@/proc/udevd"

So now I think there is a good chance I am not infected, but still am wary.
From what I've read this 'libkeyutils.so.1 -> libkeyutils.so.1.5' is really important. How does one verify they have a good version? Any other recommendations? Maybe I am just paranoid?

I skimmed through a 69 page pdf called Operation Windigo yesterday and this is a serious threat. People often say Linux is secure but reading this document would have made my hair curl if I had any. That's here if anyone is interested:
http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/operation_windigo.pdf

But even so I am really liking Flidas



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