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Research Fellow in Verified Operating System Security http://jobs.unimelb.edu.au/caw/en/job/900474/research-fellow-in-verified-operating-system-security The seL4 project and I am seeking a highly motivated postdoctoral researcher to investigate methods for proving that operating system kernels can defend against timing channels. We are seeking somebody with a research background in formal methods and security. You will contribute to the development of methods for reasoning about timing channels in verified operating system kernels, applied to the seL4 kernel. Your work will also investigate how to extend seL4’s existing proofs of information flow security, which primarily cover storage channels, to also encompass timing channels. Further details about the research project are summarised in the following position paper: Gernot Heiser, Gerwin Klein and Toby Murray. "Can We Prove Time Protection?" in Proceedings of the Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS), pages 23-29, May 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.08338 The position is for two years in the first instance, based at the University of Melbourne under Dr Toby Murray (https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/tobym/). You will work with a close-knit team here at University of Melbourne, and collaborate heavily with UNSW and Data61’s Trustworthy Systems group, in Sydney. Candidates should have experience in at least one of the following: - program verification (e.g. Hoare logic) - information flow security (e.g. non-interference) - interactive theorem provers (e.g. Isabelle, Coq, etc.) Applications close on August 30, 11:55pm Australian Eastern Standard Time (GMT +10) http://jobs.unimelb.edu.au/caw/en/job/900474/research-fellow-in-verified-operating-system-security Informal enquiries should be directed to Toby Murray toby.mur...@unimelb.edu.au https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/tobym/