Hi AKASHI, On Tue, 17 Sep 2019 at 19:23, AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org> wrote: > > For FIT verification, all the properties of a public key come from > "control fdt" pointed to by fdt_blob. In UEFI secure boot, on the other > hand, a public key is located and retrieved from dedicated signature > database stored as UEFI variables. > > Added two fields may hold values of a public key if fdt_blob is NULL, and > will be used in rsa_verify_with_pkey() to verify a signature in UEFI > sub-system. > > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.aka...@linaro.org> > --- > include/image.h | 2 ++ > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h > index 97b6a82d9754..685f5181c829 100644 > --- a/include/image.h > +++ b/include/image.h > @@ -1136,6 +1136,8 @@ struct image_sign_info { > struct checksum_algo *checksum; /* Checksum algorithm information */ > struct padding_algo *padding; /* Padding algorithm information */ > struct crypto_algo *crypto; /* Crypto algorithm information */ > + const void *key; > + int keylen;
Please do add comments. Also if these only relate to EFI they should have efi_ prefix and probably an #ifdef. > const void *fdt_blob; /* FDT containing public keys */ > int required_keynode; /* Node offset of key to use: -1=any > */ > const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */ > -- > 2.21.0 > Regards, Simon _______________________________________________ U-Boot mailing list U-Boot@lists.denx.de https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-boot