On 09/05/2020 11:04, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 5/6/20 5:04 PM, Grant Likely wrote:
On 05/05/2020 18:57, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 05.05.20 19:23, Grant Likely wrote:
On 05/05/2020 18:04, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 05.05.20 13:15, Grant Likely wrote:
On 01/05/2020 10:33, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 4/30/20 9:13 PM, Sughosh Ganu wrote:
On Fri, 1 May 2020 at 00:09, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.g...@gmx.de
<mailto:xypron.g...@gmx.de>> wrote:
On 4/30/20 7:36 PM, Sughosh Ganu wrote:
> Add support for the get_image_info and set_image routines,
which are
> part of the efi firmware management protocol.
>
> The current implementation uses the set_image routine for
updating the
> u-boot binary image for the qemu arm64 platform. This is
supported
> using the capsule-on-disk feature of the uefi
specification,
wherein
> the firmware image to be updated is placed on the efi
system
partition
> as a efi capsule under EFI/UpdateCapsule/ directory.
Support
has been
> added for updating the u-boot image on platforms booting
with arm
> trusted firmware(tf-a), where the u-boot image gets
booted as
the BL33
> payload(bl33.bin).
>
> The feature can be enabled by the following config options
>
> CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y
> CONFIG_EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_PROTOCOL=y
>
> Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.g...@linaro.org
<mailto:sughosh.g...@linaro.org>>
U-Boot's UEFI subsystem should work in the same way for x86,
ARM, and
RISC-V. Please, come up with an architecture independent
solution.
Please check the explanation that I gave in the other mail. If you
check
the patch series, the actual capsule authentication logic has been
kept
architecture agnostic, in efi_capsule.c. The fmp protocol is very
much
intended for allowing platforms to define their firmware update
routines. Edk2 also has platform specific implementation of the fmp
protocol under the edk2-platforms directory.
-sughosh
My idea is that for most platforms it will be enough to have a common
FMP implementation that consumes a capsule
* with one or more binaries
* a media device path, a start address, and a truncation flag
for each of the binaries
The protocol implementation then will write the binaries to the
device
paths:
* to an SD-Card or eMMC exposing the Block IO protocol
for most devices
* to a file in case of the Raspberry Pi or the Sandbox or QEMU
(and truncate it if the truncation flag is set)
Does U-Boot have a common device path protocol that can be backed by
either a block device or a file on a filesystem? I didn't think it
did.
A block device, a partition, and a file all can be described by an UEFI
media device path.
Sure, from a UEFI media path, but does the underlying U-Boot
implementation have that abstraction?
With a file media path we can find the partition device path on which
the Simple file protocol is already installed by U-Boot.
In the mean time, there are at least three backends that the FMP is
going to have to deal with; the two you list above (block device &
file)
and SMC backed when updating firmware is managed by the secure world.
This first implementation only handles the file-backed use case.
Can we
start with that limitation and refactor when the block-device and SMC
use cases are added in? I would hate to see this functionality held up
on having to refactor other functionality in U-Boot.
I would prefer one single FMP driver for all SMC use cases. Everything
device specific should be handled in the secure world.
Not all platforms will be able to put firmware update into the secure
world. For instance, Not many Arm v7 platforms have trustzone accessible
to open source developers. On non-secure platforms (e.g., anything that
loads firmware from a regular filesystem on SD or eMMC) it doesn't make
much sense to loop out to secure firmware when U-Boot owns the
filesystem and the secure world would then need to coordinate with
U-Boot to commit the writes.
All of the code can certainly be in the same location, but I do think
there are three distinct generic backends for firmware updates:
- normal-world file-backed (using filesystem)
- normal-world block-backed (offsets from start of device)
These two could be in one instance of the FMP protocol.
- secure device backed (needs to go into secure world for unpacking and
processing regardless)
There doesn't need to be platform-specific code in any of those back
ends, but they do have different behaviour.
Is there already a protocol defined for the communication of capsule
updates between the firmware and the secure monitor, e.g. in EDK2?
Nothing defined yet (see below)
Would we simply use the UpdateCapsule() call parameters and pass them
via an SMC call?
If secure world is handling the update? Yes, I think a thin
UpdateCapsule() SMC makes sense, with the bonus that UpdateCapsule() at
runtime becomes feasible on U-Boot. There are a couple of people inside
Arm looking at possible interfaces. In this situation there is very
little done in normal-world at all.
[...]
According to my call with Sughosh the whole semihosting thing is about
providing a testing possibility not about any real use case.
Yes, it's for testing, but it is particularly valuable testing because
it allows the host filesystem to be exposed into QEMU. Exposing
semihosting as a generic fstype_info in U-Boot is generically useful
apart from this entire discussion! :-)
If we rework the semihosting code to be just another FS driver, then I
think it is just an implementation detail on the file-backed firmware
update path.
In this case it could be completely separate from this patch series.
Where do you see the benefit of semi-hosting compared to mounting an
image?
Both are important. We need test benches for both file and block device
update scenarios.
g.
Best regards
Heinrich
On QEMU you can easily mount an image as block device using parameters
of the qemu-system-* command. On the mounted image/block-device you can
test both file and block device based firmware updates. On the sandbox
you could use the 'host bind' command for mounting an image.
Similar to the above, this would be an implementation detail on the
block-device backed firmware update path. We need both.
g.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy
the information in any medium. Thank you.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy
the information in any medium. Thank you.
[08.05 23:22] <apalos> who will provide the file path protocol and
potential offsets?
[09.05 12:02] <xypron> The media device path and the offsets have to be
provided by the one who builds the capsule and the must be integral part
of the capsule.
Best regards
I'm not convinced that is true. The capsule may not be able to have that
information. In the case of A/B updates, the firmware needs to track
between the active and inactive copies, and always write the firmware to
the appropriate location. I think it makes more sense for each firmware
blob to be identified for what it is, and the firmware know the location
where each image should be written (or at least have a default write
location built in; there will probably be exceptions once in a while)
g.
Heinrich
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient,
please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any
other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any
medium. Thank you.
