On Sun, Jun 19, 2022 at 02:20:20PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > This commit adds the menu-driven UEFI Secure Boot Key > enrollment interface. User can enroll the PK, KEK, db > and dbx by selecting EFI Signature Lists file. > After the PK is enrolled, UEFI Secure Boot is enabled and > EFI Signature Lists file must be signed by KEK or PK. > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.koj...@linaro.org> > --- > cmd/Makefile | 3 + > cmd/eficonfig.c | 3 + > cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c | 202 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/efi_config.h | 3 + > 4 files changed, 211 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c > > diff --git a/cmd/Makefile b/cmd/Makefile > index 0afa687e94..9d87b639fc 100644 > --- a/cmd/Makefile > +++ b/cmd/Makefile > @@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EEPROM) += eeprom.o > obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi.o > obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EFIDEBUG) += efidebug.o > obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EFICONFIG) += eficonfig.o > +ifdef CONFIG_CMD_EFICONFIG > +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) += eficonfig_sbkey.o > +endif > obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_ELF) += elf.o > obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EROFS) += erofs.o > obj-$(CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER) += exit.o > diff --git a/cmd/eficonfig.c b/cmd/eficonfig.c > index e62f5e41a4..e6d2cba9c5 100644 > --- a/cmd/eficonfig.c > +++ b/cmd/eficonfig.c > @@ -1832,6 +1832,9 @@ static const struct eficonfig_item > maintenance_menu_items[] = { > {"Edit Boot Option", eficonfig_process_edit_boot_option}, > {"Change Boot Order", eficonfig_process_change_boot_order}, > {"Delete Boot Option", eficonfig_process_delete_boot_option}, > +#if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > + {"Secure Boot Configuration", eficonfig_process_secure_boot_config}, > +#endif > {"Quit", eficonfig_process_quit}, > }; > > diff --git a/cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c b/cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..a5c0dbe9b3 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c > @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ > +/* > + * Menu-driven UEFI Secure Boot key maintenance > + * > + * Copyright (c) 2022 Masahisa Kojima, Linaro Limited > + */ > + > +#include <ansi.h> > +#include <common.h> > +#include <charset.h> > +#include <hexdump.h> > +#include <log.h> > +#include <malloc.h> > +#include <menu.h> > +#include <efi_loader.h> > +#include <efi_config.h> > +#include <efi_variable.h> > +#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h> > + > +static bool is_secureboot_enabled(void) > +{ > + efi_status_t ret; > + u8 secure_boot; > + efi_uintn_t size; > + > + size = sizeof(secure_boot); > + ret = efi_get_variable_int(u"SecureBoot", &efi_global_variable_guid, > + NULL, &size, &secure_boot, NULL); > + > + return secure_boot == 1; > +} > + > +static efi_status_t eficonfig_process_enroll_key(void *data) > +{ > + u32 attr; > + char *buf = NULL; > + efi_uintn_t size; > + efi_status_t ret; > + struct efi_file_handle *f; > + struct efi_file_handle *root; > + struct eficonfig_select_file_info file_info; > + > + file_info.current_path = calloc(1, EFICONFIG_FILE_PATH_BUF_SIZE); > + if (!file_info.current_path) > + goto out; > + > + ret = eficonfig_select_file_handler(&file_info); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + goto out; > + > + ret = efi_open_volume_int(file_info.current_volume, &root); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + goto out; > + > + ret = efi_file_open_int(root, &f, file_info.current_path, > EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, 0); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + goto out; > + > + size = 0; > + ret = EFI_CALL(f->getinfo(f, &efi_file_info_guid, &size, NULL)); > + if (ret != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) > + goto out; > + > + buf = calloc(1, size); > + if (!buf) { > + ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + goto out; > + } > + ret = EFI_CALL(f->getinfo(f, &efi_file_info_guid, &size, buf)); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + goto out; > + > + size = ((struct efi_file_info *)buf)->file_size; > + free(buf);
You should set buf to NULL here. > + > + buf = calloc(1, size); > + if (!buf) > + goto out; > + > + ret = efi_file_read_int(f, &size, buf); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS || size == 0) > + goto out; > + > + attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | > + EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | > + EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | > + EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS; > + /* PK can enroll only one certificate */ > + if (u16_strcmp(data, u"PK")) { > + efi_uintn_t db_size = 0; > + > + /* check the variable exists. If exists, add APPEND_WRITE > attribute */ > + ret = efi_get_variable_int(data, efi_auth_var_get_guid(data), > NULL, > + &db_size, NULL, NULL); > + if (ret == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) > + attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE; > + } > + Why are we appending? Shouldn't we always overwrite the platform key? > + ret = efi_set_variable_int((u16 *)data, efi_auth_var_get_guid((u16 > *)data), > + attr, size, buf, false); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + eficonfig_print_msg("ERROR! Fail to update signature database"); > + goto out; > + } > + > +out: > + free(file_info.current_path); > + free(buf); > + > [...] Thanks /Ilias