Hello,

Similar to CVE-2021-39685 affecting the Linux kernel U-Boot is vulnerable to a 
buffer overflow
present in the USB Gadget stack. Handling of a control transfer request with 
wLength larger than
USB_BUFSIZ (4096) may result in a buffer overflow.

The buffer for USB control endpoint is allocated in the composite_bind function 
implemented in
drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c. The buffer size is set to USB_BUFSIZ (4096) 
bytes.

>       /* preallocate control response and buffer */
>       cdev->req = usb_ep_alloc_request(gadget->ep0, GFP_KERNEL);
>       if (!cdev->req)
>               goto fail;
>       cdev->req->buf = memalign(CONFIG_SYS_CACHELINE_SIZE, USB_BUFSIZ);
>       if (!cdev->req->buf)
>               goto fail;
>       cdev->req->complete = composite_setup_complete;
>       gadget->ep0->driver_data = cdev;

In the composite_setup function data transfer phase is set up to the length of 
"value" bytes
which in multiple cases may be controlled by an attacker (is set to wLength).

>       if (value >= 0) {
>               req->length = value;
>               req->zero = value < w_length;
>               value = usb_ep_queue(gadget->ep0, req, GFP_KERNEL);
>               if (value < 0) {
>                       debug("ep_queue --> %d\n", value);
>                       req->status = 0;
>                       composite_setup_complete(gadget->ep0, req);
>               }
>       }

In example the OS descriptor handler may be forced to set value to w_length.

> } else {
>     /* "extended compatibility ID"s */
>     count = count_ext_compat(os_desc_cfg);
>     buf[8] = count;
>     count *= 24; /* 24 B/ext compat desc */
>     count += 16; /* header */
>     put_unaligned_le32(count, buf);
>     buf += 16;
>     fill_ext_compat(os_desc_cfg, buf);
>     value = w_length;
> }

Execution of this code path for wLength set to a value larger then USB_BUFSIZ 
will result
in a buffer overflow. Since wLength is a double byte value it may have values 
up to 0xffff.

Besides the common OS descriptor handler this issue may be exploited for some 
of the available
gadgets e.g. f_dfu, f_sdp where "value" is derived from wLength.

drivers/usb/gadget/f_dfu.c
> static int handle_dnload(struct usb_gadget *gadget, u16 len)
> {
>       struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = get_gadget_data(gadget);
>       struct usb_request *req = cdev->req;
>       struct f_dfu *f_dfu = req->context;
> 
>       if (len == 0)
>               f_dfu->dfu_state = DFU_STATE_dfuMANIFEST_SYNC;
> 
>       req->complete = dnload_request_complete;
> 
>       return len;
> }

drivers/usb/gadget/f_sdp.c
> if (req_type == USB_TYPE_CLASS) {
>    int report = w_value & HID_REPORT_ID_MASK;
> 
>     /* HID (SDP) request */
>     switch (ctrl->bRequest) {
>     case HID_REQ_SET_REPORT:
>         switch (report) {
>         case 1:
>             value = SDP_COMMAND_LEN + 1;
>             req->complete = sdp_rx_command_complete;
>             sdp_func->ep_int_enable = false;
>             break;
>         case 2:
>             value = len;
>             req->complete = sdp_rx_data_complete;
>             sdp_func->state = SDP_STATE_RX_FILE_DATA_BUSY;
>             break;
>         }
>     }
> }

Please find attached a patch addressing this issue.
Depending on request direction wLength larger than USB_BUFSIZ will result in 
either
endpoint stall or value trim.

Best regards,
Szymon
From 1723d976ab0387be0d91b177011559cb07a66e03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidr...@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 17:55:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent buffer overflow on USB control endpoint

Assure that the control endpoint buffer of size USB_BUFSIZ (4096)
can not be overflown during handling of USB control transfer
requests with wLength greater than USB_BUFSIZ.

Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidr...@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c
index 2a309e62..cb89f6dc 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c
@@ -1019,6 +1019,17 @@ composite_setup(struct usb_gadget *gadget, const struct 
usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl)
        u8                              endp;
        struct usb_configuration        *c;
 
+       if (w_length > USB_BUFSIZ) {
+               if (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) {
+                       /* Cast away the const, we are going to overwrite on 
purpose. */
+                       __le16 *temp = (__le16 *)&ctrl->wLength;
+                       *temp = cpu_to_le16(USB_BUFSIZ);
+                       w_length = USB_BUFSIZ;
+               } else {
+                       goto done;
+               }
+       }
+
        /*
         * partial re-init of the response message; the function or the
         * gadget might need to intercept e.g. a control-OUT completion
-- 
2.38.1

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