All other error paths in padding_pss_verify() return negative error codes (-EINVAL, -ENOMEM), which is the same as the rest of the U-Boot RSA stack. The positive value is inconsistent with U-Boot's convention and is a potential bug: any caller that tests (ret < 0) to detect failure would incorrectly treat a malformed PSS signature as a success.
Signed-off-by: Aristo Chen <[email protected]> --- lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c index 3169c3a6dd1..28d1a915d94 100644 --- a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ int padding_pss_verify(struct image_sign_info *info, if (db_nopad[0] != 0x01) { printf("%s: invalid pss padding ", __func__); printf("(leftmost byte of db after 0-padding isn't 0x01)\n"); - ret = EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } -- 2.43.0
