(In reply to Brian Smith (:briansmith), was bsm...@mozilla.com (:bsmith) from 
comment #94)
> 1) I see in the patch that this is a build option that is off by default. I
> would prefer it to be ON by default for all Linux desktop builds, and if
> libsecret isn't available at runtime, then we just don't use it and we
> disable the Firefox UI related to the Gnome Keyring. Is there anything
> inherently wrong with doing it this way?

It shouldn't be a problem if we can dynamically load the library at
runtime.

> 3) The Gnome keyring should never store/protect a password that the user
> entered. Instead, it should store a randomly-generated key (e.g. 32 bytes of
> randomness from nsIRandomGenerator, or similar). NSS's protection of the
> master password is very weak, and also users will almost always choose
> relatively weak passwords, so using a random key as the NSS password is
> important.

This has a drawback however: if for some reason you lose your keyring
then you loose all your saved passwords. It also means that you can't
move your profile across machines unless you also move the keyring (or
write down the random-generated password). If the master password by
itself is week wouldn't it be better to generate a random salt and store
it in plain-text in the profile and then use the master password + salt
for the encryption? That would improve the effectiveness of the
resulting encryption while keeping a password that cannot be remembered
by the user. Would there be any downsides to doing it this way?

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/217300

Title:
  Seahorse integration

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/firefox/+bug/217300/+subscriptions

-- 
ubuntu-bugs mailing list
ubuntu-bugs@lists.ubuntu.com
https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-bugs

Reply via email to