Public bug reported:
Neomutt gives no possible way to send a PGP-encrypted msg and then save
an unencrypted local copy. This forces users to choose from the
following workflows:
1) Encrypt the msg only to the recipients & store a copy of it, which
the sender can never again see the payload they sent. In this case the
body of the msg is just a useless & space-wasting blob. The sender can
have a record that they sent a msg (the metadata) but no way to recall
what they sent. In fact the payload serves as a risk with zero benefit,
because in the event that the recipients key is compromized the sender’s
copy can then be read by an adversary.
2) The sender adds an “encrypt-to” config option to gpg.conf that causes
all msgs sent to be encrypted to themself. This enables the sender to
keep an accessible record of what they sent out. One side-effect is that
they may choose to keep email records longer than they keep their
private key, and so when they lose or delete their private key or
password, they can no longer access records of what they sent. That’s
not serious, but consider this scenario: Alice anonymously sends a
highly sensitive PGP-encrypted msg to wikileaks & forgets that she has
everything set to encrypt to self. Wikileaks (or someone forcing
wikileaks) can run pgpdump on the encrypted payload and see Alice’s
keyID. Doxxed!
Both options 1 & 2 need improvement.
Approach 1 can be improved by giving users the option to store metadata
only. Mutt should save only the headers (perhaps including the original
payload size), but delete the payload itself both for security and for
wiser use of storage space.
Approach 2 should perhaps be possible for users who want that option
(everyone has their own threat model), but there needs to a be a 3rd
option: give users the possibility to store a plaintext copy so they are
not always at risk of accidentally doxxing themselves.
** Affects: neomutt (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1977567
Title:
security oversight that makes users vulnerable to doxxing
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