On Wed, May 25, 2011 at 11:49:45AM -0700, Steve Langasek wrote: > I'd much rather we find a way to fix it so the information *logged* to these > files isn't privileged to the point that it can't be exposed to admins, > instead of gutting admins' ability to make use of these crucial logs.
Currently, the upstream kernel folks have rejected filtering printk. However, there has been some noise recently about making a distinction between the "actual" address and the "unrandomized" address. (As in, printk would be forced to use a new %p modifier for all kernel addresses, and that modifier would report the "unrandomized" address by default, keeping the actual address secret even from dmesg. We'll see how this progresses... -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team -- ubuntu-devel mailing list ubuntu-devel@lists.ubuntu.com Modify settings or unsubscribe at: https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-devel
