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.................That the UPC in general and the
leadership in particular tended to divide along broadly North-South lines is
fairly clear. Why this occurred is rather less clear. Some politicians,
particularly some Baganda, tried consciously to bring such a division about, on
the grounds that UPC policy of reducing regional inequities by furthering the
advance of Northern districts generally and of individual Northerners in
particular, was being carried too far. But this explicitly regional appeal
seemed to have carried little weight among UPC leaders. Moreover, insofar as
this argument gained any currency at all, it did so mainly after the split in
UPC became generally known rather than before, so that the appeal seemed to have
been an effect or reflection of the division rather than a cause of it. More
relevant to an explanation of the division, probably, is the gradual erosion
that occurred in the post-independence period of the trust and confidence which
the principle UPC leaders had developed in one another during the
pre-independence period. Exactly how and why this erosion took place can
probably not be known until the participants them selves describe what
happened, but the following general considerations seem, prima facie, to be
relevant. A group such as UPC leadership derives its cohesion not from an
impersonally organised system of roles and authority relations, that is, not
from the kind of system that holds a civil service or army together, but from
the personal knowledge the members have one another and in particular from the
trust and confidence they come to feel in each other's judgment and word. In
such a group coalition and alliances of course form-- for collective decisions
must be reached, and unanimity is a rare condition-- but these tend to be
unstable: new ones form as different issues come up and dissolve as the matters
that occasion them are decided.
If the condition of trust within a group as a whole
should become eroded, however, members will find them selves in ambiguous
circumstances when making decisions. They will not know whose
expressed views to take at face value and whose to discount, or who can be
counted on to discharge a responsibility
reliably and who can be expected to use the opportunity to further his own ends.
Under such conditions they will tend to feel that, generally speaking, they are
safer trusting those whose backgrounds are similar to their own and less safe
trusting others. Coalitions and alliances will thus tend to form on the basis of
similar backgrounds. Such alliances are usually stabler than those formed in
connection with particular issues, though, since in the nature of the case the
members'back grounds do not change. They thus have a mechanical, repetitive
quality to them, and in due course give raise to well-defined, continuing blocs.
In the kind of environment in which a group like the UPC leadership has to
operate, there is one condition in particular that seems to have an especially
corrosive effect on the degree of the trust with in the group. This condition
develops when the members come to know that each is subject to
considerable pressure and inducement from various out side groups to act in
certain ways within the group, but have no way of knowing with any
certainty of whether or to what extent each has, in fact, been co-opted by or
become a supporter of one or another outside interest. Known out side
affiliations seem not to have strong negative effects, presumably just because
they are known. They can be openly referred to in debate and taken into account
when evaluating what a man says or when deciding whether or not he should be
given a particular responsibility. But that is exactly what can not be done when
external affiliations are merely suspected and would be denied if openly
broached. The thought that some among a man's colleagues are secretly in league
with out siders, particularly out siders whose interests he does not share or
may even actively oppose, and hence whose aim may well be to remove him from
power-- it is this thought that when held by several members of the group,
rapidly erodes whatever degree of trust they may have had in one
another.
How far such general considerations go in
explaining the division within UPC leadership in 1964 and 1965 is, as was said ,
impossible to know at the present time. But there is some circumstantial
information which makes them at least seem relevant. A number of countries-- The
US Russia, Britain, China, and so forth-- were indeed actively involved in
trying to influence Uganda policy. And UPC leaders, as well as others, did
become concerned with the question of who was receiving what aid from whom and
for what purposes. But this question, once asked, can almost never be
satisfactorily answered, and the possibility of a cumulative process of doubt
and discord thereupon becomes very real. Conceivably, the UPC leadership might
have remained intact, despite the corrosive effects resulting from these
influences, in the lines of conflicting arising from the Buganda question
had cut across the lines of conflict arising from the cold war pressures, But
they paralled them instead, and the strains from these two sources of tension
increased at the same time and in the same degree. And when they were coupled
with the regional blocs so engendered, the combined effect proved completely
disruptive. Obote and his associates, on the one hand, and Ibingira and his
associates, on the other, came increasingly to doubt the other's intentions. In
due course each group considered it had enough information to assume its doubts
were well-founded, and each prepared to act against the other.
The split between the two wings was evident, as was
said, in virtually all of the functional and regional arms of the party. In late
1965 and early 1966 attention centered principally on control of the rapidly
growing UPC organization in Buganda, however, where an Obote-affiliated faction
led by Binaisa was opposed by an Ibingira-affiliated faction led by Lumu. The
increasing weakness of KY and its imitate demise, coupled with the parallel
growth of UPC, had induced a number of leading Baganda to decide that the best
protection for their interests lay in joining UPC, organising UPC chapters in
Buganda, and, by using their delegate strength in support of the "Moderates",
tempering national policy toward Buganda. The Buganda region UPC, which had
limped along for several years with hardly more than a token membership, thus
suddenly found its self, in the middle of 1965, acquiring new members at the
rate of several thousands a week. Most national politicians from Buganda,
including all but one of the Baganda ministers in the national government, and
many other Baganda as well, opposed what was sometimes referred to as "The mengo
clique". The core of this group was formed by a number of baganda notables who
had strong vested interests in the existing structure of political, economical,
and social power in Buganda and who in consequence pursued a policy aimed at
preserving intact for as long as possible, one, Buganda's relative autonomy
within Uganda, which protected the structure from the modernizing forces in the
national government, and two, the Kabaka's powers, which formed the apex of the
structure of control and gave it its stability. However, only the most 'radical'
or 'militant' UPC politicians from Buganda had openly and from the start
attacked the Buganda establishment; the others had preferred to work with in the
frame work of compromise and to reform the system from the top to down. Hence it
was that, at the time of its sudden growth, the Buganda region UPC was in the
hands of the 'militants'. Faced with the probable loss of their positions,
because relatively few of the converts from KY shared their 'radical' views, the
existing UPC leadership in Buganda called a delegates'confrence in August 1965,
and held an election that , essentially, confirmed them in their posts for
another year. The action was immediately challenged by the increasingly larger
opposition factions, and in December the UPC Central Executive Committee
suspended two of the Baganda 'militants' Bidandi Sali and Kintu Musoke, declared
the August elections invalid, and ordered new ones. The decision was
subsequently confirmed by the party's national executive, and in the new
elections, in February 1966, the Lumu-led "moderate" faction defeated the
Binaisa-led "radical" faction for control of Buganda Region UPC.
The whole development deepened the split between
the two UPC wings, beyond a point at which a compromise resolution of their
differences in the interests of party unity could have been arranged, and it
indicated that the "moderates" within UPC were clearly in position to launch a
potentially successful attack on Obote's leadership. It also made clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Buganda question was at the heart of the differences
and that the out come of a showdown would inevitably determine in what manner,
and on what terms, Buganda would be further incorporated into the evolving
national society; either the compromise frame work would be more or less
preserved, and "moderate" Baganda, such as Lumu and Mayanja-Nkangi, the
Buganda Katikiro, would play a far more influential role than they has before,
and thus in effect mediate between the conservatives, vested interests in
Buganda and the centralizing , moderate forces in the national government; or
the frame work would be dispensed with, the more "radical",
anti-establishment Baganda would come to have substantial influence in the
national government, and a sustained attack would be launched on Buganda's
autonomy, The Kabaka's powers, and the whole "Traditional" structure of
interests and controls.
To be continued
The Obote revolution coming up
(Don't go yet !!!)
The Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" Groupe de communication Mulindwas "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie" |
- ugnet_: BUGANDA IN UGANDA (Uganda People's Congress) Mulindwa Edward
- Mulindwa Edward
