David Martin 1974
General Amin. London, Faber & Faber.
Ch 1. The Rise of Amin. Pp. 11 – 26. (Excerpt from
pp. 16 -20)
“Amin’s mixed background has given him a smattering
of five languages. He speaks Kakwa and some Luganda, having been raised in the
part of Uganda where those vernacular (sic) are spoken. From the army
he learned Swahili which is the language of command, as limited English, which
is laboured when he is reading prepared text, and somewhat better during his
impromptu harangues. The only language he speaks reasonably well is a type of
broken Arabic referred to as Nubian which is used by the West Nile Muslim
colony in Buganda.
“Since coming to power, and for several months before
that, Amin has made much of his Islamic beliefs. The Nubian-Islamic impact was
felt most in West Nile, but at the time of the coup less than 6 per
cent of Uganda were Muslims. Amin’s devotion to Islam has been particularly
manifest publicly since he broke relations with Israel in 1972, but it is
clear his beliefs are tailored to his political needs.
“The background of his four wives is revealing. The
first, Sarah, also known as Mama Maliam’, only converted to Islam in 1968
after ten years of marriage. The second, Kay, is the daughter of a Protestant
clergyman and still a Christian. The third, Norah, is also a Protestant, and
her parents are Balokoli (sic), which is the Uganda equivalent of
Puritans. His fourth wife, Medina, whom Amin claims was ‘given’ him in 1971,
was the only Muslim at marriage. To marry three Christians in succession and
to make little effort to convert them to Islam hardly smacks of a devout
Muslim.
“A more interesting side of his nature is provided by
his service record in colonial times. Africans who served with him in this
period in the King’s African Rifles recount that he was frequently in
trouble.
“One story hold that after Amin had become a sergeant
he was caught in bed with a colleague’s wife and pursued naked down Nakuru
Street. A British officer, quoted in Sunday Telegraph, recalled: ‘In
1955 there was only one blot on his copybook. His record showed that he had
had venereal disease which made him ineligible for a good conduct stripe.’
“But other stories are far less humorous. As a
corporal fighting the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s he established a sadistic
record. In Uganda the north-eastern Karamajong tribe, who traditionally go
about naked, were notable cattle rustlers who periodically had to be disarmed.
Naturally, they were reluctant to surrender their spears and shield, and
another British officer who served with Amin at the time has boasted that Amin
was remarkably successful in persuading them. He
claimed that Amin made them stand with their penes on a table and then
threatened to cut of the organs with a machete unless they told him where
their spears and shields were hidden.
“If these incidents were not an indicator to Amin’s
true nature then certainly the Turkana murders in north-west Kenya were
earlier in 1962. Like the Karamajong the Turkana are semi-nomadic herdsmen
with a penchant for cattle rustling. But unlike the Karamajong, the Turkana
use guns on their forays, and periodically, during the dry season, when there
are only limited water-holes in the area, joint police-army sweeps were
launched to disarm them. One of these sweeps was mounted in late in 1961 and
into 1962 and the force included ‘C’ Company of the 4th King’s
African Rifles in which Amin was a lieutenant and a platoon commander.
“That Amin’s platoon carried out a series of murders has
been disputed as Obote propaganda, but I have obtained irrefutable evidence
that a number of killings did take place. The story goes that platoon of
‘C’ Company carried out a series of raids on Turkana villages to seize arms,
and only Amin’s platoon returned empty-handed. Angered by this apparent
failure Amin took out his platoon again that night and they returned fro a
Turkana village with guns they had seized. A few days later, complaints were
received from the Turkana, and a number of bodies were exhumed from shallow
graves at the village. The showed clear signs of having been tortured and
beaten before death.
The then Police Commissioner of the Kenya Police, Sir
Richard Catling recalled: ‘I remember the incident well. A number of Turkana
had been ill-treated and some killed.’ He said that the 4th King’s
African Rifles had been responsible adding that he had had some difficulty in
insisting that the investigation of the murders should be carried out by the
police and not by the army.
“Sir Walter Coutts, the last British Governor of Uganda,
remembers being telephoned early in 1962 by the Deputy Governor of Kenya, Sir
Eric Griffith-Jones. ‘He said some pretty frightful things had been going on
in Turkana and it looks as though there is some evidence apparently that one
of your Ugandan army people has so brutally beaten up a complete Turkana
village, including killing them, that I think I shall have to take criminal
proceedings against him.’ The office mentioned by Sir Eric was Idi Amin.
“The Governor pointed out to Sir Eric that it was only six
months before Uganda independence and that it would be politically highly
disastrous to bring one of the only two black officers in the Ugandan army to
trial for murder on the eve of independence. ‘I told him, “Why can’t you let
me have him back and deal with it here?” ‘ Sir Walter recalled. ‘Eric felt he
should proceed according to law. But I was quite convinced it would be
politically wrong. We got Amin back.’
“Sir Walter says he consulted the former commander of the
4th King’s African Rifles, Colonel Bill Cheyne, as to whether Amin
should be court-martialed. The Colonel’s view was that there should be a
court-martial, but they decided that Obote, who was then Prime Minister,
should be consulted.
“Obote had never met Amin at this point, although he must
have been aware that5 he was one of only two African officers in the army. He
(Obote) subsequently wrote:
‘I (Obote) had been Prime Minister for only a few months
when the Governor, Sir Walter Coutts, asked me to go to State House. The he
told me (Obote) the story of the murder of the Turkana by one Lt. Idi Amin.
Sir Walter told me about the inquiries made by the KAR G.O.C. HQ in Nairobi
about these killings and the case against Amin. Sir Walter was
Commander-in-Chief of the 4th KAR. The
G.O.C., as I (Obote) understood it, found Amin guilty and sent the file to the
C-in-C to confirm sentence, which was dismissal. Sir Walter sought
my opinion whether he should confirm the sentence or not.
‘I (Obote) regret to say
that part of Uganda’s present suffering, sickness and inhumanity can be traced
to the opinion I (Obote) gave to Sir Walter. Even now I cannot explain why I
(Obote) came to give that opinion for it does not fall into the various
decisions involving the loss of human life which I (Obote) made subsequently
or before that opinion was given. I (Obote) advised that Amin be warned –
sever reprimand! After I (Obote) had given my advice Sir Walter told me
(Obote) that an officer like Lt. Idi Amin was not fit to remain in the KAR;
the case against Amin should have had the sentence of at least imprisonment
and that I (Obote) was wrong to advise that Amin should not be dismissed. The
Sir Walter added: “I (Sir Walter) warn you (Obote) this officer (Amin) could
cause you (Obote) trouble in the future.” I (Obote) remember this warning word
for word except for the word c ould, about which I have some doubt
whether Sir Walter said would or could.’
“Obote remembers that in
1966 Sir Walter visited Uganda during the Congo gold and ivory scandal and
repeated his prophetic warning.
‘In 1966, Sir Walter, in the
presence of Sam Odaka, reminded me (Obote) about the warning he had sounded
some four years back. We were in the PM’s office in Entebbe and it was after
the Ocheng allegations in the National Assembly.’
“Thus the political wind of change saved Amin on the eve of
Ugandan independence. Sir
Walter‘s recollection of exactly what action was taken against Amin is hazy,
but he believes that the matter was dealt with by an army court at Jinja where
he thinks Amin was fined. However the main
point is that at independence on 9 October 1962, Obote was well aware of the
nature of Amin, as were the British when they happily greeted his seizure of
power in 1971.”
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My
take is that Obote knew exactly what he was doing – only he was mistaken and
his plan eventually backfired on him. (Incidentally, Ibingira also came to
pretty much the same conclusion in his book, African Upheavals Since
Independence.) He thought that by shielding Amin from the full wrath of
the law, that the latter (Amin) would then owe his job, if not very existence
to him (Obote), and that Amin would forever be loyal to him (Obote). Boy, was
he wrong! For all it matters,
Western governments in choosing puppets to protect their interests, almost
always choose those who are weak, unpopular and insecure to do their bidding
without question. Since they lack
popular support, they owe their jobs to their foreign masters. The rest, as
they say, is history.
note:
I added the stuff in parentheses in the above excerpt to improve clarity.
