Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2003 6:48 PM
Subject: Museveni - The Ugandan Narkisses (2)
Furthermore, Museveni asserts that Obote would rather support Nkrumah's notion of a continental union because he knew it was impractical. "In the case of an East African Union which was feasible, opportunists such as Obote, who were also political dwarfs, feared its realisation because they wanted to remain big fish i n small ponds." (p. 18). The historical facts do not support Museveni's strictures. During the meeting of African Heads of States and Governments, Addis Ababa in May 1963, at which the Organisation of African Unity was formed, Nkrumah made a passionate speech in support of union government. It is on record that Milton Obote was one of the African leaders at the conference who strongly argued in favour of regional groupings.
There is also the need to critically assess the Obote I period, 1962-1971. Museveni characterizes it as a time of intrigues and corruption, with no meaningful development. But any objective evaluation of the whole period would show it as the greatest era of prosperity in Uganda. The economy was kept on a sound and expanding basis and much of the money generated was used to expand education and health facilities throughout the country.
Politically, Museveni accuses Obote of being unscrupulous and cites the way in which he misled the traditi onalists in Buganda and then, after some years, "made an about-turn over the same issues." (p. 19). He, however, does not discuss the issues. For instance, the independence constitution, which established Buganda in a federal relationship with the rest of Uganda, created more problems than it set to solve. Both Obote and Kabaka of Buganda believed that they could establish a working relationship between UPC and Kabaka Yeka. Museveni condemns this alliance as opportunistic and sectarian, but he does tell us what could have been done, given the independent constitution, which attempted to marry a monarchical and authoritarian regime with a parliamentary system.
Moreover, the same independence constitution had provided for the holding of a referendum in the Lost Counties - a disputed area between Buganda and Bunyoro. This area had been excised from Bunyoro and given to the Baganda at the close of the nineteenth century as a reward for their loyalty. For sixty years the Banyoro demanded their counties back but the British were not able to make amends. Buganda had become too powerful for any ruler to offend it. During the constitutional conference in London, it had been resolved that within two years of independence a plebiscite should be taken in the Lost Counties. 225 Nobody thought that Obote would have the courage to implement that resolution. But he did and forever incurred the wrath of the Baganda. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants voted to return to Bunyoro. This is what ruptured the UPC/KY alliance, and not Obote's unscrupulousness. The Kabaka, as President of Uganda, refused to sign the Bill transfering the Lost Counties to Bunyoro - this in itself was unconstitutional.
Buganda leaders then engaged in a series of maneuvers intended to engineer the overthrow of Obote. The election of Grace Ibingira from Ankole as UPC Secretary General to replace John Kakonge, was part of the conspiracy supported by Buganda leaders, to oust Obote, with the help of the Americans and the British who were made to believe that Obote was a communist. Hence, the split in the UPC at this time was not between the left (Kakonge) and the right (Ibingira) a Museveni would like us to believe. It was a split between the pro and anti-Obote forces.
Then there was the motion moved in parliament by David Ocheng, an Acholi friend of the Kabaka who had been elected as Kabaka Yekka Member of Parliament. It accused Obote and Idi Amin of theft of gold, ivory and coffee from Congo. Parliament voted that a Commission of Inquiry should be set up.
Museveni claims that no Commission of Inquiry was set up (p. 38). This is a strange claim, for it is on record that on 27th February, 1968, the Minister for Internal Affairs, Basil K. Bataringaya, appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the allegations made by David Ocheng. He appointed Justice Sir Clement Negeon de L'Estang, of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, J ustice Henry Ethlewood Miller, a Judge of the High Court of the Republic of Kenya, and Justice Augustine Saidi, a Judge of the High Court of the United Republic of Tanzania. L'Estang was to be Chairman of the Commission and Samuel William Wako Wambuzi of the Uganda Ministry of Justice was to be Secretary. This was obviously a high powered Commission.
Ocheng's allegations were found to be baseless, and Obote, Amin and Minister Onama were found to be innocent.3 But as the English Guardian commented at the time, the allegations were made "to create optimum conditions for a coup." Indeed, without consulting the Prime Minister, President Mutesa had, unconstitutionally requested the British Government for troops and arms, and Brigadier Shaban Opolot, then army commander, who was closely associated with Buganda, was to carry out the coup on 22nd February, 1966. Three battalions of troops had been sent to Ankole and Bunyoro for training on 21st February. And as Obote stated in parliament:
"I would not have minded if in their plots they were using political tactics alone. But immediately they began to interfere with the armed 226 forces, I was concerned, and it is because of their interference with the armed forces that I and my colleagues decided that we must act to save the country from chaos and bloodshed."
Instead of a small section of the army staging a coup in the name of one man, Milton Obote acted. What happened is now history. And it is that history that Museveni has distorted to suit his goal of demonizing Obote.
The Role of the Army
Museveni regards the army as having been the main political problem in Uganda in the 1960s and 70s. During the colonial period, British military recruitment favoured the North and West Nile, especially the Acholi, Langi and Teso. The southern and western peoples were trained to serve in the Public Service, in schools and churches, in large scale farming and in small scale businesses. Th is kind of ethnic division of labour was not peculiar to Uganda. The British practised it in all their colonies. For instance, in India, the army and the police were reserved for Sikhs and Gukkas. In Kenya, most of the recruits into the army came from the Kamba and Kalenjin. Museveni accepts this, but blames Obote for not changing it. Instead, he expanded it and used it for sectarian aims.
While there is some truth in this accusation, the subsequent history of Uganda saw the intensification of the military factor and its sectarian nature. Idi Amin was a military dictator who recruited largely his own West Nile people, especially the Kakwa and the Nubi from the Sudan, into the anny. In fact, it can be said that Amin created for himself a private army within the national army. And according to Museveni, by the end of Amin's rule in 1979, about 500,000 Ugandans had died, many of them Acholi and Langi. (p. 45) He concludes that this is the "high price Uganda paid for a c orrupt, mismanaged and secretarian army." (p. 41).
What about Museveni himself? He admits that he was possessed, since his college days at Dar-es-Salaam, with the control of the army as a solution to political and economic power. He unashamedly admits that his principal aim was to create "a non-Nilotic armed group" in Uganda (p. 98) Towards the achievement of that goal, he and his colleagues who were largely westerners formed the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in 1971 in Dar-es-
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