Northern Uganda - Living in Hell
More than 1.2 million people have been forced to leave their homes. Deprived of their means of livelihood, once proud farmers and their families now depend entirely on the food they receive in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many people have little or no access to proper medical care. Education has been disrupted. Many children do not sleep at home for fear of being abducted. Instead, they walk kilometres at the end of each day from their villages to the relative safety of towns, where they spend the night in public buildings or on the streets.
Since 1986, northern Uganda has been racked by insurgencies. The latest and longest of these rebellions, that of the Lord�s Resistance Army (LRA), has devastated Acholi, an area close to Uganda�s border with Sudan, and has now spread to the neighbouring subregions of Teso and Lango. No one knows for sure how many people have died, but estimates run into the tens of thousands.
The war between the LRA and the national army, the Uganda People�s Defence Forces (UPDF) has had a telling effect on the inhabitants of northern Uganda. The three districts of the Acholi subregion, Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, have been particularly hard hit. Death and disease rates are high, and food is scarce. About 80 per cent of Acholi�s people live in "protected villages" and camps for IDPs, which are often overcrowded, and lack adequate water, sanitation and health services. Devoid of any means of livelihood in the camps, a people of farmers and cattle rearers has been reduced to near-total dependence on donated food and humanitarian aid.
Child abductions have long been a major feature of the conflict, but the number shot up after the UPDF launched an offensive against the LRA in March 2002. The rebels kidnapped more than 10,000 children between June 2002 and October 2003, up from 101 in 2001. This brought the total number abducted by the LRA since the start of the conflict to more than 20,000.
Abductees are made to carry heavy loads over long distances. Those who lag behind or fall ill are beaten or killed. Some are forced to kill, maim, beat or abduct innocent victims, or to look on as such abuses are committed. Sexual violence against girls and women is rampant. They are used as domestic servants or forced into sexual slavery as LRA commanders� wives. They are subject to rape, unwanted pregnancy and the risk of infection, including HIV.
One of the visible signs of the collective trauma to which the people of northern Uganda have been subjected is the phenomenon of "night commuters". These are vulnerable people who, fearing abduction, move from the countryside into slightly more secure towns or camps at the end of each day. Most are children who walk up to 10 km to seek refuge from the threat of abduction and violence. They gather in schools, hospitals, district offices, and NGO compounds � wherever they think they can spend the night in safety. Many have to sleep in the open, where they are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. The UN has estimated the number of night commuters in Gulu and Kitgum districts at 25,000.
Few schools operate in the north, and these are mostly in towns, which are relatively safe. LRA attacks led to the closure or destruction of 136 out of 189 primary schools in Gulu District in 1996, according to one aid agency. Local officials reported this year that about half the schools in Kitgum and around 90 per cent in Pader had been closed.
The conflict that has spawned the humanitarian emergency in northern Uganda is rooted in the country�s recent history, with its complex mix of uneven social and economic development, violent regional conflict and marginalisation of minorities by governments and elites in power.
After the National Resistance Movement/Army of President Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986, there was a widespread fear in the north, especially among the Acholi people, that it would take revenge for atrocities committed when northerners dominated the army. NRA military actions, during which Acholis were abused, tortured or "disappeared", partially justified these fears, leading many to join rebel movements. These included the Uganda People�s Democratic Army (elements of the Ugandan army who fled to Sudan after the NRA took power) and Alice Lakwena�s Holy Spirit Movement.
Lakwena emerged in late 1986, claiming to be possessed by a spirit that was guiding her for the good of the Acholi people, who felt they were being victimised. Her movement offered Acholi soldiers ritual purification for past misdeeds, along with a moral and religious mission to support their opposition to the NRM. This won her some degree of popular support among the Acholi. Her movement was defeated by the Ugandan army in 1987, but her claim that she had spiritual guidance inspired Joseph Kony, who has also purported to be visited by spirits. He gathered remnants of the Holy Spirit Movement around him and formed the Uganda People�s Democratic Christian Army, which became the LRA around 1994.
Observers say Kony�s supposed religious mysticism is where the similarity to Lakwena ends. Rather than enjoying popularity and winning the hearts and minds of the Acholi people, the LRA has targeted the civilian population - in defiance of international law - committing severe human-rights abuses in the process.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Kony switched from battlefield confrontations with the Ugandan army to kidnapping civilians, attacking hospitals and ambushing vehicles. His group also started mutilating people: cutting off lips and noses, using padlocks to lock the mouths of those they thought might report them, and cutting off hands and ears. Beyond its stated aim to overthrow the Ugandan government and its purported commitment to establishing a government based on the biblical Ten Commandments, the LRA appears to have no clear political agenda. For the most part, the rebels choose not to engage the Ugandan military, but target schools, health centres, passing vehicles, IDP camps and refugee settlements.
Towards the end of 1993, talks between the government and the LRA gave rise to hopes for peace. However, the negotiations collapsed in early 1994, leading to a dramatic resurgence of violence in Acholiland. After the talks broke down, any support the LRA may have enjoyed among the Acholi dried up, according to observers of the war in the North. This was when the rebels began the mass abduction of children for use as porters, fighters and sex slaves.
In June 1998, representatives of the Acholi people listed a number of reasons why the LRA�s war continued after the rebels had stopped receiving popular support: Ugandan support for the Sudan People�s Liberation Movement/Army [a Sudanese rebel group]; Sudanese support for the LRA; the fact that some civilians benefited financially from the war; foreign powers� use of Uganda as a base for fighting the Sudanese government; and lack of trust between the Acholi population and the Ugandan government.
The latter half of the 1990s was marked by ongoing LRA actions in northern Uganda from bases in southern Sudan and, in early 1997, the Ugandan parliament voted, after a lengthy investigation, to continue pursuing a military strategy to end the conflict. Around this time, too, the Acholi diaspora and the churches in Uganda began to play an increasingly active and vocal role in pushing for a negotiated and peaceful settlement to the rebellion. Groups that have been particularly active in this regard include the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), an inter-faith forum of Muslim and Christian leaders inaugurated in early 1998. From early 1999, there was a noticeable lull in LRA activity and a change in the political climate, especially after Museveni agreed to let community leaders and peace activists talk with the LRA. In late 1999, the Ugandan authorities announced an amnesty for LRA fighters and, in December of that ye ar, Uganda and Sudan signed a reconciliation agreement that envisaged a series of steps to build mutual trust and, eventually, normalise diplomatic relations. These developments again raised hopes for peace.
However, within weeks of the agreement, the rebels re-entered Uganda from southern Sudan, and the hopes for an early peace were quickly shattered. LRA attacks on villages and IDP settlements resumed. Roadside ambushes became more common. Abductions, killings and looting resumed with a vengeance.
In 2001, Uganda and Sudan continued their efforts to improve their ties, exchanging diplomats in August of that year. In December, the US government announced that it was adding the LRA to its "terrorist exclusion list", a move welcomed by Kampala. Eager to mend relations with the US as it pursued its global war on terror, the Sudanese government said it had cut off all support to the LRA. Fearing that Sudan might take action against it, the LRA began to relocate its bases, soldiers and abductees to the remote Imatong mountains on the Sudan-Uganda border.
In early 2002, Sudan and Uganda concluded a diplomatic protocol giving the Ugandan army access to southern Sudan to attack LRA rear bases. By March 2002, the UPDF had launched "Operation Iron Fist,� a military campaign aimed at eliminating the LRA threat and freeing abductees".
The operation, which saw the deployment of as many as 10,000 Ugandan troops, had an unintended effect. It led the rebels to return in force to northern Uganda in June 2002 - reportedly with new equipment, uniforms and training. From then on, the LRA, which split into smaller operational units, stepped up its attacks, abducting thousands of children and targeting religious leaders and other civilians. The group also attacked convoys delivering relief supplies to northern Uganda or transiting to affected populations in southern Sudan.
In October 2002, the Ugandan government gave civilians 48 hours� notice to return to IDP camps or protected villages, while aid agencies warned that the continuing conflict was destroying the tentative gains of the recent past. Following sustained efforts and contacts by the ARLPI, the government appointed a peace team in late 2002. However, ARLPI noted that the LRA�s attitude changed between July, when there was a military stalemate, and September 2002, as the rebels acquired new military equipment and appeared unwilling to negotiate seriously.
In March 2003, Kony announced a unilateral ceasefire. Museveni initially rejected it, then responded with a limited ceasefire in areas where the rebels were to hold talks with the presidential peace team. However, hopes for peace were dashed in April when the LRA broke the ceasefire arrangements and killed an emissary of the presidential peace team, causing the government to resume open warfare against the rebels. The peace team was disbanded in May and attempts at establishing a negotiated peace appear seriously constrained as the military option is vigorously pursued.
In June, the conflict spread beyond Acholiland, with the LRA attacking parts of eastern, central and northwestern Uganda. In Teso subregion, attacks on the districts of Katakwi, Kumi, Kabermaido and Soroti have displaced 306,000 civilians.
The unprecedented violence visited on civilians in northern Uganda since 2002 has given rise to the country�s worst humanitarian crisis in 17 years, and sparked calls for a higher level of international attention.
Francis Deng, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs, who visited Uganda in August 2003, said he was struck by the level of devastation due to the conflict and the precarious situation the internally displaced are facing. Pointing to the complex and intertwined causes of the conflict, Deng noted the need for a regional perspective and possibly third-party mediation to address the problems and achieve lasting peace.
A broad range of Acholi civil and religious leaders have consistently called for dialogue as a means of arriving at a durable solution to the conflict. Another requirement, they say, is a willingness to facilitate and engage in peace talks. The international community has been showing signs of seeking engagement. However, there is little to indicate that either parties is interested in negotiations.
Most observers believe that, given the protracted nature of the conflict and the scant success of military campaigns, a negotiated settlement is the only possible solution. Many people in northern Uganda also feel this way. With fighting, this war will take another 18 years, said one IDP. The only thing is to sit down and negotiate.
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