Source: Government of the United States of America Date: 2 Oct 1997
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The Anguish of Northern Uganda - Sections 3 - 5
SECTION III CONFLICT IMPACT ON NEBBI DISTRICT SECTION IV PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT EXPANSION
SECTION V OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(click on triangles to expand indices)
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Background
Nebbi District in the West Nile region shares a western border with Zaire, a northern border with Arua District, and an eastern border (the Nile River) with Gulu. Nebbi's 3,000 square kilometers make it about one-quarter the size of Gulu, though its population of 300,000 is almost the same.
The predominant ethnic group of Nebbi is the Alur, whose traditional kingdom is currently ruled by King Jobi II, who resides in the eastern Nebbi village of War. Minority groups include the Lendu, who reside principally near Zeu in eastern Nebbi, and the Kebu people, who are concentrated near Kango.
Like the Madi people of Moyo, the Alur and other groups of Nebbi are small and inclined to avoid conflict. They have generally abstained from the current war as well. Although several hundred Alurs, including some Muslims, joined the WNBF, many complain that the promised US$300 recruitment bonus was not fulfilled. In June and again in November 1996, King Jobi issued public appeals to the WNBF combatants "begging you with misery" to return home. Most have done so. According to King Jobi II, religious and civil officials, no WNBF returnees have been killed or persecuted by the government. [60% of the people of Nebbi voted for President Museveni in the 1996 elections.]
Few Alur have been associated with Joseph Kony's LRA. Alur leaders assert that historical enmity divides the Alur from the Acholi. The Alur have never been a predominant force in the military or in government. Like the Madi people, they are a small group which cannot afford miscalculations. The people of Nebbi have, nonetheless, been affected by the conflict in three ways:
Jonam County - attempted infiltration
Jonam County, on Nebbi's eastern wing bordering the Nile River, depends on cotton cultivation and fishing for its livelihood. It has remained relatively conflict-free. In 1996, a WNBF unit, reportedly carrying land mines, was detected in Jonam and denounced by the local civilian population. After five insurgents were killed by UPDF forces, the rebels withdrew.
Western Nebbi - occasional disruptions
From a base near Mahagi in northeastern Zaire, WNBF elements launchedoccasional incursions into Zeu, Kango, Erussi and Paida sub-counties of western Nebbi. [A prominent WNBF officer, Lt. Col. Athocon, comes from this area.] In late 1996, isolated WNBF attacks included the killing of a dozen government officials, destruction of two schools and several homes, some brief abductions, and the theft of an NGO vehicle. Two dozens civilians have been wounded in various incidents. Short-term temporary displacement occurred in a few villages.
Nebbi's economy: victim of the Karuma/Pakwach convoy attack
An earlier section of this report (see page 39) described an LRA attack on 8 March 1996 against a mixed civilian and commercial convoy traveling through Gulu District en route to the West Nile. Nebbi Hospital provided emergency care to 32 survivors. Nebbi interviewees reported that this incident and related insecurity have significantly affected Nebbi's commercial life. In past years, Nebbi hosted eight seasonal cotton buyers; that number has diminished to three. Cotton prices have fallen and overall cotton revenues have been slashed by more than 50%. At the same time, the cost of commercial products transported from Kampala has increased. These events have slowed Nebbi's normally prosperous economy.
According to local sources, farmers in parts of Nebbi have sold some of their cattle to compensate for reduced income. An estimated one hundred head may have been stolen by WNBF combatants and pleuro-pneumonia has claimed some of the herd. Nonetheless, district veterinary officers report that Nebbi's cattle population has increased from an estimated 50,000 in 1985 to 70,000 in 1997.
SECTION IV PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT EXPANSION
An assessment of the prospects for the revitalization of the LRA and WNBF or their expansion beyond their current geographic areas depends upon their internal vigor and potential appeal outside their home areas.
Prospects for the Lord's Resistance Army
...within Acholi
The LRA is by far the stronger and more dynamic of these two insurgencies. It has inherited a revolt which has kept most of 15% of Uganda in turmoil for over a decade. However, it is strikingly devoid of political content. Given the anti-Museveni sentiment of most Acholis, the LRA's inability to mobilize support - or to at least avoid repudiation by its own ethnic base - is remarkable.
The insurgency's military prospects have waxed and waned over the last decade. At the moment, they are in a slump. Prospects for continued refuge in and military assistance from Sudan, which are increasingly critical for its viability, are dimmer than at any time since they began in 1994. This does not preclude the possibility that in future the fortunes of the Sudan/LRA alliance will improve. But the next few years will more likely involve an LRA struggle for survival than the launching of an expansion of its activities beyond its current geographic boundaries.
The author believes it is highly unlikely that an LRA revitalized by wiser leadership and a more forward-looking political message would persuade any significant segment of the Acholi population to continue this insurgency. The Acholi have been morally exhausted and economically ruined from five successive phases of this conflict. What they seek is an end to the war, a chance to rebuild their economies and to enjoy the fruits of peace.
Nor are the LRA's neighbors yearning for its presence. Thus far, five separate phases of Acholi insurgency has had little appeal beyond its borders, although Alice Lakwena's 1987 march to Kampala attracted some support along the way.
...among the Madi, Alur, Banyoro and Karamojong
The Madi and Alur people of Moyo and Nebbi districts - the Acholi's eastern neighbors - have for over a decade abstained from participation in the LRA's conflict. They will not likely alter this disposition in the near future. The LRA's struggle is more hopeless and self-destructive than it was at the outset when, for reasons described earlier in this report, these groups first decided to stand back. In addition, the LRA's human rights conduct of the past few years - of which these groups have been occasional victims - has increased their fear of the LRA. In any case, the 1996 presidential election results suggest that a majority of Madi and Alur people support the Museveni administration.
The Banyoro people reside in Masindi District, separated from southern Gulu by the Victoria Nile. According to some Ugandan sources, the Banyoro are cultural descendants of the Acholi. One source asserted that in 1996 when a new Banyoro King was coronated, Acholi consultants participated in organization of the traditional rituals.
Hundreds of families displaced from Gulu and Kitgum by actions of both parties to the Acholi conflict over the last decade have sought refuge in the peaceful Diima area of northeast Masindi; others have transited the Karuma and Diima areas en route to more distant locations within Uganda. Despite their cultural and historical ties with the Acholi, the people of Masindi delivered 88% of their votes to President Museveni in the 1996 elections. Masindi seems unlikely as a propitious environment for LRA activities.
Having rustled virtually the entire Acholi cattle herds nearly a decade ago, the main interest of the Acholi's eastern neighbors, the Karamojong, will more likely be to pick off remaining livestock than in joining together with the LRA. The Museveni government appears to have achieved positive relations with the Karamojong. More than 95% of Karamoja's 84,000 voters supported candidate Museveni in the 1996 presidential elections [about 57% of Karamoja's registered voters actually went to the polls].
...among the Langi
The Langi people of Apac and Lira districts, who with the Acholi share a common language and the bonds of decades of shared participation in the Obote I and II military, have had traditional border rivalries with their northern neighbors.
The overthrow of the Obote government, the expulsion of the Langi from the government and ill-treatment by the Acholi in 1985 must be factored into the appeal which a potential alliance with the LRA holds for the Langi.
Recent LRA activities in northern Lango districts of Apac and Lira have probably reinforced these negative attitudes. The abduction of 152 school girls from St. Mary's College in northern Apac described earlier (see page 41) is the most dramatic recent example of LRA action in this area. But dozens of smaller incidents in which Langi farm families have been killed, abducted and looted (especially after harvest seasons) have heightened local fear of the LRA.
The Langi people are considered by some other northerners to be astute and cautious politicians who prefer to play background roles in such conflicts. The possibility of the re-establishment of links which would permit or complement LRA activities outside of Acholi seems tenuous. Nonetheless, the Langi share with the Acholi (and with the people of Arua District) electoral opposition to the Museveni administration. More than 80% of the Langi electorate voted for Dr. Ssemogerere.
...among the Iteso
The Iteso people of Soroti and Kumi districts are separated from Kitgum District by a narrow corridor through Lango and Karamojong areas. The Iteso conducted their own revolt against the Museveni government between 1987 (following major cattle raids) and 1992, allegedly with training and military assistance from Kenya. The predominantly Iteso Uganda People's Army (UPA) was established principally by members of the former UNLA special forces. In that both were comprised principally of professional soldiers, the UPA was similar to the Acholi UPDA of the 1986 - 1988 period. Both Museveni's NRA and the UPA in the Iteso conflict were known for their rough tactics with civilians. A July 1989 incident in which 69 prisoners in NRA custody were apparently purposely suffocated in a rail car at Okungulo railway station in Mukura Sub-County, Kumi District, is well-known throughout Uganda. (For details of this incident, see Amnesty International, Uganda: The Failure to Safeguard Human Rights, September 1992. The Monitor newspaper published a retrospective of the incident, including eyewitness accounts, in its 29 June 1997 issue.)
According to one authoritative source, even during the early 1990s, when both the Acholi and the Iteso were battling the NRA, LRA forces, during incursions in Soroti, inflicted atrocities on Iteso civilians. The LRA's human rights conduct has worsened over the years, leaving it little appeal in this area.
The conflict in Soroti and Kumi with the Museveni government was concluded in 1992 through the efforts of the Teso Commission, first formed in 1990. It appears that the conflict resolution achieved in the Iteso region in 1992 has been durable. The majority of the Iteso electorate voted for President Museveni in the 1996 elections.
...among Ugandans in general
The Luwero Triangle atrocities - with which, justifiably or not, Acholi UNLA elements are associated - coupled with the LRA's recent human rights conduct would probably constrain the LRA's welcome in other areas of Uganda.
Prospects for the West Nile Bank Front
...within the West Nile region
Because the war's impact has been relatively mild, the WNBF enjoys some support in northern Arua and in Moyo's western Obongi County. A recruitment bonus attractive to unemployed former soldiers and youth, local pride and the invocation by rebel advocates of the "better days of the Amin regime," rather than a relevant political program, seem to underlie this support. To some degree, a common Muslim identity with the insurgency's Sudanese supporters resonates in parts of the West Nile. The WNBF appears to lack a political content which transcends some of these narrow sub-regional issues.
Moreover, unlike the Acholi insurgency - which began and continued for almost a decade without Sudan's assistance - the WNBF seems more a product of external stimulation and assistance which has been largely eliminated by military developments during 1997.
This development does not preclude low-level continued disruptions in some parts of the West Nile by WNBF remnants. But the character of these incidents may be more akin to banditry than to the activities of a coherent insurgency.
The WNBF's appeal even within the West Nile has been limited to mainly three counties. Almost all of Moyo District and all of Nebbi District, and parts of Arua have abstained from participation in the rebellion. No indications were detected of a change in their opposition to this insurgency.
...outside the West Nile region
The prospect of a return to power of West Nile forces associated with the Amin military and security apparatus holds no appeal (or perhaps a negative appeal) for Ugandans outside the region. With its diminished military capabilities and isolation in northern areas of the West Nile along the Sudan border, the potential for this movement's expansion outside the region seems tenuous.
SECTION V OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I RESUMPTION OF PEACE NEGOTIATONS
Direct peace negotiations between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army broke down in February 1994 and have not been resumed since. During the 1994 negotiations, both parties demonstrated the ability to organize effective direct communication which led to a temporary cessation of hostilities and to substantive and constructive discussions. Both parties might wish to consider resumption of such negotiations at this time. The moment is opportune.
Such a process would probably be swifter and more effective if, as in 1988 and 1994, it were arranged and carried out directly between the parties. Negotiation by those closest to the conflict would sooner reach its essential elements. The intervention or mediation of third parties, including the diplomatic community, would more likely encumber than facilitate a successful outcome. The participation of third parties could slow down or create opportunities for the distortion or manipulation of the process.
In recent years, direct negotiations have had demonstrated success in mitigating or concluding violent conflict in northern Uganda. In June 1988, direct negotiations between the Government and the UPDA concluded an earlier phase of the Gulu/Kitgum conflict. The revolt in the ethnic Iteso districts of Soroti and Kumi was resolved in 1992 through direct contacts between the parties. Finally, but for the appearance for the first time of external military assistance to the LRA, a durable agreement between the parties might have been reached through the direct 1994 negotiations.
Whatever their view of the merits of the insurgency at the war's outset, the overwhelming majority of Acholi people in Gulu and Kitgum oppose its continuation. They believe, with much justification, that the LRA has no chance to overcome government forces. While their attitude toward the present Government is not positive, their repudiation of the insurgents is almost universal. This is a conflict without a constituency or, in the view of most Acholis, any beneficial purpose. The predominantly Acholi LRA forces in these districts will continue to find themselves waging a war against the wishes of those in whose name they are fighting and compelled to extract support from the Acholi people by means of violence. Negotiation between the two sides would enjoy almost unanimous support among the grassroots Acholi people.
To facilitate a peace agreement, the Acholi people would be prepared to peacefully reintegrate the vast majority of LRA insurgents in their communities. The Catholic Church, including the Comboni Fathers of Verona, Italy, the Church of Uganda, and Islamic leaders are well placed and in some cases eager to support the peace and reconciliation process.
During the current period, the Government has pursued a military solution to the conflict, with uneven results. The majority of LRA forces are apparently deployed in southern Sudan alongside Sudanese Government forces. Together, they are defending against an aggressive SPLA military offensive which is reportedly assisted by Ugandan armed-forces elements. LRA safe havens in southern Sudan are vulnerable. Sudan's ability to deliver arms to the LRA in northern Uganda is being affected. Deprived of Sudanese bases and material assistance, the LRA's capabilities would be seriously affected and many casualties could be expected. To the degree that the LRA is forced to operate principally within the districts of Gulu and Kitgum, the Acholi people's opposition - though it can be overcome with brutality - will encumber its operations.
Nonetheless, whatever the success of the SPLA/Ugandan offensive in southern Sudan, under present conditions a military solution to this conflict by the Ugandan Government armed forces will not soon be achieved. The insurgency in Gulu and Kitgum began in 1986 and continued without external assistance for more than eight years - until 1994. Some of the region's terrain offers natural advantages to such activities. The LRA's willingness to consider unprotected civilian communities as legitimate targets makes defense extremely difficult. Without Sudan's assistance and with much reduced forces, the LRA's capacity to disrupt Gulu and Kitgum in coming years could still be considerable.
In this complex military environment, the UPDF has not, in recent years, demonstrated the capacity and commitment required to bring the war to a conclusion through military means. Peace throughout Uganda - in large part because of the Gulu/Kitgum insurgency - has not been consolidated since the advent in 1986 of the NRM administration. The financial strain of the conflict drains the national treasury of funds which most Ugandans believe could be better invested in reconstruction and social services.
For these reasons, it may be in the interest of both parties to resume negotiations. The first step could be taken by the Government of Uganda itself. A genuine effort in this direction would be warmly welcomed by the Acholi people in Gulu and Kitgum and would dispel skepticism in sectors of the diplomatic community concerning the government's commitment to end the conflict. A positive response by the LRA would have the same effect.
The leadership of both parties will encounter elements within their own ranks who, for their own motives, will oppose this process. Moreover, LRA leaders may find they are not as free in 1997 as they were in 1994 to take independent decisions on such matters. Such obstacles could affect the outcome of the proposed process. Those on both sides who share with the grassroots Acholi people a recognition of this war's futility, may through their creative persistence find the means to overcome them.
II ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Without intruding directly in such negotiations, the international community should actively encourage their resumption. Considerable interest for this notion has been encountered in the United States Government and diplomatic missions of other friendly countries. Sustained support for negotiations could be helpful to the leadership of the Government and to others, should they decide to proceed. Public media attention to the northern conflict and to the negotiation process could have a positive effect. It would also help to assure the Acholi people that - contrary to the belief of many - the international community is, indeed, concerned with their problem.
III HUMAN RIGHTS PANEL OF INQUIRY
The human rights conduct of the parties to the conflict has evolved significantly during the five phases of the anti-government insurgency in Acholi which began in 1986. The current phase of the war, which began in February 1994 following the breakdown of peace negotiations, has had its own unique character. Eight prominent incidents involving large-scale loss of human life, mass abductions or other significant human rights violations have occurred during the last three years. Confusion over the identity of the party responsible for these incidents, and over the facts and circumstances surrounding them, is an obstacle to the peace process and to reconciliation.
Ugandans in most districts of the country outside Gulu and Kitgum, in Kampala, and especially Acholi people abroad, have not received clear, impartial and authoritative information about these eight critical events. A minority of such persons seem to purposefully pursue their political opposition to the current Government by distorting information about them. The facts of these incidents are crucial to an understanding of the current situation.
As a result of the confusion concerning these events, the perception of the problems suffered by the Acholi people at home by some leaders outside the area who could constructively assist the peace process is out-dated or simply inaccurate. Important changes have occurred which require accurate current reporting. Attention is misfocused on unnecessary debates about the authorship and nature of the eight incidents, and by extension the overall situation in the north, instead of on the resumption of a peace process. To some degree, this confusion sustains an environment in which the war is perpetuated. Acholi and most others of varying political outlooks - in Gulu and Kitgum as well as outside the area - indicated that they would welcome an impartial investigation of these recent incidents. The LRA, in July 1996 and February 1997, urged this type of investigation. Such an inquiry could help create an environment more supportive of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
An independent, impartial, authoritative international three-member Panel of Inquiry could be convened to investigate these eight incidents in a thorough manner to establish the responsibility for each of them and to determine pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding them. The Panel should be convened collaboratively by a small number of interested European and other donors who are not perceived to hold strong views in favor of or against the current Government. Such a Panel could be convened rapidly and complete its task in two months. Its final report should be distributed widely both in Uganda and to the international community.
The eight key incidents proposed for investigation are set forth in the annex. Provisional summaries of the alleged circumstances are provided as initial references which will be subject to the panel's findings.
IV RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE
If the peace process proceeds, international donors should be prepared to provide rapid economic assistance specifically designed and targeted to accelerate post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and economic reactivation in the north. Such activities, if rapidly implemented, could help to stabilize the area and consolidate peace in its early years. Implementation of sizable activities must await an improvement in security conditions which only a peace process and at least a stable cease-fire within a promising negotiating environment can provide. Interested donors might wish to consider at an early stage what type of assistance they might provide to support the consolidation of peace should such talks succeed. Three particular options stand out among a large variety of possible activities:
A. Seeds and tools for agricultural reactivation
Nearly 150,000 persons - perhaps 30,000 or more families - remain displaced so distant from their homes that their normal agricultural activities have been disrupted. In addition, the seed and tool supplies of other families who have not been displaced have also been affected. Donors should aim to assist farmers to re-establish their sources of food for both consumption and sale as quickly as possible, as conditions permit. Early provision of seeds and tools for returning displaced families and for others who were not displaced but who are in similar need is inexpensive and essential.
However, to insure that donor funds are used to greatest effect, an extensive process of direct consultation with local farmers should be conducted in advance to determine the proper type, quality, quantity and branch of seed and tool "packages" which will be most practical in each part of the districts.
B. School reconstruction
The resumption of normal educational activities in Gulu and Kitgum would be an important signal that stability has returned and is essential for future development. A donor could opt, for example, to reconstruct twenty-five primary schools in each of these two districts. Lists of schools which have been destroyed are available through the respective District Education Officers. The reconstruction cost for 50 schools would be about US$1.5 million. Extensive rehabilitation is also required in public secondary schools.
In the past, much local primary school construction has been conducted on a collaborative basis between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local communities. Unskilled labor and the local materials it can produce have been donated by the communities. Such collaboration, in the view of the implementing NGOs, has focused the community's attention on the importance of the buildings and their future maintenance. In practice, many communities have collected cash to employ unskilled laborers in the effort. However, this collaborative approach has delayed construction by as much as eighteen months.
For the first eighteen months of the post-war reconstruction period, the requirement for voluntary community participation should be waived. The target areas are cash-poor and will require all of their resources to rebuild their own homes and livelihoods. Donors can contribute more effectively to economic recovery by providing for cash employment of unskilled laborers. Rapid implementation of projects will restore hope in an accelerated return to a more normal life. Local staff of several large NGOs suggest that communities could be informed that a "waiver" on voluntary community participation has been temporarily applied because of the economic emergency in which the area finds itself.
C. Short-term cash employment
Eleven years of civil war have collapsed the economies of these two districts. Agricultural production has been disrupted throughout most of Gulu and much of Kitgum. The cattle and livestock herds upon which the Acholi depended in such emergencies have disappeared. Many of their houses have been burned. Most of their tools, clothes, property and cash have been traded, stolen or lost. Cash employment is a decade-old memory for many Acholis. In fact, cash transactions have in some locations been replaced by barter.
Should the conflict be resolved, the absence of cash and the opportunity to earn it will be significant impediments to the acquisition of the essential items which each family will require for its own sustainable economic recovery, including eventual acquisition of livestock. Reconstruction activities and economic reactivation will also be handicapped by the deteriorated state of many roads. Gradual livestock recovery and other rehabilitation will be constrained in Kitgum by the deteriorated condition of river dams and valley tanks.
These problems may combine to create an opportunity which should be carefully evaluated for a donor such as USAID to assist the area's reconstruction. A three-year US$5-million short-term transitional employment generation program could be considered with the aim of generating 75,000 person-months of employment, which could be shared in on a rotating basis by up to 15,000 persons. Under such an approach 75% or more of the $5 million in project funds would be used exclusively for the salaries of manual laborers. Workers would rehabilitate two types of infrastructure:
Unsurfaced farm-to-market roads Major rehabilitation would be undertaken with manual tools (such as picks, shovels, wheelbarrows, rammers and pedestrian rollers). No new roads would be built nor would routine maintenance be financed under this project. Aggregate is often crushed manually in this area. Farm-to-market roads are essential to the marketing of agricultural produce upon which sustainable economic recovery and development in this region will largely depend.
[Heavy equipment would be used exclusively for tasks which manual labor cannot economically undertake, specifically for transport of dumper loads of gravel and in rare instances to move large obstacles. Equipment already provided by several donors together with other USAID funds which could be available could finance fuel and spare parts, as needed.]
A system which pays its workers by the task accomplished, rather than by time invested, is recommended. Such a system has been used for recurrent road maintenance by local road authorities in Gulu and Kitgum through the use of "petty contractors." In principle, these contractors are experienced road supervisors who compete for road contracts in which they, in turn, employ crews of manual laborers. The contractors are paid - and, in turn, pay their employees -- as each section of work specified in their contract is completed.
This system has at times worked inefficiently in several northern areas because:
contractors have not been paid on a timely basis (or at all in some cases) and/or their employees have not been paid by them;
the bidding system has been politicized and has not selected qualified contractors;
contractors do not have the manual tools to enable them to employ sufficient workers simultaneously;
supervision has been weak; and
corruption has been difficult to control.
These weaknesses can be remedied through vigorous implementation by independent institutions. In principle, however, systems which reward outputs will function far more efficiently than systems which reward inputs.
Compensation for each specific task should be computed based on a rapid market survey of minimum prevailing wage rates for temporary unskilled labor. This strategy avoids artificial wage inflation which could undermine economic recovery. Those in greatest need would "self-select" themselves for participation. The temptation to use the program for patronage would be diminished. With whatever funds are available, the largest number of workers could benefit and the greatest amount of infrastructure could be repaired - infrastructure which will directly serve the workers and their families as well.
Labor-intensive strategies for major rehabilitation of roads (and for the opening of new roads, which is not proposed here) are reported to have been used with considerable success in both Uganda and Tanzania. USAID Mission engineers have observed a similar effort financed by GTZ in Soroti District; authoritative observers assert the employment it created immediately after the 1992 peace accords there contributed substantially to consolidating stability. Similar efforts have been carried out in Tanzania. Such a strategy seems particularly appropriate in northern Uganda, where employment generation is critical.
The labor-intensive approach could create several thousand jobs in a relatively short period of time. The technology is appropriate to the beneficiary area. In comparison with the current reliance on imported heavy equipment, it is more sustainable. It would enable simultaneous coverage of a wider geographical area and avoid the costs and delays associated with equipment breakdown, lack of spare parts and fuel shortages.
The principal target districts for this effort should be rural Gulu and Kitgum districts. To a lesser degree, such a project could include northern Arua, Moyo District, eastern Nebbi and northern Apac and Lira. Experienced experts in the region recommend that roads constructed over black cottonsoil terrain should be excluded from the proposed program.
River dam and valley tank repair A similar labor-intensive approach should be studied and considered - exclusively for Kitgum District - for the rehabilitation of some of its 34 large river dams and 42 valley tanks. The availability of surface water in this district is unreliable during several months of each year and groundwater potential in some areas is limited. The dams and tanks provide sweet water for drinking, cooking, washing and other domestic needs, and for livestock. While livestock watering is not an immediate priority, the dams will be essential to eventual livestock recovery. They are typically stocked with telapia and mudfish, a source of food for local communities. They may also be used as take-off points for sustainable development of long-term fish ponds and vegetable farming.
Beginning in the 1950s, a system for harvesting and storing rainwater in earthen collection and storage dams was developed. Most of the initial dams were built exclusively with manual labor using locally available materials. Some of the larger ones, such as those in Namu-okora and Palabek, are designed to store up to 20 million gallons. While their monthly water levels vary, they provide an adequate water supply throughout the dry season.
Most of Kitgum's river dams and valley tanks have received little or no maintenance since their construction up to 45 years ago. The river dam at Namu-okora, for example, has silted up and its earthen retaining wall has been eroded. When that wall was originally built, it was compacted by cattle driven across its surface. As cattle are no longer available, a labor-intensive approach using manual rammers could be considered. The planting of trees and grass in the run-off areas is recommended. Not all river dams and valley tanks require - or would be suitable for - such rehabilitation.
Frogs and some fish species should again be used, as they were in the past, for insect control. Also in the past, local government stationed a guard at the river dams to enforce rules which safeguarded water quality. Minor improvements, such as simple low-cost low-maintenance sand filtration pipes for drinking water, could be installed.
Implementing Mechanism
If USAID, after careful field review, decides to pursue employment generation opportunities, it is recommended that it do so in a direct, non-traditional, emergency "hands-on" operational manner. To succeed, such efforts must be insulated from the pressures of local politics, corruption and inefficiency which typically affect areas recovering from prolonged civil conflict. The establishment of a streamlined operational unit in the north staffed with a small number of expatriate contract staff and with Ugandan engineers and program personnel (to the extent possible from the beneficiary districts themselves) would help to insure that the program goals are met. The operational unit should have the authority in the field to procure commodities and services, and to pay labor and other program costs. The presence of an operational USAID unit would demonstrate the U.S. Government's concern with the problems faced by residents of this area.
At the field level, such a unit should work collegially at the local level with government engineers and experienced field staff of NGOs such as World Vision, the International Service Volunteers Association (AVSI), and Lutheran World Federation, among others. The Cooperative Bank, which typically serves the rural areas and which is represented by three branches in the two key target districts, should support the program with commercial and accounting services.
Before proceeding, the USAID Mission and the Embassy's Inter-agency Working Group should evaluate their willingness to undertake such an approach in the complex northern environment. Reductions in staff and resource levels may affect its ability to give such a project the time and attention essential for its success. Under an optimistic scenario, the types of efforts proposed here could not begin before mid- to late-1998.
USAID has used the "operational unit" strategy with great success in other regions, most notably on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. The Mission may wish to request of USAID/Nicaragua relevant documentation, such as program and financial management descriptions, and to review its evaluations and audits. The names of key USAID/Nicaragua managers involved in this effort have been provided to Mission/Kampala management for further consultation.
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