By Andrew M. Mwenda
April 7 - 13, 2004
|
I had planned to write about how President Yoweri Museveni can manage the political process to get a constitutional amendment on the third term and also get re-elected in 2006.
Thus far, Museveni has demonstrated uncertainty over the success of the third term project, and in not offering an open stance on it, he is leaving himself an exit route. Clearly therefore, even the president is not sure of his chances of success. However, although Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (Pafo) and all other forces against the third term have a very high potential to carry the day (the statistics favour them), they are neither organised nor mobilised. Electoral politics, however, does not rely on 'potential' to win (i.e. broad national goodwill for one's cause), but on actual ability to organise and mobilise voters to cast their vote in your favour. It is here that Museveni and his pro-third term advocates have the strategic upper hand. Already, President Museveni has embarked on his usual pre-election "poverty reduction" campaigns. Pro third term groups are being given bags of money to traverse the countryside to mobilise support for the project. Although Museveni has undermined and crippled the organisational structure of the Movement, he has the organisational structure of the state through the local councils to get his message across to the people, especially in the countryside. Museveni also has a large network of highly sectarian and informal organisations in every community mobilising for third term.
Already, the government is asking for a supplementary budget of Shs 146b. Defence spending is always a sure cover for mobilising a political resource fund, so the Barlonyo and Abia attacks came in handy to push the hands of a reluctant international donor community and a recalcitrant parliament to sign off the supplementary budget. For this government the war in northern Uganda is good justification for the ever-increasing military expenditure, and also for legitimising the suppression of individual rights and keeping the military and security services at the centre of our political process. While the defence budget was $42m in 1992, this financial year it was budgeted at $156m. With the supplementary budgets through other ministries, and also given that by December last year defence had overspent its budget by Shs 30b, military spending this year will exceed $200m, a record figure in the context of LRA's almost unlimited propensity to wreck havoc in northern Uganda as the UPDF wear rugs, go hungry and many die of disease. Apparently, increased defence spending does not always translate into increased actual expenditure on the military. On the contrary, a significant portion of the defence budget goes into a slash fund used by the regime for political mobilisation.
Then there are those politicians who are not buyable but can be intimidated. These will get the carrot and stick therapy. Some dirty things from their past will be brought forth and threatened with arrest and prosecution or detention, and they will go mute. Museveni further hopes that an early strike against Pafo by scattering its meetings will scare its member from continued mobilisation. Finally, a few courageous persons like Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu, Eriya Kategaya and Ruzindana will find themselves isolated and fighting a thinly defended frontline. Therefore, as Museveni and allies organise and mobilise, Pafo should redouble its efforts. Museveni can afford to break up two or three of their rallies in the next two months. He cannot afford to break 1,000 rallies over the next two years. Museveni's international allies and financiers will begin to wobble. Is Pafo willing to pay this price? Pafo needs to organise. However, it should do so through its constituent members rather than seek to become a political party itself, as that would defeat its very purpose. The struggle against a presidential monarchy should be fought by an umbrella organization that Pafo is today, just like Narc in Kenya.
The organised groups within Pafo like the UPC and DP are discredited to present an effective challenge to Museveni. The other organised groups like Reform Agenda, JEMA, NDF, the Free Movement etc are politically weak. The strongest political constituency within Pafo is Movement MPs opposed to the third term. To give Pafo political bite, these Movement MPs need to form a political party to become the institutional agency through which they can advance their agenda. For such an organization to succeed, it must go beyond parliament. Museveni is spending 18 hours every day planning how to get a third term. Those who want to block him need to devote as much time or even more. In this case, Pafo needs to go beyond parliament, and organise in churches, factories, gardens, schools, universities, markets, taxi and bus parks, shops and offices. Pafo and its constituent members should immediately begin to open branches in these areas. Schools and universities are the hotbeds for political organisation and activity. Let Pafo and its constituent member political organisations open branch offices in all the areas listed above. Without active political organisation and mobilisation, Ruzindana's claims that "we are on the right side of history" will be meaningless. Therefore, although Museveni has solidified the historical opposition, alienated the moderate and progressive Ugandans, isolated himself from the mainstream churches, divided the Movement and angered his international allies with his desire for a life presidency, he cannot be defeated only by goodwill. Only active political organisation and mobilisation will defeat him. |
© 2004 The Monitor Publications
The new MSN 8: smart spam protection and 2 months FREE* -------------------------------------------- This service is hosted on the Infocom network http://www.infocom.co.ug
