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July 18 - 24, 2004
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This is the second in our four-part serialisation of Prof. George W. Kanyeihamba’s book, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda: From 1894 to the Present. This instalment analyses the dramatic events that led Obote to detain five of his ministers in 1966: - The Conspiracies Notwithstanding that the ruling party, UPC, had poached KY and DP of members, the party soon found itself in trouble, generated from within. By 1965, the divisionist and traditionalist elements had penetrated the party, and acquired active supporters within the rank and file of the party followers.
Many voices, dissenting from the official line of the party, began to make themselves heard throughout the country. The party was torn by confusion because many of these voices belonged to some of the most influential leaders of the party. After the successful referendum and final transfer of the two “Lost Counties” to Bunyoro in 1964, the animosity of Buganda towards the Obote government and UPC escalated. Buganda traditionalists at Mengo, the capital of the kingdom, began to exploit all possible political angles in the country with the aim of undermining and eventually removing Obote from power. A political alliance between the Kabaka, his ministers and disgruntled elements within UPC was reached. The latter included and was led by the then Minister of Justice Grace Ibingira, who was at the same time the Secretary General of UPC. He had within his group of conspirators Balaki Kirya, George Magezi and Dr. Emmanuel Lumu, who were also Cabinet Ministers in Obote’s government. They had also recruited Mathias Ngobi, a prominent member of the opposition party, DP. The hope of the traditionalists was that this alliance was capable of overthrowing the government led by Milton Obote. This group constituted the first conspirators. In conjunction with the Mengo traditionalists and with the consent of the President, Edward Mutesa II, the King of Buganda, the conspirators approved the contents of a letter which was sent to Her Majesty, Elizabeth II, the Queen of the United Kingdom and Head of the Commonwealth, requesting her government to supply them with guns so that they could fight and overthrow Milton Obote from the government of Uganda. Her Majesty declined the request. The conspirators next turned to the British High Commission in Uganda and requested it to get in touch with British private firms of gun manufacturers and ask them to supply guns. Gailey and Roberts, gun manufacturers, were contacted but they too declined to assist the conspiracy but somehow through other means, which have not been revealed by anyone, the conspirators managed to get hold of some guns and ammunition. This first part of the conspiracy, which was purely military, was then truly set. The next stage of the conspiracy was political. King Mutesa and the first group of conspirators began to persuade others from the Central Government, Parliament and the opposition groups to join them in the mission of overthrowing the Obote government. Part of the plans to discredit that Government was for the Opposition group in Parliament to bring charges and allegations of corruption and abuse of power against Obote and his close associates so as to debate a motion of a Vote of No Confidence in Obote and pass it in Parliament. An interesting phenomenon developed. The same people who had been entrusted with the maintenance of the Westminster model of democracy in Uganda were now dissenting from their own party policies. Convention at Westminster required British politicians to disown themselves from the party and fight against it in the open. Only then could their dissent be legitimate and their stand credible. However, those in Uganda did not resign, either because they lacked the courage to do so, or because they thought that they would be more effective within rather than outside the party. They would eat their cake and have it at the same time. They continued to enjoy the privileges bestowed on them by the party: they kept their ministerial portfolios thus flattering the Prime Minister, while at the same time working secretly for his downfall. The feudalists and traditionalists who joined the conspiracy had thought that they had lost so much under Obote. The dignity and grandeur of traditionalism required a government that respected the rulers, chiefs and the proprietary rights of the privileged few in the country. The Obote Government was radical; at least, it claimed to be. From the policies it envisaged and the actions it took, the Obote Government was putting the common people above the traditional rulers and their henchmen. This trend had to be stopped by the creation of a government, which would owe allegiance to the country’s traditional groups rather than to the masses. The third conspiracy was supposed to be inspired and led by the Prime Minister himself. According to his accusers, who included Mutesa himself, this group had as their motives the destruction of the Independence Constitution, the establishment of a leftist dictatorship, the undermining of Uganda’s ancient traditions and customs and the takeover by the state of personal property which had been built through individual private enterprise. A study of the events at the time reveals sufficient evidence to suggest that the first and second conspiracies existed in one form or another. We shall discuss the third conspiracy first. There is no doubt that the UPC always claimed to be radical and socialist. All along, the party had claimed to represent the masses of Uganda rather than one region. It was natural, therefore, for them to oppose anything that was against the interests of those they represented. Obote and his ministers spoke against the rigidity of the constitution, which they saw as a hindrance against radical policies for change and development. The entrenched positions of the federal states became the targets of criticism by Obote and his followers for they were seen as problematical with regard to the building of one nation, which the party wanted. The party leadership complained about the wastage of maintaining costly palaces, estates and privileges for what it regarded as anachronistic monarchies. Consequently, if Obote and his Government intended to carry out these changes, it was inevitable that the constitution would change. However, was this a conspiracy? It is suggested that this was no more a conspiracy than the act when government changed the constitution whereby Uganda ceased to form part of Her Majesty’s dominions, or when the Governorship was abolished to be replaced by a Ugandan President, or when the powers of the traditional rulers were altered. These changes had been accepted by many Ugandans because they made Uganda more independent and were in keeping with her own peculiar needs. Conspirators are secretive by trade. They discuss in whispers and plot by night. They are afraid of being found out before their plans are put into operation. By contrast the Government or rather Obote and his colleagues, in the Uganda People’s Congress, did not hide their ideas. On the contrary, they debated them in public places, shouted them at political rallies and published them in the press and magazines. They were testing the ground and, at the same time, educating the public about unpopular and controversial issues, which they thought were good for the country. This is what is done in other democracies. *** A government can sometimes be wrong and it is possible for politicians to plot conspiracies, but it cannot be said that anyone who advocates change of an established institution, however unpopular that change may be, is a conspirator. On this account alone, Obote was not conspiring to overthrow the government of which he was the political head. However, an examination of available evidence on the first two conspiracies suggests that they did exist. Hitherto, the role of branding UPC as a radical and near-communist party had fallen on the Democratic Party, but was soon joined by some UPC members. At the Gulu Party Conference, for example, no less a person than the Secretary-General of the party, Grace Ibingira, participated in a move designed to expel one of the party’s leading radicals, John Kakonge, from the top leadership, on the grounds that he was too socialist. It has been seen that in their zeal to oust Obote from the Premiership, the dissenting elements within UPC joined forces with the traditionalists and opposition members to make concrete plans and to carry out manoeuvres for the deed. Apparently, sympathisers with these elements were carefully selected and recruited in the armed forces and arms and ammunitions began to arrive in the country with out the knowledge of the Government. There can be no doubt that these were the acts in a conspiracy. It is not certain whether the above arrangements were being made for a coup d’etat as the ultimate objective. This is slightly ruled out by the subsequent methods that were resorted to by the conspirators. It is likely that the recruitment of “loyalists” in the army and the importation of arms and ammunition were to be used for the maintenance of law and order by soldiers loyal to the conspirators once they had obtained power. The method chosen by the anti-Obote factions was a sophisticated one. The Government would be ousted from power “legally” by quasi-legitimate motions of debate and censure in the National Assembly. The famous, or infamous depending on one’s viewpoint, among the motions was one on the Gold Allegation. The Gold Allegation had as its theme, character-assassination of the leadership of UPC and its Government. Prima facie, the motion did not appear to involve issues of constitutional importance. It simply alleged that one Idi Amin, then a high-ranking officer in the Uganda Army as Deputy Commander at the time, had illegally acquired valuable property including gold, ivory, coffee and money from the Congo, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and that the same had been put to personal use and gain. However, the debate of the motion would develop in such a way that Idi Amin would not be the only culprit. Allegations would also embrace the Prime Minister himself and two of his Cabinet colleagues. It would be alleged that the gold was obtained to enrich those three leaders. It was to be shown that even if Idi Amin may have personally gained in that adventure by getting sums of money and promised the commandership of the army, the real beneficiaries of the loot were the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues. It was essential for the conspirators that the motion be moved with conviction and oratory. The convincing words would be found in the mouth of one Daudi Ocheng, and the oratory in his manner of delivery. Both the motion and its proposer were carefully and strategically chosen. The success of the motion would mean the constitutional downfall of the Obote Government, but before that moment, convincing evidence had to be found. Documents and witnesses had to be sought and produced. Ocheng was a non-Muganda, he was an Acholi. He belonged to the same ethnic group as Obote, Prime Minister. These two factors would lend credibility to the motion and would make it a lethal political weapon. In spite of his ethnic origin however, Ocheng, a personal friend of the Kabaka, was a traditionalist by culture and a feudalist by upbringing and conviction. He had gone to schools and spent most of his adult life in Buganda. He spoke Luganda fluently. He was known and trusted by the Buganda establishment so much so that he, a non-Muganda, was given the honour to represent the kingdom in the Uganda National Assembly. That fact alone was almost unique in Uganda politics, when one considers that the overwhelming majority of the members of the National Assembly represent their tribal areas. He was a good debater with a flair for political venom. The conspirators found him an ideal political instrument. But, he also personally, found in the motion an excellent opportunity to promote the interests of Buganda. The die was cast. The accused on their part had to prepare for the battle ahead. So it was done. It was a convention that whenever major political issues or policies of the Government or motions of great importance were to be introduced in the Assembly, the Uganda People’s Congress members of the Assembly House would meet, as a parliamentary group, to assess the situation. Accordingly, the group debated Ocheng’s motion, and, as it happened, it was unanimously agreed to reject it. That meant, among other things, that it would not be debated in the National Assembly. However, this was a motion of public importance, and the public would have demanded to know the truth of the matter. So reasons for rejection had to be given. Undoubtedly, the Prime Minister and his colleagues explained their position in the affair. And they seem to have satisfied all the members present, including some of the conspirators. There were two constitutional issues involved in the motion, and both had political connotations. Firstly, whatever might have been the truth, to debate the motion would have cast a shadow on the integrity of the Prime Minister and his colleagues. Indeed, there is no doubt that the public would have lost confidence in the Government. It must be remembered also that, by this time, the dissenters within UPC had become more vocal. Therefore, politically, the motion would have been disastrous to the ruling party, and no political party, however, democratic, wishes to commit political suicide if it can help it. Secondly, and more importantly, it was an open secret that the Uganda Government’s attitude to the then civil war in the Congo was am-bivalent. In public, the Government supported the legal regime of the Democratic Republic of Congo, but privately, and like her sister countries of Tanganyika and Kenya, she sympathised with the rebel leaders of the Eastern Province of the republic. It was, therefore, not unexpected for the East African Governments to give moral and material support to the rebels, including keeping in safe custody any property entrusted to them by the rebels. Indeed, the Prime Minister did not, at the meeting, deny that gold, ivory and other property might have found their way into Uganda. To have revealed this information, and the revelation was inevitable if the debate went ahead, would not have been in Uganda’s public interest. The country would have been accused by the Congolese legal regime of assisting its enemies. The accusation would have damaged Uganda’s international reputation besides creating an enemy on her border.
The Prime Minister and some other members of the National Assembly had occasion to go up-country, and this prompted the promoters of the motion to gather courage and to reassess the situation. Accordingly, the conspirators decided to revisit the Ocheng motion, but on this occasion, the Cabinet, rather than the parliamentary group, would consider it. Here, the enemy within the conspiracy members in the Cabinet would lead the debate for reversal of the parliamentary group’s earlier decision. So on the 4th of February 1966 the Cabinet met behind closed doors and the conspirators were able to trick their gullible colleagues into agreeing to the reversal. The UPC parliamentary group was not informed of the Cabinet’s decision until the afternoon of that same day, shortly before the motion was due to be de-bated in the National Assembly. That the Cabinet was legally entitled to meet in the absence of the Prime Minister is not in doubt but to reject the previous advice of their supporters in the Assembly was highly suspect. Moreover, by convention, they should not have accepted and debated such an important motion in the absence of the leader of the government who was in the country, and who, moreover, had advised against it. Politically, the Cabinet had blundered in ignoring the most influential members of the party, the parliamentary group. In fact, this amounted to a tacit withdrawal of confidence from the Prime Minister, and an attempt to rule without the party. According to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the Cabinet should have resigned since they fundamentally disagreed with their leader on a matter of great public interest. This might have forced the Prime Minister to recommend the dissolution of Parliament, but dissolution would not have satisfied those who were against him. The truth of the matter was that, under Obote, UPC had become the most attractive party in the country. The party had proved that it had the capacity to govern, and, an election following dissolution would most likely have resulted in a vote of confidence in the same government. Moreover, the election would have delayed the plans to remove Obote from office. The Cabinet members who supported the Prime Minister would not resign either. Obote was away and they were confused. Resignation might have meant that they were deserting him. In addition, it would have given his enemies ample oppor tunity to execute their plans without interruption. The knowledge that the Cabinet had somersaulted on the motion threw the UPC parliamentary group into a state of panic and confusion. If the group decided to oppose the motion, it would mean that the party was split in the middle. If they supported the motion, it would mean that the party doubted the integrity of their own leaders including the Prime Minister. Either way, they were bound to lose. Amid the confusion that ensued, the parliamentary group chose to save the unity of the party rather than the integrity of their leaders. The conspirators had won the battle, but not the war. The motion would at least be debated. The standard of debate was one of the highest ever witnessed in the National Assembly. This is ironic, for the motion under discussion was the lowest in inception and purpose because it was founded on conspiracy and treachery against the UPC leadership. Nevertheless, every speaker was charged with em otion, sensing victory or doom, depending on which side he supported. For the motion it was said by its mover and supporters thus, [Ocheng] “If I live a hundred years, or for a hundred hours only, this motion shall always be my greatest contribution to my country Uganda.” [Ibingira] “Our blood, the precious blood was shed because of this man and fellow conspirators so that they may get some gold...” [Abu Mayanja] “Supremacy of the law, and the long arms of the law are the principles at stake. In accepting this motion we approve and endorse both... But the other allegations of a plot to overthrow the Uganda Constitution is indeed very serious; its truth or its falsity I am not sure of either. It is therefore, only right that an investigation to expose their falsity or to establish their truth out, into them.” [Sam Odaka] “I challenge him to repeat these charges outside this House where libel is a subject of court action and damage... I am willing to resign from the ministerial post on one condition alone, that Ocheng, or one of you repeats the accusations anywhere outside the House.” [Kakonge] “Might acceptance of the motion not imply that this very House had accepted accusations against our Premier and two of his ministers? Clarity is of the essence, much more so for sound reasons... Thus, for the first time, this House has seen ministers clash here. It has seen ministers talk and reveal what they should not. Judging by the trend of these unusual occurrences, we are going to the dogs, we are heading for trouble...It is said that one group of ministers are supporting Opolot to topple the Government and they regard Amin as a stumbling block to them and hence all this big outcry for his removal forthwith. Mr. Speaker, this debate is of the lowest standard. Rumours, hearsay and falsehood are being aired from this House. I have taken up the cue and I have said all that I have heard.... Implementing this motion is no solution at all. Only one thing can save us. Firm and very firm action by the Uganda Government. “ Others spoke. This notwithstanding, the motion was passed with one dissenting voice, that of John Kakonge. Uganda was thrown into the darkness of utter confusion. Instead of central direction of purpose, the nation witnessed the chaotic situation with every statement and action based on rumours, innuendo and guesswork. Uncertainty replaced stability. The leaders who had been entrusted with the Government of Uganda had decided to divide it. This was one moment in their history, when Ugandans felt they were leaderless. There were people who believed that the Prime Minister would resign. Some people contemplated his flight from the country and yet others went so far as to advise that power of Government should be handed over to the army. But the Prime Minister was doing none of these things. He took some time to return to the capital. After the passing of the motion, the House ordered the immediate suspension of Idi Amin from the Army and the holding of an inquiry into his bank account. The decision by itself was not constitutionally important. Its importance lay in what was implied. A slur had been put on the character and integrity of the Prime Minister and two of his cabinet colleagues. In supporting the motion, the Cabinet had appeared to endorse the allegations of corruption. As one speech followed another, in the National Assembly, it must have been obvious even to the admirers and supporters of Obote that the die was cast. The tide of political power was flowing to the advantage of the conspirators. The Obote loyalists tried to defend him but they were doing so against heavy odds. The passing of the motion was a curtain raiser to the bigger issues that were to follow. The nation was tense with expectation. Everyone waited anxiously for the next move, and more importantly, for the person who would make the move. Speculatively, the then President could have taken the first constitutional step following the passing of the motion. Under the Independence Constitution, the President was empowered to remove the Prime Minister, if the latter had lost support of the National Assembly. Constitutionally, the President might have removed the Prime Minister from office and invited one of the conspirators to form a new government. That this alternative was not considered saved Uganda from the catastrophe of a civil war. There is little doubt that the country’s leadership was divided on the motion and that each faction might have found support in the country and in the army. The inability of President Mutesa to act does not mean that he considered the possibility of a civil war. On the contrary, through his own writing later, it is known that he detested Milton Obote and would have welcomed his downfall through any means. The failure to resort to the constitutional procedure by the President would indicate that he was privy to other methods of removal, which were considered more effective. In his book, The Uganda Crisis, Akena Adoko speculates that after the passing of the motion, the conspirators planned to remove the Prime Minister by assassination. The idea of assassination sounds more plausible when other prevailing factors at the time are considered. Firstly, not many UPC members of Parliament believed that their leader was guilty of corruption as alleged even though most wished to see the allegations investigated. Secondly, the position of the army was doubtful. It must have been obvious to the conspirators that most of the troops were loyal to Obote. Therefore, had the President made a constitutional attempt to remove the Prime Minister from office any new regime might have found it problematical in establishing legitimacy in the country. On the other hand, if Obote was assassinated the situation would have been easier to control. He would have left behind no other person of the same political stature. He would have died with the stigma of corruption still attached to his name. In politics it is not worthwhile to take a momentous decision unless it is followed by an action, which will be guaranteed a fair amount of success which success, moreover, must be backed by political power. There was uncertainty still as to which side the army would support. In Kampala, the Prime Minister denied the allegations and vigorously defended his character and the integrity of his other accused colleagues. Many of his supporters who had, like lost sheep, wavered amid the confusing events, began to rally to his side and show how loyal they had been. Some suggested means to reach a solution. Later on, the Cabinet met and the Prime Minister challenged any of his colleagues who believed in the allegations to resign from the Government. None did. Subsequently, the Cabinet decided to appoint a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate the allegations. To ensure impartiality, no lesser persons than High Court Judges of the neighbouring countries of Tanganyika and Kenya were appointed to be members of the Commission. There has been a great deal of speculation about the contents of the Commission’s report, which was never published while Obote was still in power. However, the evidence that was received in public by the Commission, the behaviour of some of the key witnesses to the Commission, and the number of revelations which have been made by many people who were closely connected with the events leave little doubt that the Prime Minister was telling the truth or that a great deal pertaining to the allegations had been merely speculative. The critics of the Obote government were ready to say that the report was not published because it contained the truth of what was alleged. On the other hand, those who supported his government maintain that what was revealed in the public hearings exonerates those who were accused and publication of the full report was withheld because it would not have been in the public interest to do so because of the Government’s ambivalent policy towards the DRC already alluded to. In view of what has already been said in this chapter, and what the members of the Commission said, the latter view seems to be more plausible. During the few days following the Premier’s return, revelations were made as to who was behind the plan to overthrow the government. It was alleged that a number of soldiers and officers were being trained to stage a coup d’etat. On the 22nd of February 1966, the Prime Minister called in advisers and decided to arrest the situation. It was decided that the members of the Cabinet who had been actively engaged in the plot to overthrow their own Government should be arrested and deported. A Cabinet meeting was summoned for seemingly routine business, but for the plotters, who included the [five] ministers implicated in the conspiracy to remove Obote from office, it would be the last Cabinet meeting they would attend for a very long time, if ever. Two days later, the Prime Minister suspended the Independence Constitution, abolished the post of the President and Vice-President; and assumed the powers of Government *** The Prime Minister’s act was obviously unconstitutional. From the day the Constitution was suspended, until the 15th April 1966, when a new constitution was passed by Parliament, Uganda was ruled by a de facto rather than a de jure government. In the meantime, following the suspension of the Constitution, the country experienced instability and feared the establishment of dictatorial rule by decree. However, on the 24th of February 1966, the Government approved the Prime Minister’s action; and nearly two months later, the Prime Minister laid before the National Assembly proposals for a new constitution, thus bringing to an end the Independence Constitution and ushering in the 1966 Constitution. Analysing the events of that period, and the provisions of the 1966 Constitution, the Independence Constitution of 1962 was neither suspended nor abolished. What happened was that only those parts, which dealt with executive powers and Head of Government, were altered in order to merge the post of the President with that of the Prime Minister and create an Executive President. However, the changes also brought to an end the federal form of government and gave the N ational Assembly considerably more powers than those it had enjoyed under the 1962 Constitution. The rest of the constitutional provisions were unaffected. Serialisation continues next Sunday with a most fascinating account and analysis of the Lule government, in which the author served. Book published by Centenary Publishing House, Kampala, 2002 |
© 2004 The Monitor Publications
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